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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines Hezbollah’s transition into a regional armed non-state actor (ANSA). 
Specifically, how did this transition happen? To unpack this puzzle, this thesis studies 
Hezbollah’s maneuvers in multiple theatres: Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, and 
focuses on its operations in Syria. The civil war in Syria, this thesis considers, and its 
spillovers across the region, was the conduit for Hezbollah’s transition. It argues that its 
engagement in Syria’s turmoil was a war of necessity. More importantly, three variables 
underpinned the transition: Hezbollah’s sectarian mobilization and instrumentalization of 
its sectarian identity, the shift of into a quasi-army mixing between classical and guerilla 
tactics and formations, and its embed as a partner in the axis that now extends from Beirut 
to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad. Hezbollah intervened in Syria to prevent the 
collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and emerged triumphant on the regional scene. 
That said, the year 2018 provided a set of conditions, impossible to reproduce, that 
allowed Hezbollah to reach its apogee on both the domestic and regional theatres. In 
sum, the implication of this thesis to the field is straightforward: ANSAs are playing 
prominent roles in the regional order in the Middle East, and Hezbollah, for instance, has 
helped tilt the power balance during Syria’s civil war in favor of the regime and its main 
regional partner, Iran. Further, it added to the sectarianism debate arguing that Hezbollah 
instrumentalized its sectarian identity and adopted a sectarian mobilization policy for what 
was in fact a regional geopolitical contest. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Focusing on the Middle East has its own particularism, providing rich and eloquent 
material for researchers and never failing their academic journeys. It is “the chrysalis of 
three of the world’s great religions”, the land of the holy wars where empires have risen 
and fallen, the region where “every form of domestic and international order has existed, 
and been rejected, at one time or another” (Kissinger, 2014, p.96). Raymond Hinnebusch 
(2015) opined that “the Middle East is arguably the epi-center of world crisis, chronically 
war-prone and the site of the world’s most protracted conflicts” (p.1). Of course, conflicts 
are not an exclusivity for the Middle East but the latter has always been volatile and 
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seldom stable. Amid a changing world order throughout the 20th century, the region has 
endured seismic ordeals such as the Tripartite Aggression War conducted by Israel, 
France and the United Kingdom (UK) against Egypt, the Lebanese civil war, and the first 
and second Gulf Wars. Among the myriad events that engulfed the 20th century Middle 
East, three were paramount to the regional order: World War I and its aftermath, namely 
the Sikes-Picot agreement and the de facto states that were implemented; the 1948 
declaration of the State of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli wars; the Islamic revolution 
in Iran and its regional implications.  
A pray for domestic, sub-regional, regional and international powers and 
competing ideologies and agendas, there is no room for harmony in the Middle East and 
any peace process is bound to fail. As the 21st century opened with the draconian 9/11 
bloodshed culminating in the 2003 Iraq invasion by the US and the Arab Uprisings less 
than a decade later, the Middle East will likely remain unstable in the foreseeable future. 
These latter events caused the biggest waves of unrest with short and long-term 
ramifications. Not only did they destabilize the region, but also led to the resurface of 
sectarian identities and tensions. The rise of sectarianism, according Morten Valbjørn & 
Raymond Hinnebusch (2019), is a vital topic in the study of the modern Middle East. The 
power vacuum caused by the decrease in states’ influence made them prone to 
contestation between regional powers hoping to fill the void and tilt the balance of power 
in their favor. Pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, these powers 
instrumentalized sectarian identities and adopted a sectarian mobilization agenda in a 
biting game to limit the influence of their rivals: While Sunni regimes such as Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar supported Sunni groups, Iran sponsored Shi‘a factions.  
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This situation deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a schism and the confrontations in countries 
such as Iraq and Syria were falsely framed as sectarian while it was in fact a geopolitical 
contest driven by the interplay of domestic, regional and international rivalries and 
sectarian relations were one among an array of factors that exacerbated the conflict, 
namely driven by the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry. Haddad (2020) stressed that “the 
intersection of sectarian identity and Arab-Iranian rivalry has seen regional strategy 
instrumentalizing markers of sectarian identity to foster sectarian solidarity and 
mobilization by portraying geopolitical issues as existential threats confronting all Sunni 
and Shiʿa (p.116).” Moreover, the post-Saddam Iraq and post-Arab Uprisings 
environments witnessed the unleash of terrorist groups stretching from Abou Mos‘ab al 
Zarkawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq to Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Da‘esh or the Islamic State (ISIS) 
in Iraq and Syria. In fact, the Arab Uprisings, a groundswell of rebellions that engulfed 
North Africa and the Middle East since the end of 2010, were expected to bring change, 
democracy, peace and economic prosperity, but instead, they brought more instability, 
authoritarianism, starvation, calamity and anarchy. 
Having said that, Marc Lynch (2018) argued that the traditional powers in the 
Middle East are barely operative. States’ weakness and failure shifted power to a new 
operational level which functions through “influence peddling and proxy warfare”, and 
regional powers delved into alternative encounters: the proxy confrontations.1 These 
dynamics provided more room for the rise of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) which have 
thrived in the Middle East since the 20th century and helped shape the regional order. For 
                                                
1 Lynch, Marc (September 2018). The New Arab Order. Retrieved from: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new-arab-order 
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instance, the US and its Middle Eastern allies adopted a proxy confrontation agenda to 
counterbalance the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s by supporting Islamist fighters 
who later formed al-Qaeda. Subsequently, the latter marked the US as its primary target 
and executed a lethal attack on 9/11/2001 killing thousands of Americans. Next, George 
Bush’s administration launched a campaign against al-Qaeda by invading Afghanistan 
and later on Iraq in order to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime. Furthermore, in 2014, a 
group of terrorists occupied vast territories in Iraq and Syria and announced the reign of 
Da‘esh (ISIS). The emergence of a Sunni jihadist organization that spread hatred against 
all sects, including Sunnis who refused to obey it, and butchered people for apostasy 
facilitated the mobilization of fighters to join anti-ISIS armed groups. These were mainly 
Shi‘a groups who formed al-Hashd al Sha’bi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF), with the 
assistance of Iran, and to a lesser extent, Hezbollah, to prevent ISIS’s forays. These 
groups were predominantly Shi‘a but they were also joined by Christians, Yazidis and 
Turkmen (Dylan O’Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen, 2017, p.37). In the ensuing months, 
ISIS’s mischief-making took the world’s attention and pressed the US and its western 
allies to train, arm and equip the Kurds, namely the People’s Protection Units (YPG), in 
Iraq and Syria in order to fight ISIS on the ground. Moreover, it established an 
international coalition which focused on launching aerial attacks on ISIS.  
The point to make here is that states contesting for international and regional 
influence have adopted a proxy warfare paving the way for the emergence of ANSAs. Not 
only does such support provide regional gains, but it also gives the sponsor states more 
room on the negotiation table and for plausible deniability had any covert operation been 
discovered. And as shown above the rise of ANSAs and their margin of maneuvers were 
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paramount to the regional balance of power, sometimes more than states. Therefore, this 
thesis will tackle the role of perhaps one of the most iconoclastic and important ANSAs in 
the Middle East, Hezbollah. While it will examine its role in the Lebanese theatre, it will 
focus on its operations in Syria during the civil war. It will elaborate how Hezbollah played 
a major role in tilting the power balance during the Syrian conflict by helping prevent the 
close collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Most importantly, it will unpack how Syria’s 
conflict, a war of necessity for Hezbollah, has transitioned it into a regional ANSA. 
It is necessary to mention here that on 16 February 1985, in its open letter 
addressed to the world, Hezbollah officially announced itself a resistance, not only against 
the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, but also of Palestine (Joseph Alagha, 2011, p.5). This 
group of fighters adopted a sectarian mobilization agenda by instrumentalizing its Shi‘a 
identity and sect-specific symbols. Then, Hezbollah had emerged as an organization 
bellicose and eager to fight the Israelis through guerilla tactics – hit-and-run with small 
units. In the ensuing decades, the Lebanese organization witnessed intellectual, military 
and political transformations. First, Hezbollah grudgingly realized the inconveniency of 
creating an Islamic State in a multisectarian society such as Lebanon and therefore, from 
rejecting the Lebanese system and debunking it, Hezbollah caved to the status quo. As 
this leitmotif became obviously doomed, Hezbollah sought to adapt by pursing an 
“openness policy” and decided to run for the parliamentary elections in 1992 on cross-
sectarian lists (Alagha, 2006, p.169). Second, during that decade, Hezbollah faced two 
major clashes with the Israelis: The July 1993 Operation Accountability and the April 1996 
Operation Grapes of Wrath; which it endured and gained further credibility among the 
Lebanese citizens. On 25 May 2000, Israel departed from South Lebanon and Hezbollah 
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was credited for the liberation although other groups had also fought the Israelis in earlier 
stages. Third, the departure of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) from Lebanon in 2005 
pressing Hezbollah, for the first time, to participate in the government to fill the power 
vacuum left behind. Forth, the 33 days of war in 2006 against Israel making it an essential 
military force and a player in the regional order. Fifth, and most important, Syria’s civil war 
that embedded Hezbollah as a partner in the axis that extends from Iran to Lebanon, via 
Syria, and more recently Iraq, and shifted it into a regional ANSA. 
By and large, Hezbollah’s fate is pegged to Iran and the latter’s sponsorship is 
paramount for the former’s endurance. This relationship is mutually beneficial: Hezbollah 
implements Iran’s agenda and provides it with regional leverage and in return, Iran helps 
Hezbollah stand against Israel and amplify its domestic, and more recently, regional clout. 
In conjunction with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah spearheaded 
the bolster of Palestinian factions since early 1990s, and in post-Saddam Iraq it 
participated in assisting and training Iraqi Shi‘a groups, such as Badr Organization in 
order to fight the US and increase Iran’s influence. This role was followed later by the 
formation of the PMF after ISIS’ emergence in 2014. In 2012, as Syria was disintegrating 
into chaos and while the opposition fighters were closing up on Damascus, Hezbollah’s 
highly equipped and well trained fighters started their gradual engagement in their bid to 
prevent the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. “The intervention”, Saouli (2019) 
emphasized, “was gradual and dictated by the changing military balance on the ground. 
The weaker the regime and the higher the threat of its fall became, the more Hezbollah 
stepped in to fill the void and to offer the necessary backing” (p.190).  
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At the outset, Hezbollah’s sectarian identity and discourse served as a 
mobilizational tool for what was in fact an intervention in a geopolitical confrontation that 
risked tilting the power balance in its rivals’ favor. Fanar Haddad (2020) argued that 
“religion as doctrine is not needed to make ‘religious conflict’; it is far more likely for such 
conflicts to be driven by religion as identity– in other words, religion less as a metaphysical 
truth and more as a marker of group solidarities and group boundaries” (p.51-52). 
Therefore, doctrinal truth does not explain the causality of the conflict, but Hezbollah’s 
politicization of sectarian identity and sect-centric symbols and sectarian mobilization 
policy were needed to justify its intervention. While Haddad (2020) stressed that “political 
instrumentalization of sectarian identities is not always malign nor is fostering division 
always the aim” (p.97), Hezbollah participated in deepening the Sunni-Shi‘a schism and 
in parallel, was demonized by its Sunni rivals.  
In June 2013, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, raised the stakes 
by accusing foreign powers of conspiring against the “axis of resistance” –Iran, Syria, 
Hezbollah and other pro-Iran factions. “Wherever we must be,” Nasrallah underlined, “we 
will be”2. By other words, this was a green light to unleash Hezbollah’s fighters all over 
Syria. Pursuing an increasingly offensive policy, Hezbollah’s troops helped tip the power 
balance in Assad’s favor and their intervention proved to be a game changer. Further 
afield, this discourse provided an evidence that Hezbollah’s primary motive was to defend 
its geopolitical interest in Syria but the sectarian card was merely a mobilizational tool at 
the outset. The conflict has also shifted Hezbollah into a quasi-army that mixed between 
                                                
2 Middle East Observer. (20 June 2013). “Hezbollah’s Nasrallah on Syria: wherever we 
must be we will be”. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUkKcEfDehI 
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guerilla and classical army formations and tactics, and embedded it as a partner and a 
decision-maker in the axis. These factors were key to Hezbollah’s increasing influence 
and its transition into a regional ANSA during Syria’s cataclysmic conflict.  
This paper will unpack an era in Hezbollah’s history that witnessed major shifts 
extending from 2004-05 until the 2018 Lebanese parliamentary elections. During this 
period of time, Hezbollah has enmeshed itself in regional tumults from Damascus to 
San‘a, through Baghdad and Jerusalem, accelerating its shift to a regional ANSA. The 
paper will tackle these events along with an explanation of Hezbollah’s emergence, but 
will primarily focus on its engagement in Syria’s civil war. In February 2010, Assad held 
a presidential dinner in the presence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then Iran’s president, 
and Nasrallah. As matter of fact, Nasrallah’s presence among two presidents was a 
recognition that Hezbollah has become a partner and a decision-maker in the axis even 
before the beginning of the Syrian conflict. However, the civil war was the turning point in 
this partnership and provided a damning proof that it is a partner rather than a surrogate 
for both Iran and Syria. More to the point, in order to explain Hezbollah’s transition into a 
regional ANSA, three factors will be emphasized: The instrumentalization of its sectarian 
identity, the transformation into a quasi-army and its partnership in the axis and 
participation in the decision-making process. 
Palpably, Hezbollah has become one of the most effective ANSAs in the Middle 
East. The overarching aim of this thesis is to survey Hezbollah’s transition into a regional 
ANSA and present Hezbollah as a case study to stress that ANSAs are key to the regional 
order. For our purposes, it will focus on Hezbollah’s political and military role in Syria’s 
conflict. The paper will elaborate how sectarian identity and mobilization were deployed 
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as a tool in the geopolitical contest on regional canvas. The conflict was a war of necessity 
for Hezbollah as it risked losing a strategic ally had Assad’s regime collapsed. Christopher 
Phillips (2018) argued that “Hezbollah faced a grave, even existential threat should Assad 
be toppled. Syria provided it with strategic depth, including the essential supply to Iran, 
and legitimacy: The Syrian-Iranian alliance was presented as part of a wider resistance 
on behalf of all Muslims and Arabs against Israel and the West. Like Iran, it feared a 
Sunni-dominated regime emerging in Damascus, but with further domestic reason: it 
might shift Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance in favor of Sunnis, at the expense of the 
Shiʿa and Hezbollah” (p.157).  This thesis will emphasize that it is likely that the chaos in 
the Middle East will endure and peace is hardly reachable, namely because sectarian 
relations are a central driver of political contest and sectarianism will not end in the 21st 
century.  
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis is guided by the following question: What effect did the Syrian conflict 
on the transition of Hezbollah into a regional ANSA? While exploring this question it will 
offer a short history, not only about the emergence of Hezbollah, but most importantly of 
the rise of the Shi‘a in Lebanon. This is necessary so that readers do not misstep this rise 
by confining it to the establishment of Hezbollah. The paper will explain Hezbollah’s 
relationship vis-à-vis Iran and then move to scrutinize the former’s operations on the 
domestic theatre, stretching from its emergence in 1982 to the first transition, dubbed 
“infitah policy”. For our purposes, it will explain the international pressure that pushed 
towards implementing the 1559, a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
demanding the departure of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the disarmament of all 
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militias –in reference to Syria and Hezbollah, respectively, and the subsequent 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, former Prime Minister, followed by mass demonstrations 
demanding the departure of the SAA from the country. Granted a mandate over the 
country since the 1989 Ta’if agreement that ended the civil war’s hostilities, Syria 
withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 leaving behind a power vacuum that Hezbollah had to fill. 
These events marked the beginning of a new political order in Lebanon and a new era, 
stretching from 2004-05 to May 2018, which this thesis will study. 
Further afield, on the regional level, it will unpack Hezbollah’s operations in 
Palestine, Iraq, Yemen and most importantly, Syria. The engagement in the Syrian 
conflict enmeshed Hezbollah in a geopolitical contest that was the conduit of its transition 
into a regional ANSA. In fact, if anything, ANSAs have become unavoidable political and 
military players in the Middle East regional order and therefore this thesis will examine 
Hezbollah as a case study to provide in-depth understanding and analysis about the 
skyrocketing clout of one of an array of ANSAs in the region. That said, it will emphasize 
that Hezbollah’s transition was paralleled with its operations in conjunction with other 
major regional powers, chiefly Iran and Syria. Its engagement in the latter’s chaotic civil 
war in 2012 was a choice of necessity to undermine would-be regional threat had Assad’s 
regime collapsed. This transition was driven by three main variables: Hezbollah’s 
sectarian mobilization and instrumentalization of sectarian identity, the tilt into a quasi-
army and its partnership in the axis. This somewhat imposed Hezbollah as a regional 
ANSA that cannot be overlooked by Middle East scholars, journalists, and even casual 
observers. 
	 18	
It is necessary to mention here that the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
in 1979 has encouraged it to adopt a foreign policy of power projection. More to the point, 
one of its primary successes was the establishment of Hezbollah. “Understanding the 
impact of state sponsorship on the decision-making of non-state armed actors is among 
the most important issues to scholars of security studies” (DeVore, 2012). The Iran-
Hezbollah relationship has been mutually beneficial. While Naim Qassem (2005) argued 
that Hezbollah detected an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Iran upon its foundation 
in order to gain support and achieve its purpose and aspiration (p.235), Iran benefited 
from this relationship to increase its regional clout through Hezbollah’s proxy roles. 
DeVore (2012) stressed that the organization’s decision-making was directly and 
indirectly shaped by Iran due to the sponsorship of the latter. Jordan Schachtel (2015) 
also argued that “Hezbollah has 80000 missiles” that it could unleash into Israel if Iran is 
attacked by the latter. That said, it is hard to escape the fact that Hezbollah will retaliate 
if Iran came under attack.  
Generally speaking, proxies receive aids, funds and training to serve directly and 
indirectly the interest of the country that is offering them support. Devore (2012) claimed 
that “governments seek to have foreign policy interests through their relationships with 
armed non-state actors”. The Iranian strategy, he pursued, is to use Hezbollah as a proxy 
as “they convinced the party to include high value targets on the hit list and attack the 
enemies”. Shoghig Mikaelian and Bassel Salloukh (2015) argued that Iran was balancing 
against the US and Israel’s threat by using its proxies, chiefly Hezbollah. Moreover, Scott 
Stewart (2010) reasoned that Iran used Hezbollah and its other proxies in Latin America 
to threaten the US. As a matter of fact, people related to Hezbollah were arrested in 
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numerous countries in south America and southwest Asia. Indeed, the US department 
had always claimed that Hezbollah is directing cells in Latin America, Africa, Europe and 
Asia (Masters Jonathan & Zachary Laub, 2014). “On 17 March 1992, Hezbollah 
operatives supported by the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires attacked the Israeli 
Embassy in that city with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device killing 29 people 
and injuring hundreds more” (Stewart, 2010). “Hezbollah’s outside branch is accused of 
staging a number of attacks against Jewish targets, most recently against Israeli tourists 
in Burgas, Bulgaria on 18 July 2012” (Mikaelian & Salloukh, 2015). These indictments 
were valid, however, Hezbollah has matured and rationalized. Therefore, it has 
undergone a behavioral change in the 1990s and such activities started waning.  
Furthermore, as will be explained in chapter 3, Iran was not the key drive behind 
the emergence of Shi‘a activism in Lebanon. Rather, it exploited the rise of the Shi‘a to 
organize a group of zealous Islamist fighters under one organization which came to be 
known as Hezbollah. Suffice it to say here that the ground was fertile for the emergence 
of such an Islamist jihadist group, especially after the Israeli invasion and decades of 
marginalization of Shi‘a rural areas. Of course, from Iran’s side this was the perfect 
opportunity to expand its regional influence. Thereafter, the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries marked serious attempts to create what was called a Shi‘a Crescent from 
Tehran to Beirut. Iranian ambitions had been confronted by regional powers, however. 
Further afield, the post-2003 Iraq and post-Arab Uprisings environment has witnessed 
further implementations of sectarian identities deepening the Sunni-Shi‘a split and 
causing a blood bath in many Arab countries. For our purposes, Hezbollah has politicized 
its sectarian identity and played the sectarian card for what was in fact a geopolitical 
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contest. Chaos in the Middle East seemed to have served Iran and Hezbollah as they 
both became operational in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen trying to take the 
lion’s share of the political vacuum in these collapsing states. Tilting the regional power 
balance in its rivals’ favor, namely Saudi Arabia, would have weakened Tehran and by it, 
Hezbollah. With time, “Hezbollah has transformed itself from a little-known, secretive 
apparatus founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards into one of the most powerful non-
state domestic actors in Lebanon and a major player in the regional politics” (Shoghig 
Mikaelian and Bassel Salloukh, 2016). 
The biting game between Iran and Saudi Arabia increased in 2012 with Iran 
sending its proxies to protect Bashar al-Assad’s regime from collapse, and the 
Revolutionary Guard assuming a new role in Syria (Salloukh, 2014). At the outset, 
Hezbollah’s units, in tandem with Iraqi and Afghani Shi‘a groups such as ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-
Haqq, headed to protect Sayyida Zeinab’s Mosque, a Shi‘a Iraqi shrine in Damascus’ 
suburbs, against the attacks of Sunni Islamist factions which pledge to destroy it once 
captured. This was paralleled with their assertive engagement on the Lebanese-Syrian 
borders to defend Shi‘a villages which were under attack by rebel groups. These sectarian 
bickering provided Hezbollah with the perfect justification and helped it adopt a sectarian 
mobilization agenda ahead of its full-scale intervention in Syria’s conflict. This does not 
mean, however, that the conflict was driven by sectarian identity or sectarian truth was a 
key driver. Rather, these were merely a mobilizational tool to serve their geopolitical 
agendas. The discourse, however, changed over time and Nasrallah argued that 
“Hezbollah’s activities in Syria are meant to ensure that Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr 
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al-Baghdadi will not repeat in Lebanon what he did in Iraq”3. This is plainly not the case, 
however. Hezbollah engaged before the emergence of ISIS and the mayhem it spread 
across the region but from Hezbollah’s supporters point of view this was a pre-emptive 
measure that proved to be righteous. Used as a route to transfer weapons from Tehran 
to Beirut, it became clear that Iran could not afford losing Syria to its political rivals and 
risk a flip in the regional balance of power in its rivals’ favor. In June 2013, after 
Nasrallah’s reverberating speech stressing that “wherever we must be, we will be”4, a 
new military and political balance was put in place. From that moment onwards, 
Hezbollah’s fighters increasingly spread all over Syria helping the SAA recapture areas 
that had been lost to the opposition.  
The twenty first century provided a set of conditions, surely impossible to 
reproduce, that allowed Hezbollah to increase its influence domestically and regionally. 
With the unfolding of Syria’s conflict in 2018, Hezbollah had emerged as a regional ANSA. 
Rather than offering a history of the events that led to this transition, this thesis will answer 
questions such as: when and why did Hezbollah shift to a regional ANSA? Under what 
conditions did this transition occur? What was Iran’s role in this shift? Was Syria an 
opportunity that the organization had long awaited or was it an unescapable 
confrontation? What about Hezbollah’s military arsenal? How did Syria’s civil war 
establish it as a quasi-army? What effect did the rise of sectarianism have on the 
organization? How and where did it insturumentalize its sectarian identity and adopted 
                                                
3 “Nasrallah: Hezbollah Fighting in Syria to Prevent Zionist, US Hegemony”, The 
Jerusalem Post, 11 March 2014. 
4Al-Jazeera. (2013) Hezbollah leader vows to continue Syria fight. Retrieved from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/20136141719617527.html 
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sectarian mobilization agenda? How did it become a partner in the axis? Will Hezbollah 
limit itself to Lebanon in the future?  
1.3 Map of thesis 
Chapter 2 will start by locating this thesis within a theoretical framework. It will 
argue that various organizations have undergone a transition but each in its own terms 
and conditions. For that it will give many examples of organizations that experienced 
these transitions such as Hamas and Fatah. Then it will tackle the literature vis-à-vis 
Hezbollah. It will debate the previous works that have focused on Hezbollah who mostly 
focused on its emergence, confrontations with Israel, its first transition in the 1990s and 
its engagement in the Lebanese systems. However, although some works were 
exceptional and mentioned Hezbollah’s regional role, this chapter will emphasize that the 
work in this thesis is original as it will focus mainly on Hezbollah’s regional maneuvers 
with minor interest in the Lebanese theatre. It will also assure that ANSAs, such as 
Hezbollah, are playing vital roles in the Middle East regional order and more attention 
should be given to these actors. The chapter will end by explaining the methodology that 
this thesis will adopt which is a qualitative methodology and use primary and secondary 
resources such as online database, in-depth interviews and field work. This theoretical 
chapter will locate this thesis within the literature before delving into studying Hezbollah 
in the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 will address the rise of the Shi‘a as part of the emergence of Islamism 
in the Middle East following the demise of Pan-Arabism. In parallel, a small Shi‘a 
community was spreading across Lebanon and participating in the political activism. From 
this background, namely spearheaded by al-Da‘wa party and the less religious Amal 
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movement, Hezbollah surfaced. Its emergence and maneuvers will be tackled in this 
chapter, along with its allegiance to the wilayat al-faqih, a religious concept implemented 
by Ayatollah Khomeini after the triumph of the 1979 revolution. In coordination and bolster 
by the IRGC, namely the Quds Force, Hezbollah was established to fight against Israel’s 
occupation in Lebanon. The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is fourfold, as this 
chapter will show: religious, political, military and financial. The Lebanese organization’s 
labeling as terrorist or resistance will be elaborated and both points of view will be 
attempted. The point of this chapter is to shed light to key moments in the history not only 
of Hezbollah but also to the rise of the Shi‘a. 
Chapter 4 will study the maneuvers of Hezbollah in the Lebanese theatre from 
2004 until 2018. But first, it will explain Hezbollah’s “infitah policy” during which the soft-
liners prevailed within the organization leading to the subsequent participation in the 
Lebanese parliamentary elections. Then, the chapter will unpack the fears of a conspiracy 
against Hezbollah following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, former Prime Minister, 
whose murder was later attributed to Hezbollah. Moreover, it feared of the full 
implementation of the 1559 United Nations Security Council Resolution which tacitly 
demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the disarmament of Hezbollah. These 
transformative domestic events pressed Hezbollah to engage in the cabinet in 2005, the 
first post-Syria withdrawal cabinet. The chapter will also tackle the “Memorandum of 
Understanding”, an agreement signed by Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary 
general, and Michel Aoun, then leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and later 
president. This was few months prior to the 33 days’ war in July 2006 between Hezbollah 
and Israel. It will be highlighted how Hezbollah conducted a cross-border raid and 
	 24	
kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, and killed 6 others, hoping to exchange them for the 
remaining inmates in Israeli prison. Israel, however, retaliated fiercely and hostilities 
gradually disintegrated into a full-scale war during which Hezbollah, unexpectedly, proved 
its ability to play a key role in altering the balance of power in the region. 
Consequently, the chapter will elucidate the political stalemate that engulfed 
Lebanon from 2006 until 2008 dividing the country along the dichotomy of 8 March 
alliance –pro-Syria, and Aoun’s FPM, vs 14 March alliance – anti-Syria. This political 
deadlock was paralleled by demonstrations and a sit-in in Beirut by Hezbollah and its 
allies demanding the resignation of the pro-west government. On 7 May, clashes erupted 
between both sides and Hezbollah fighters and their allies, quickly took Beirut. The wound 
was sealed by Qatari mediation in what called the “Doha agreement”. The chapter will 
then elaborate about the presidential election which brought Aoun to the highest position 
in Lebanon and the offensive dubbed “En ‘Odtom ‘Odna” (if you’re back we’re back) by 
Hezbollah on the Lebanese-Syrian borders. The chapter will conclude by unpacking the 
6 May parliamentary 2018 elections which leveraged Hezbollah and its allies by securing 
the majority of the seats. These rising clout of Hezbollah on the domestic scene was 
coupled with its increasing regional influence. More to the point, the interplay between the 
domestic and regional theatres was necessary for Hezbollah’s transition into a regional 
ANSA. 
Chapter 5 will analyze Hezbollah’s maneuvers beyond the Lebanese theatre. It will 
first unpack its proxy role vis-à-vis Iran in Palestine and Iraq. The Palestinian portfolio is 
Hezbollah’s raison d’être but without Iran’s bolster, it would have not been able to provide 
the Palestinian factions with the support they need. It will argue, however, that Palestinian 
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factions, which happened to be Sunnis, are partially part of the axis because the pressure 
that burdened them during the rise of sectarianism amid Syria’s civil war distanced them 
from their allies in the axis. It will examine Hezbollah’s proxy role in post-Saddam Iraq 
where it executed Tehran regional agenda by helping establish Shi‘a ideological replicas 
under Iran’s supervision. Above all, it will emphasize Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria’s 
civil war which was a war of necessity. In its bid to prevent the collapse of Bashar al-
Assad’s regime, Hezbollah intervene in Syria through al-Qusayr, on the Lebanese-Syrian 
border, and Damascus’s suburbs. It justified this engagement by a sectarian narrative 
pledging to protect Lebanese Shi‘a villages in al-Qusayr’s countryside and Shi‘a shrines 
in Sayyida Zeinab, few kilometers from Damascus. This chapter will maintain that this 
discourse helped exacerbate the Sunni-Shi‘a schism which was also fanned by the 
emergence of terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (ISIS).  
Gradually, Hezbollah troops spread across Syria, from Dar‘a and Quneitra in the 
south, all the way up to Deir ez-Zor in the northeast and Idlib in the northwest and Aleppo, 
through inland provinces, namely Rif Dimashk, Homs and Palmyra. During these battles, 
Hezbollah units, backed by springs of ammos and artillery, adopted a carpet bombing 
policy that rained rebel held areas with barrages of bombardments and followed later by 
waves of fighters. This chapter will elaborate these confrontations and argued that 
Hezbollah became a quasi-army that mixed between guerilla and classical army tactics 
and formations. Moreover, it will indicate that Hezbollah became a partner and a decision-
maker in the axis that extends from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad, from 
ground offensives, to operations rooms all the way up to the leadership level. The analysis 
of these variables will culminate with a conclusion that Hezbollah has transitioned into a 
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regional ANSA which participated in tilting the balance of power in Syria’s in the favor of 
Assad and his allies. It will then conclude by briefly tackling Hezbollah’s proxy role in 
Yemen where it helped Iran implement its regional agenda by supporting the Houthis 
against the Saudi backed regime hoping to counter-balance Riyadh on the its borders. 
Chapter 6 will resume the key features that were the conduit for Hezbollah’s 
transition to a regional ANSA. First, it will argue that Hezbollah leapt into Syria to prevent 
the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, its strategic and long-term ally. Syria was the 
harbor of its weapons en route from Iran to Lebanon and losing it would have tilted the 
balance of power in its rivals’ favor. Therefore, this chapter will emphasize that Syria’s 
civil war was a conflict of necessity that Hezbollah was forced to conduct to guarantee its 
endurance. In fact, it was a geopolitical confrontation between domestic, regional and 
international powers on Syria’s soil during which Hezbollah transitioned to a regional 
ANSA. The transition was shaped by three variables: Hezbollah’s exploitation of its Shi‘a 
identity, the military confrontations that transitioned it into a quasi-army, and its 
transformation to a partner and decision-maker in the axis. Hezbollah used a sectarian 
narrative to justify its intervention by pledging to protect the Sayyida Zeinab’s mosque –
a prominent Shi‘a shrine in Damascus’s suburb, and the Shi‘a villages on the Lebanese-
Syrian border, namely al-Qusayr. However, it will emphasize that this was merely to 
mobilize its Shi‘a entourage and fighters to implement its regional agenda. This 
intervention placed Hezbollah in a new battlefield different than the one it was 
accustomed to in Lebanon and against a new foe. In order to adapt, it had to mix between 
guerilla and classical warfare tactics with large army formations and top-notch units and 
emerged as a quasi-army. During these confrontations, Hezbollah embedded itself as a 
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partner and decision-maker in the axis that now extends from Beirut to Tehran, through 
Damascus and Baghdad. However, it will highlight that within the axis, Syria was not 
Iran’s ideological replica but they shared the same regional agenda.  
Chapter 7 will conclude by summing up the argument of the thesis. It will resume 
Hezbollah’s new posture in the regional scene and tackle the alterations in the regional 
order in which Hezbollah took part. It will emphasize that the changing balance of power 
in the Middle East provided a fertile ground for NSAs to thrive and expand their influence. 
However, among all ANSAs, Hezbollah played the most crucial role in the Lebanese 
theatre and beyond. Furthermore, it will argue that Hezbollah participated in deepening 
the Sunni-Shi‘a schism, namely through its participation in Syria’s civil war, a rift that will 
not end in the 21st century but on the contrary will be the tool of new confrontations as it 
was in Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries. It succeeded in its bid to prevent the collapse 
of Syria’s regime, spearheaded by Bashar al-Assad, and embedded itself more in the axis 
that now extends from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad. Nevertheless, it will 
mention the nuance between Syria and Iran, who shared a similar agenda in Syria but do 
not share the same Shi‘a dogma. It will unpack Hezbollah’s personnel arguments vis-à-
vis their future roles and endeavors and will close with stressing that eliminating 
Hezbollah will be the hardest milestone for its rivals amid the regional chaos.  
2 Conceptual framework and methodology 
2.1 Theoretical emphasis 
Organizations, and sometimes statecrafts, find themselves compelled to undergo 
certain transitions, and most of the time, these changes happen as part of a changing 
policy in order to adapt to a new set of rules and are also connected to geopolitical 
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alterations. The overarching aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it will provide examples 
of organizations that experienced transitions but each in its own terms. Second, it will 
provide Hezbollah’s transition with a theoretical framework within the literature. Michael 
Boning (2011) in his book entitled The Politics of Change in Palestine: State Building and 
Non-Violent Resistance, assessed the transitions underwent by both Hamas and Fatah 
factions at critical crossroads during their political itineraries. Accordingly, Boning 
stressed that “Hamas, like many social institutions, has undergone dramatic change in 
recent years, partly influenced by outside factors and partly reflecting internal responses 
to external developments.” Hezbollah’s transitions were indeed influenced by both factors 
but were more severe tilts than Hamas’s due to the multisectarian Lebanese society and 
the confessional system. Bringing the discussion back to Boning’s argument, he said that 
Hamas is an organization in transition that has indirectly and gradually denounced the 
1988 Hamas Charter that was considered radical and has adopted a policy of “political 
pragmatism” by accepting the two-state solution. It has started, according to Boning, 
operating within the political spectrum as an opposition to Fatah, and then became a 
political party within the Palestinian Territory rather than a radical opposition, and then in 
a final shift it became a de facto government in the Gaza Strip. Boning emphasized that 
“a variety of originally ‘radical’ political organizations have ultimately followed a path of 
reform that began with practical steps on the ground as opposed to abstract changes in 
theoretical orthodoxy.” This is exactly true not only in the case of Hamas but also 
Hezbollah, and more precisely, in regards to its engagement in the electoral elections in 
1992. This participation came after years of appeal to the establish an Islamic State. In 
comparison with Hamas’ adaptation, Hezbollah too didn’t dispel its aim but gradually 
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modified its political stance as a first step of reform. This was followed by further pragmatic 
steps which will be elaborated in chapter 4 but will not be focused on. 
Boning (2011) focused on the Gaza Strip saying that ruling in this area, transformed 
“parts of Hamas from violent resistance movement into a de facto state actor charged 
with administering a ‘real existing’ political entity”, and this change have had ideological 
ramifications with “an open-ended process of transformation.” Hezbollah has 
accomplished a further change when it got involved in the 2005 government for the first 
time and started acting as part of the political spectrum. This was due to a changing 
domestic and external political factors that Boning had applied on Hamas as mentioned 
above. This 2004-05 shift, along with Hezbollah’s transition into a regional ANSA during 
Syria’s civil war fall into the open-ended process of transitions that Boning mentioned. 
Boning (2011) maintained that Hamas is undergoing a transition from a movement to a 
state actor. This is not the case for Hezbollah, however. Rather, it has been engaged in 
the Lebanese system since 1992 and its operations beyond the Lebanese theatre, 
namely in the Syrian conflict, transitioned it to a regional ANSA. Hamas is the best 
example to compare with Hezbollah as both have experienced transitions on the political 
and military levels.  
Gordon Peake (2003), in “From Warlords to Peacelords”, explained how the warlords 
in Afghanistan became part of the political scene and held key positions in the government 
in the wake of the US invasion. These local leaders helped fighting the Taliban and the 
new formed government “was dependent on leaders undergoing the transition from 
warlord to peacelord” in collaboration with the international community, chiefly the United 
Nations (UN). Peake concluded that these warlords became peacemangers instead of 
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peacelords; then recovering from a war is even more challenging and the transition in 
such communities is a harder task that needs even more effort. Therefore, NSAs are 
prone for changes in certain political contexts that shape the dynamics of these 
transitions. The Kurds, however, provide a prominent example in this matter. 
Gareth Stansfield’s (2003) book, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political development and emergent 
democracy, illustrates the development of the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. It is 
necessary to mention Stansfield’s book to create a theoretical framework for the transition 
that Hezbollah has undergone, but the core of his work has a different approach of that 
adopted in this thesis because Hezbollah has not changed from a guerilla or resistance 
movement to a party ruling or controlling a de facto state, but to a regional ANSA. 
Moreover, Hezbollah has experienced a transition from guerilla, but to become part of the 
state rather than “the state” or the “de facto state” as he mentioned. However, both the 
Kurdish parties –Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), and Hezbollah have endured transitional periods but each in its own terms. 
Stansfield (2003) argued that geopolitical realities have galvanized additional 
development of the situation among the Kurds: “The change in the global and regional 
geopolitical system at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s presented an 
unprecedented opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to seize the initiative” (p.12). The core 
argument of Stansfield (2003) is derived from the lack of political science literature, as he 
said, vis-à-vis “the development of a political grouping from that of a guerilla movement 
to a political party”. In particular, he focused on the geopolitical rather than ideological 
aspects of a revolution based on “the theory of the insurgent state” and its close relativity 
with “the de facto state of Iraqi Kurdistan” (p.16).  
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The abovementioned examples provide a general theoretical framework. However, 
the closet groups to Hezbollah that witnessed transitions are the paramilitary Shi‘a groups 
in Iraq. Not only were these Shi‘a but also many were loyal to Iran and swearing allegiance 
to wilayat al-faqih. Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabbar (2017) in “The Popular 
Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future” studied the policy shift vis-à-vis paramilitaries and 
how such groups were accepted by, for instance former prime minister and leader of al-
Da‘wa party Nouri Maliki, who had previously refused the establishment of armed groups. 
This shift was mainly triggered by the rise of ISIS and the mischief-making it created. 
Further, “one domestic political factor”, Mansour and A. Jabbar argued, “that led to the 
emergence of paramilitaries in Iraq was the failure of state building in the security sector 
amid the rise of the Islamic State”. Since 2013, Maliki allowed seven groups, under the 
banner of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), to operate in Iraq. This was the first 
transition of these groups into what became legal armed forces, the PMF. In 2014, with 
the ISIS take-over of Mosul, thus controlling one third of Iraq’s territory, “Maliki signed an 
official decree to form the Commission of the PMF”. This of course was also legitimized 
by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s edict to volunteer in order to fight ISIS. The point to make out 
of these facts is to explain how these groups transitioned into legal armed forces fighting 
under the umbrella of state but with large autonomy from it. Furthermore, similar to the 
case of Lebanon, the emergence and the embrace of the PMF by the Iraqis was due to 
the facts on the ground and the chaos that was engulfing the country. Hezbollah’s 
increasing support among the Lebanese citizens was underpinned by its fight against the 
Israeli occupation of Lebanon. This is clearly not a comparative study. Suffice it to say 
here that these groups have undergone transitions legitimizing their work. Of course, this 
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is not the case for Hezbollah as it has only been recognized as a resistance operating 
completely out of the state’s reach. But both Hezbollah and many PMF factions are part 
of wilayat al-faqih, operate in tandem with the IRGC and rely on Iran for backup. 
In the early 1990s, Hezbollah has altered from a mere guerilla group fighting against 
the Israeli occupation of Lebanon to a Lebanese party participating also in domestic 
politics. This transition was crucial to the survival of Hezbollah and its adaptation with the 
Lebanese system. However, the transition that it experienced during Syria’s civil war is 
different and on a larger scale with much bigger roles. In fact, while the first transition was 
an adaptation, the second was a necessity as will be explored throughout this thesis. 
Moreover, they were both triggered by the interplay of domestic and regional factors and 
alterations. Hezbollah, a unique regional ANSA, now operating in multiple theatres 
beyond its state of origin, is luring journalists, scholars, and researchers interested in the 
Middle East. Most importantly, the engagement in the Syrian conflict has shed light to the 
central role that Hezbollah played in altering the power balance and to the insurmountable 
role of such ANSAs superseding the power and geographical boundaries of these states.  
2.2 Literature review 
The understanding of Hezbollah stems from its deep-rooted Shi‘a identity, its 
relationship with Iran, its military challenges against Israel, and more recently, its 
engagement in Syria’s civil war. This work, however, will focus on its involvement in the 
Syrian conflict, but will also, to a lesser extent, tackle its history and religious allegiance 
to Tehran. Before all this, one should recognize that the rise of Hezbollah is part of a 
larger increase of Shi‘a influence in the Middle East after decades of marginalization. The 
upsurge of the Shi‘a had previously occurred during the rule of the Safavids, when Shah 
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Ismail rose to power in 1500, and in two years’ time he expanded his reign and 
implemented Shi‘ism as the official faith (Hamid Dabashi, 2016, p.11). The second 
whopping role came with the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, where Ayatollah Khomeini 
rose to power and implemented an Islamic State, considered fundamental, according to 
Genieve Abdo (2017), and causing a threat to other Shi‘a trends, namely the clerical 
establishment in al-Najaf, Iraq (p.20). “Khomeini’s vision, the senior-most religious jurist, 
or faqih,[Khomeini and later on Khamenei], was duty-bound to assume political and 
executive authority, the velayat (or wilayat), in place of Iran’s corrupt and westernized 
secular rulers” (Abdo, 2017, p.20). However, the wilayat al-faqih was not bound to 
geographical borders, but the faqih has power over the umma, or nation, of which 
Hezbollah and other Shi‘a factions were part. Rodger Shanahan (2017) explained that 
the word Hezbollah is mentioned in various Qur’anic verses promising those groups a 
direct pass to heaven. More importantly, Shanahan referred that it is used to refer to 
“group of believers engaged in a common struggle, rather than an organized political 
entity”. This common struggle is described by Khomeini as oppressors [the West and 
Israel] and oppressed [depends on the arena, but namely the others]. A further 
explanation of wilayat al-faqih and Khomeini’s Islamic views will be provided in chapter 3. 
With the unfolding of the regional events, from the Arab-Israeli wars, to the post-Saddam 
Iraq and the Arab Uprisings, it has become clear that the role of armed non-state actors 
(ANSAs), chief among them Hezbollah, is growing.  
This thesis hopes to provide a compelling emphasis vis-à-vis Hezbollah, with a focus 
on its transition into a regional ANSA during Syria’s civil war. This literature, however, is 
emphasizing major works about Hezbollah before explaining the detailed target of this 
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work: First, it will underline the new alerts lunched by mainstream scholars regarding the 
necessity of shedding more light to these NSAs. Second, it will provide some data about 
non-state actors (NSAs), namely violent NSAs, and locate Hezbollah within the literature. 
Third, it will get into the debate on sectarianism which will also be detailed in chapter 6. 
Fourth, it will divide the earlier works about Hezbollah into two parts: In the first section it 
will tackle books that are now old fashion but were significant at earlier stages; in the 
second it will offer new works that have been more academically important and offered 
new frameworks. Fifth and finally, it will conclude by explaining the scheme that this thesis 
will adopt and how it will provide original work about Hezbollah through primary and 
secondary resources.  
In a liberal world where boundaries became superficial, transnational groups’ 
effectiveness is growing, among them are NSAs. International Relations (IR) theories 
have ignored the role that NSAs, namely ANSAs, played in inter and intra-state relations. 
Nevertheless, these actors started taking attention in the field of IR and a variety of 
scholars started recognizing their role. Whether a politician, statesman, scholar, 
researcher or even observer, one cannot ignore ANSAs when studying the Middle East 
because in the 21st century, some of these organizations are appealing more attention 
than states. Even staunch realists like Stephen Walt have altered their primordial thoughts 
and accepted the role of ANSAs: “All you have to do is think about terrorist organizations 
equipped with biological weapons or nuclear weapons; they could do extraordinary levels 
of damage; far more than any non-state actor could ever have done in the past” (2009). 
More importantly, Henry Kissinger (2014) in World Order avowed to the role that jihadist 
groups, both Sunni and Shi‘a, are undermining the states’ role and putting the latter and 
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its armed forces in jeopardy (p.7). Kissinger blamed the decline in states legitimacy –
more precisely Westphalian states, over their territory and the chaos in Middle Eastern 
states, such as Iraq and Syria, for the increasing influence of “non-state entities such as 
Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, ISIL [ISIS] and the Taliban” (p.142).  Kissinger argued that “if order 
cannot be established, vast areas risk being opened to anarchy and to forms of extremism 
that will spread organically into other regions” (p.145). This argument is plausible, and the 
establishment of Hezbollah, or at least its endurance, would have been impossible if 
Lebanon was a strong state, or even restored in the post-civil war. But one most pay 
attention to a key confession between the lines that Kissinger stated, and that is his 
acceptance that these ANSAs are playing crucial roles in changing not only the power 
balance, but the de facto Westphalian states. 
In the conclusion of his book, Kissinger poses the following challenge: “A 
reassessment of the concept of balance of power is in order”. He considered, however, 
that the replacement of the old world order is yet to be determined depending on the 
“conception of the future” (p.371-372). Kissinger is clearly addressing here the West 
hoping for better governance and cooperation, but amid these challenges that he posed, 
ANSAs, and their sponsor states, of which he mentioned Iran through his book, would 
disagree on such endeavor because their role would flicker and even demise in such 
world order. These ANSAs would definitely sabotage and co-opt any attempt to 
jeopardize their role, who for instant, is becoming more expansionist and regional, such 
as the case of Hezbollah. Raymond Hinnebusch (2018), The International Politics of the 
Middle East, challenged the realist view of “Cohesive Westphalian states” considering 
that states in the Middle East are divided to the extent that there is no unique foreign 
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policy that represents the national interest of each of these states. Hinnebusch added 
that neo-realists’ assumption that the international behavior of the states is delineated by 
inter-state relationships is misleading since trans-state identities are ignored (p.2-3). 
Trans-national identities in the case of this work are sects, of which falls the maneuvers 
of Hezbollah’s Shi‘a identity. In fact, while realism totally ignores NSAs, liberalism and 
constructivism provide a better explanation. Liberalism provided enough space to 
emphasize about the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and leading 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN). But constructivism, according to Hinnebusch 
(2018), covered the functionality of sub- and supra-state identities with state identity (p.3). 
Michael R. Pompeo (2018), US secretary of state, argued that “the emergence of al-
Qaeda, cybercriminals, and other dangerous entities affirmed the threat of NSAs”.5 This 
clear avowing by a US statecraft can added to the aforementioned works, thus raising the 
necessity of bridging the gap between IR theories and ANSAs by shedding more light on 
the lack of attention given to the latter.  
Hinnebusch (2018) argued that “if there is one thing that distinguishes the Middle 
East system it is the powerful role of non-state identities” (p.5). Hezbollah, represent an 
NSA, specifically ANSA, that represent an Iran-led non-state Shi‘a identity that extends 
beyond the Westphalian state boundaries. Hinnebusch maintained that the chaos 
exacerbated in the region gave trans-state Islamist movements more room to maneuver, 
mobilizing further support and fragmenting the regional order (p.7). What is important here 
is that Hinnebsuch underscored the crucial role that these movements, whether for the 
                                                
5 “Confronting Iran: The Trump Administration Strategy”, on November/December 2018. 
Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-
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best or worse, are playing in altering the regional order. Hinnebusch (2018) emphasized 
that supra-state public arena was revived in the 1990s, and the public discourse of the 
axis represented by former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syria’s president 
Bashar al-Assad, and Hezbollah’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, has been 
prevailing in the 2000s against the US and its allies (p.275). In fact, both alliances have 
not been prevailing against each other, but the axis was filling the vacuum created by the 
US agenda, namely the Iraq invasion, and gaining leverage against the gulf countries led 
by Saudi Arabia. Through time this Iran-Saudi Arabia regional geopolitical confrontation 
turned sectarian, and while both Iran and the US shared hegemony and dominance in 
countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, the Saudi influence was decreasing in the region. 
Hinnesbusch (2017), however, astonishingly concluded: “The MENA [Middle East and 
North Africa] region has been described as a graveyard of IR theories, since none seems 
to adequately capture its dynamics” (p.293). Certainly, this was the most accurate 
description of the relationship between IR theories and the Middle East and a reminder 
of the new awareness of prominent scholars, such as Kissinger and Walt, vis-à-vis the 
increase of the ANSAs’ influence. Indeed, the dynamics of the regional order in the Middle 
East differ from other arenas and IR theories have remained confined by narrative cul-
de-sacs that have provided little studies about ANSAs. Therefore, the latter, namely 
Islamists driven by ideology, have been able to play a flamboyant job that straddled the 
geopolitical fault-lines in the region. 
There are nowadays abundant studies about NSAs, and some have tackled violent 
non-state actors (VNSAs), which we will elaborate below. That said, many have branded 
Hezbollah a VNSA, but this thesis will categorize it an ANSA that for sure uses violence 
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for political ends but also has ministers in the Lebanese cabinets and Members in the 
parliament. Kledja Mulaj (2010) argued that NSAs, mainly economic, have received more 
attention in IR than VNSAs (p.1). To comprehend regional and world politics, analyzing 
VNSAs is becoming more necessary since the security environment started to be 
influenced by the power of these groups (Mulaj, 2010, p.2). Moreover, she contended that 
the strength of VNSAs is fresh. People around the world are affected both directly – the 
9/11 attacks on the towers of New York and the Pentagon, and indirectly – the spread of 
news and videos of any occurrence through the internet or networks (p.2). So social 
media was the most effective tool that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) used to 
spread its ideology and fear and attract jihadists from all over the world. Hezbollah, for 
example, has built its own chain of media that includes a TV channel and social media 
channels, and transmitted this strategy to other allied NSAs, such as the Houthis in 
Yemen. Hezbollah focuses on filming its operations to gain more trust and honesty among 
its supporters and foes. 
Mulaj (2010) defined VNSAs as “non-state armed groups that resort to organized 
violence as a tool to achieve their goals. State/non-state divide is not necessarily clear 
cut, given that VNSAs not only operate in opposition to, or cooptation with, a state or 
states, but often also exist in a dependent relation to the state in term of support, benefits 
and recognition” (p.3). In fact, in strong states that have full authority over their territory, 
the emergence of these actors is nearly impossible. Mulaj (2010) differentiated numerous 
branches of these groups that use violence for political purposes: National liberation 
movements; insurgent guerilla bands; terrorist organizations; militants in weak states; and 
mercenary militias. She placed Hezbollah under the umbrella of insurgency and defined 
	 39	
it as explained by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “A technology of military conflict 
characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural areas” 
(p.4).6 However, this is an underestimation of Hezbollah’s role, capabilities and 
maneuvers. Mulaj’s book is published in 2010, which means prior to the Syrian civil war 
that further changed the face of Hezbollah. Following its full-scale engagement in Syria, 
its military tactics evolved and Hezbollah became a quasi-army merging between guerilla 
and classical warfare tactics and mostly operating with large army formations. Therefore, 
if it is to be framed in the pre-Syrian war engagement, it would have been better placed 
on the crossroads of two offshoots: national liberation movements and insurgent guerrilla 
bands. This thesis, however, will emphasize that Hezbollah does not fall under any of 
these categories, but Syria’s conflict was the conduit that shifted it into a regional ANSA. 
Natasha Ezbrow (2017), in Global Politics and Violent Non-State Actors, debated that 
VNSAs can be distinguished by their activity and inspiration. So she therefore detailed 
five key characteristics: First, their primary motivation, observing whether they are 
politically or economically driven, their political ideology, their vision towards the status 
quo, their ambition to hold lands and their will to engage into the pre-existing political 
system or do they seek to change it. Second, methods of achieving their goals and 
whether they aim to attack civilians or state’s military. Third, their organizational structure, 
its hierarchy, its sophistication and ways of recruitment. Fourth, the group’s resource of 
funding. Fifth, the group’s impact, its power, its control of territory, its legitimacy, its 
popularity and its influence of the state and society (p.37). Ezbrow (2017), specified in 
                                                
6 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American 
Political Science Review, Vol.97, No. 1, February 2003, pp.75-99, at p.75 
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her book a chapter for each type of VNSAs: Insurgencies, terrorist organizations and 
terror networks, warlords and marauders, organized crime and gangs and private security 
companies and paramilitary units. For every category, she attributed the five elements 
that were mentioned above.  
Ezbrow discussed in chapter 11 entitled “Moderation and politicization”, political 
parties with violent wings arguing that some groups have both political and militant wings. 
The political wing participates in activities, offer services to the public such as education 
and healthcare, and “plays by the rules of the game” while the military wing conducts 
violent acts to serve its political belief and ideology (p.168). Ezbrow (2017) emphasized 
that the case study of Hezbollah presents a violent group that forms a political party 
participating in the parliamentary elections and naming ministers in the Lebanese 
government (p.177). However, the differentiation of Hezbollah’s military and political wing 
is somewhat imposed by countries and diplomats that are keen to maintain a line of 
communication with Hezbollah. It is just a game of terminologies to find an excuse as they 
might be present in places with ministers or MPs from Hezbollah. Anyhow Ezbrow’s 
classification is not valid anymore and fails to provide a compelling categorization that 
can be adopted vis-à-vis Hezbollah as its role after the Syrian conflict is not the same 
anymore. That said, this study will adopt a straightforward hypothesis: Hezbollah shifted 
during Syria’s civil war into a regional ANSA. 
Troy Thomas, Stephen Kiser & William Casebeer (2005), in Warlords Rising: 
Confronting Violent Non-State Actors, defined VNSAs as a “non-state organization that 
uses collective violence” and influence their environment and are influenced by it (p.9). 
They considered that VNSAs are illegitimate for states since the aims and purposes of 
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both sides are contradictory (p.10). Though Thomas et al.’s (2005) argument is valid for 
a most VNSA/ANSAs, yet Hezbollah proved it wrong. For many Lebanese, namely the 
anti-Hezbollah, as the interviews in this thesis will show, consider Hezbollah a militia that 
cannot coexist with a strong state. They perceive that Lebanon’s foreign policy agenda 
must be in the hands of the government only and Hezbollah’s is undermining the authority 
of the polity. However, Hezbollah survived even in the post-civil war Lebanon for political 
and strategic geopolitical calculations of countries that had the upper hand in the country, 
namely Syria, and later on, Iran. Consequently, Lebanon’s government considered 
Hezbollah a legitimate resistance against Israel by using the “Army-People-Resistance 
Trilogy” in the consecutive governmental statements thus legalizing Hezbollah arsenal; 
at least until further notice. Hezbollah has always adopted a conspiracy theory discourse 
to undermine his rivals and garner support. With many endeavors to alter this Trilogy by 
Hezbollah’s foes, it remained unaffected but has undergone minor verbal modifications 
that kept Hezbollah’s arsenal legal. Although this intra-Lebanese disagreement fluctuates 
depending on the domestic, regional and international situation, it has not been a concern 
for academics and scholars. But one mounting scholarly debate is sectarianism. 
Sectarianism itself has been the most dangerous trend in the Middle East since the 
2003-US invasion of Iraq. This, however, does not mean that sectarianism is new, but 
resurfaced due to the geopolitical contest in the region. Chapter 5 will unpack the 
sectarian mobilization and instrumentalization of sectarian identity by Hezbollah and 
chapter 6 will focus on this issue. Suffice it to mention here to mention two samples. The 
best work vis-à-vis sectarian conflicts is the book edited by Nader Hashemi & Danny 
Postel (2017), where many prominent scholars have contributed: Sectarianization: 
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Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East. Hashemi and Postel (2017) traced back the 
origins of the Sunni-Shi‘a schism, which dates to the disagreement among the successors 
of the Prophet. The focus of the authors is to negate the mainstream discourse that relate 
every conflict in the Middle East to sectarian tensions. Although they admit the presence 
of this split, they argue that sectarianism is just an instrument for geopolitical agendas, 
generated by the US invasion of Iraq and the Arab Uprisings and driven namely by Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. Throughout the book, many case studies were considered, such as the 
conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. They held Hezbollah, of course, 
responsible, alongside Iran, for part of this wrongly framed sectarian conflict, or better 
said, the Sunni-Shi‘a schism. The book is indeed mesmerizing and offered a new 
academic perspective and original work. 
On the contrary, Geneieve Abdo’s (2017) book, entitled The New Sectarianism: The 
Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni divide, contradicted Hashemi and 
Postel’s work and criticized those who view the conflict in the Middle East as non-
sectarian. Abdo recognized the geopolitical conflict that exacerbated the Sunni-Shi‘a rift, 
but also considered that this conflict is not new and guides many conflicts in the region. 
Abdo, however, exaggerates in her explanations of this conflict, because as Hashemi and 
Postel maintained, the Sunni-Shi‘a schism is being flamed by the geopolitical 
confrontations. But also the latter simplified this conflict to this geopolitical battle more 
than necessary. In fact, it is true that sectarianism was always a motive and this can be 
documented through the 16th and 17th century Iran, where the Pahlavis adopted Shi‘ism 
as the official creed of their realm, not for their religious belief, but most to counter-balance 
the Sunni Ottoman Empire. However, Abdo fell for tiny mistakes for those who are not 
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experts in Lebanon. First, she misallocated some areas few times, which appeared a lack 
of knowledge not a writing or printing mistake. Second, she argued that Hezbollah has 
lost support among the families of its fighters killed in Syria. In effect, this a complete 
misleading argument because those families always appear before cameras proud of the 
sacrifices of their sons, and there is not a single leak of information or interview that a 
family has rebuked this death. However, as will be shown in chapter 5, some interviewers 
maintained that some, inside Hezbollah and Shi‘a in Lebanon, were hesitant about this 
battle where they would be confronting Arabs instead of Israelis for the first time. This 
internal debate emerged because Hezbollah supported the Uprisings in Egypt and Libya, 
and now took a decision to defend Assad’s regime. Abdo, as her counterparts, said that 
Hezbollah borne a big part of the brunt of the conflict, namely through its intervention in 
Syria’s civil war. Therefore, both books blame Hezbollah, along with Iran, directly and 
indirectly to take part in deepening the Sunni-Shi‘a schism. The academic debate among 
scholars is thriving, but these two books offered examples of both opinions vis-à-vis 
sectarianism. Other works about Hezbollah will follow, however. 
One of the reliable contributions about Hezbollah is Judith Palmer Harik’s book 
(2005), in Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, who maintained that a group of 
Shi‘a who split from the then dominant Amal Movement were focused on the struggle 
against Israel. These men, fitted Iran’s foreign policy agenda and therefore a deal was 
bargained between Tehran and Damascus each for its own geopolitical advantages: Syria 
sought to defend its own interests in Lebanon while Iran wanted to create a bridge with a 
wider Arab and Islamic community. Some of them, Harik pursued, had already proved 
their eagerness to fight and ability to deliver in previous operations they executed for 
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Iran’s favor. They shared the same goals of the Islamic revolution, and were consequently 
supported by the IRGC to establish an organization with a local leadership that was willing 
to combat against Israel (p.39). This narrative was outspoken by all scholars studying 
Hezbollah and also articulated in the interviews that will be provided in chapter 3. 
Moreover, Harik (2005) highlighted that a deal has been arranged between Hezbollah 
and the Lebanese government under Syria’s supervision in which Hezbollah had to 
abandon its radical belief so it could participate in the political system. In return, “The 
Party of God’s jihad activities against the Israelis would receive official authorization to 
continue by virtue of the government’s recognition of the armed struggle as a national 
resistance.” (p.47). In fact, this bargain occurred in the post-civil war era when all militias 
handed their arsenals to the government, and in parallel, an internal shift was undergoing 
that ended with the prevail of the soft-liners allowing more pragmatism and adaptation in 
the de facto state of Lebanon. 
Harik (2005) argued that for Arabs and Muslims, Hezbollah is a legitimate resistance 
group (p.7). During the last decade of the twentieth century, Hezbollah’s support 
increased among Arabs and Lebanese. “This was especially true after Israel bombed a 
UN bunker where civilians had taken refuge in Qana on April 18, 1996, killing 106 people” 
(Deeb, 2006). Harik (2005) claimed that a local newspaper ran a poll before the 1992 
elections concluding that the majority of the respondents considered Hezbollah a 
resistance and distinguished it from other militias that participated in the Lebanese civil 
war (p.50). However, since 2003, with the rising tension between Iran and Gulf countries, 
mainly Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah was considered Iran’s proxy and threatened the peace in 
the Middle East. Besides, its take-over of Beirut in 7 May 2008 after a political standoff 
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with its foes, created animosity and deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a rift. This was grafted with 
the retroactive murder of former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, who Hezbollah 
was officially accused of killing by the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (STL). Details about 
these events will be tackled in chapter 4, however. Thereafter, the 2010 Arab Uprisings 
inflamed a new geopolitical confrontation plagued with a second sectarian wave. What 
helped mobilize Sunnis against Hezbollah and the Shi‘a as whole was Iran’s expansionist 
agenda and its participation, along with Hezbollah, to prevent the collapse of the Alawite 
Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. So this engagement discredit Harik’s label of 
Hezbollah as a resistance group, because it is now operating beyond Lebanon’s theatre 
in the favor of the interest of the axis that extends from Tehran to Beirut, via Damascus 
and Baghdad. 
When it comes to understanding the organization from the inside and their core 
beliefs – that is if one considers that it is honest and reliable information, Naim Qassem’s 
(2005) work is essential. One of the founders of Hezbollah and deputy secretary general, 
Qassem traced in his book entitled Hizbullah the relation between the group who later 
formed Hezbollah’s leadership and Iran, back to the demonstrations that took place in 
Lebanon after the success of the Islamic Revolution “under the banner of “Supportive 
Committees to the Islamic Revolution in Iran”, a movement which eventually led to 
communication with the pillars of the young Islamic government in Iran”. Qassem assured 
that prior communications have only been clerical rather than political and that this 
incident was the first connection with Tehran’s political leadership (p.18). This was 
confirmed with the interview with Hezbollah’s minister: “We had Islamic mentalities and 
orientations and we were operating under a secretive party called ‘Al-Da‘wa Party’ and 
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with the emergence of the Islamic Iran we sought to further our relation with them not the 
other way around”.7 Although both Hezbollah leaders confirmed narrated the same story, 
it does not mean that Iran was not interested. On the contrary, it was concerned with the 
power projection of its ideology based on wilayat al-faqih, and has therefore found in the 
Lebanese Shi‘a the perfect opportunity to implement its geopolitical plan. The relationship 
was mutually beneficial and more related to the broader rise of the Shi‘a in the Middle 
East. This was of course amid the increase of Islamist movements in the region after the 
collapse of Pan-Arabism.  
Qassem (2005) explained wilayat al-faqih as follows: The Prophet is the Messenger 
of God who introduced the holy principle of Shari’a. After the Prophet come the infallible 
Imams, from Imam Ali ibn Abi Taleb to Imam al-Mahdi. In the absence of the infallible 
Imam, the public needs to acquire guidance to apply the Shari’a in society (p.51). 
Khomeini considered, according to Qassem, that it is illogical that God has limited his 
holy message of Islam to Prophet Muhammad and his successors. Based on this view, 
he considered that there must be a “Wilaya” to guide Muslims until the appearance of al-
Mahdi. The Jurist-Theologian’s authority is thus a continuation of the rule of the Prophet 
and the infallible Imams. Waliyy al-Faqih is considered the arbitrator who shapes 
jurisprudence while waiting for the appearance of Imam Al-Mahdi. His geographic and 
spiritual authority is not limited to a territory. “The degree of authority awarded to the 
Jurist-Theologian is obviously high, for he is entrusted with implementing Islamic 
jurisprudence, guarding the Islamic structure, undertaking political decisions of 
considerable weight and bearing on the nation’s overall interest” (p.54). Everyone who’s 
                                                
7 Interview with author. On 12 September 2018. 
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under the umbrella of the Wilaya is committed to the custodianship of the Jurist-
Theologian. Moreover, issues of war and peace are in the hands of the Jurist-Theologian 
(Qassem, 2005, p.53). One of Hezbollah’s main objectives: “The legitimate leadership is 
designated to the Jurist-Theologian who is considered to be the successor to the Prophet 
and the Imams. The Jurist-Theologian draws the general guiding direction for the nation 
of Islam. His commands and proscriptions are enforceable” (Qassem, 2005, p.19). 
Although Hezbollah is part of the wilaya, the organization have developed a relationship 
of mutual trust that allowed it to have more autonomy. Qassem (2005) opined that this 
relationship is beneficial for both sides with full autonomy in the fieldwork (p.237). In fact, 
through time, Hezbollah has proven to function in tandem with the IRGC and for the 
interest of the axis as will be shown throughout the thesis. 
Qassem (2005) put the relation between Hezbollah and Iran in the context of a 
cooperated alliance, a shared belief in the jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian, mutual 
Islamic principles, and an identical political vision with respect to Israel’s confrontation 
and the world superpowers’ hegemony (p.236). This is the common narrative that 
Hezbollah has adopted to justify this cooperation, but with the modus operandi and events 
that came up later, chiefly the Syrian civil war, it seemed that Hezbollah is part of a 
grandiose plan that the axis is implementing and this was a mere discourse contradicted 
by the facts on the ground. Qassem (2005) highlighted that all Lebanese parties maintain 
foreign connections, however, Hezbollah’s link with Iran is not a leader-follower 
relationship. Tehran’s support for Hezbollah comes in the context of resisting Israel and 
US hegemony in the region, thereby making the alliance beneficial for Lebanon. 
Furthermore, Iran backed other resistance movements in the Muslim world such as the 
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Palestinian resistance (p.238). Qassem was hence trying to detract Iran’s sectarian label 
by saying that it backed Sunni Palestinian groups rather than only Shi‘a factions such as 
Hezbollah. Catherine Bloom (2010) argued that Iran does not control or direct Hezbollah. 
Similarly, Lara Deeb (2006) argued that “this relationship does not mean that Iran dictates 
Hezbollah’s policies or decision-making”. The choices and decisions of Hezbollah are 
taken autonomously and in accordance with the organization’s understandings regarding 
Lebanon as well as its benefits within the Lebanese theatre of operations (Deeb, 2006). 
In fact, Hezbollah is clearly a partner and its fate is pegged to Iran’s. Most importantly, 
Syria’s civil war reinvigorated the relationship between Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, and Iraqi 
Shi‘a factions and made it a partner and decision-maker in the axis rather than a 
subordinate. This outcome contradicts Qassem’s narrative for two reasons: first, 
Hezbollah functioned as an Iranian proxy in Iraq and Yemen; second, even though it 
played a leading role in Syria’s civil war, its extended role in theatre beyond Lebanon 
cannot be possible without the daily cooperation with the SAA and Iranian commanders 
operating in Syria, and also without their approval. Therefore, Hezbollah operated in 
tandem with the IRGC and for the benefit of the axis. Although it might be inescapable to 
engage in Syria because of the geographical proximity, similarly to most Lebanese parties 
and groups, needless to wonder about the interest of Lebanon in participating in the Iraqi 
and Yemeni conflicts.  
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb’s book entitled Hizbullah: Politics & Religion and published in 
2002 reasoned that Hezbollah rose during the 1980s for its kidnapping of more than 80 
westerners during the Lebanese civil war and for that, the organization was classified a 
terrorist movement. As mentioned in her introduction, Saad-Ghorayeb sought to alter the 
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discussion to a new level by examining “the political mind of Hezbollah” (p.3). Then, 
Hezbollah had been leading the geopolitical scene since the 2000 Israeli withdrawal and 
the discussion suggested by Saad-Ghorayeb was original. The latter also studied 
Hezbollah’s political transition clashing with the Islamic principles. The diversion in 
Hezbollah’s domestic vision has truly clashed with their previous dream of implementing 
an Islamic state. Furthermore, she assessed the socio-economic and political factors that 
the Lebanese Shi‘a have endured. So according to Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), the 
politicization of the Shi‘a was threefold: first, in the pre-1975 era, affected by the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war and wave of Arab nationalism, the Shi‘a started joining political parties 
such as al Ba’ath, the Nasserites and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); 
second, another period started in 1975 with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war which 
mobilized the Shi‘a who held arms and payed high numbers of fatalities; third and most 
importantly, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that led to the rise and ‘Islamicisation’ of the 
Lebanese Shi‘a (p.7-12). These timeframes are indeed plausible, but as the interviews 
throughout this work will show, although the Israeli invasion increased the momentum of 
the ‘Islamicisation’, the latter started beforehand through al-Da‘wa party, a secret Islamic 
and cross-border party masterminded by the Iraqi cleric Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr and 
guided in Lebanon by Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddin and Muhammad Husayn 
Fadlallah.  
Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) emphasized that Hezbollah started as a resistance without 
any relation or coordination with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. It was not until the Israeli 
invasion when Iran seized the opportunity to shape Hezbollah’s organizational body 
(p.14). This is indeed a diversion of the facts for Iran played a key role in shaping 
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Hezbollah since day one. Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) examined the influence of wilayat al-
faqih’s authority on Hezbollah’s political ideology, saying that if the faqih announced a 
fatwa to pursue the war against Israel even after its withdrawal, Hezbollah would be 
obliged to obey. In a separate work, Saad-Ghorayeb (2012) claimed that Hezbollah’s 
organizational status and its presence as a Shi‘a Islamic organization is derived from the 
Faqih and this dedication to the concept of wilayat al-faqih mainly comes in a religious 
context and it does not mean an unquestionable loyalty to Iran. That said, these two 
discourses seemed contradictory. For a matter of fact, Hezbollah is part of the wilaya and 
cannot reject obedience, but Iran gave Hezbollah plenty of room to maneuver and with 
time, it became a partnership rather than a master-subordinate relationship. 
Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) defended Hezbollah’s use of violence by unpacking 
Khomeini’s explanation of two categories: the oppressors and the oppressed. 
Characterized in the latter, and classifying Israel and the West under the former, 
Hezbollah justified its use of violence (p.16-25). In fact, the narrative became a tool that 
Hezbollah used to justify its intervention that serves its geopolitical interest and that of 
Iran. Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) argued that the Tai’f agreement and the end of the civil war 
pushed Hezbollah to participate in the Lebanese parliamentary elections as a step 
towards the organization’s accommodation with the system (p.25-29). This remained 
within the usual debate that most scholars have tackled as mentioned above. This 
engagement declared the birth of Hezbollah’s political wing; but to be clear, this 
accommodation does not mean that Hezbollah has annulled the possibility of 
implementing an Islamic state; it has only postponed it until further notice. Moreover, 
Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) quoted Nasrallah when tackling the influence of Iran on the 
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organization saying that the decision-making of the organization emerges directly from 
the Lebanese leadership, and that the territory that Hezbollah is aiming to liberate and is 
defending is Lebanese not Iranian. Nasrallah stated that despite of the benefit that Iran 
or other countries might accomplish from the results of Hezbollah’s wars, this “does not 
detract it of its nationalism or Lebanonism” and if given the choice to choose between 
Lebanese and Iranian interests, Hezbollah will not hesitate to choose Lebanon (p.83). In 
fact, in the ensuing years, this discourse had become null and void because Hezbollah 
started fighting within a broader context and in theatres beyond Lebanon. Had it 
maintained its position ante by only fighting Israel, this argument would have been 
plausible.  
At some point, it becomes obvious that most of the work vis-à-vis Hezbollah is 
concentrated on the same timeframes and topics. Although Joseph Alagha (2006) in The 
Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program 
tried to add a new framework, it was not that original. With time, not by weakness of his 
book but caused by Hezbollah’s new shifts, his argument is not plausible anymore, or at 
least ancient. Alagha tackled the history of Hezbollah and its creation, and like Harik and 
Saad-Ghorayeb, he framed the organization’s ideological shifts between 1991 and 2005. 
Alagha stressed that based on the Tai’f agreement, March-April 1990, the Lebanese 
government asked for the disarmament of the militias. However, Hezbollah threw a 
campaign of public relations in the country that managed to classify Hezbollah as an 
Islamic Resistance that was permitted to keep its arms and pursue its fight against Israel 
(p.150). In fact, the legalization of Hezbollah arsenal remains until this moment a key 
debate among anti- and pro-Hezbollah Lebanese groups and citizens. The organization’s 
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foes have continuously accused it of being Iran’s puppet and insisted on its disarmament. 
But Alagha didn’t reckon that this was a simplification of the accurate cause that allowed 
Hezbollah’s endurance and that is the Syria-Iran deal that was bargained for the benefit 
of both allowing its maneuvers against the Israelis.  
Alagha (2006) emphasized the ‘Infitah’ policy (openness) by mentioning the 
participation in the elections arguing that Hezbollah is not offering itself as an alternative 
to the state. Even though it is an Islamic movement, it is also “a nationalist-patriotic 
Lebanese political party”. Hezbollah tried to “Lebanonise” itself by creating the “Multi-
confessional Lebanese Brigades to fight Israel on 3 November 1997 attracting youth 
across sectarian spectrum” (p.169). However, this dished out propaganda has merely 
survived for two decades and proved controversial. Hezbollah is a jihadist organization 
that abides by wilayat al-faqih and consider itself part of a wider umma or nation, and in 
further stages the facts on the ground showed Hezbollah’s determination to preserve the 
Shi‘a. This sectarian identity that Hezbollah has clearly showed during Syria’s civil war 
will be elaborated in chapter 5 by uncovering damning evidence of this purpose. After all, 
sectarian rhetoric is Hezbollah’s martial tradition, and without it wouldn’t be able to 
mobilize more people and garner support among the Shi‘a. Furthermore, Alagha (2006) 
stressed that Hezbollah is Lebanese and has domestic and regional interests with the 
backing of Syria and Iran in its genuine right for resistance. Further, Hezbollah benefits 
from the convergence of its interests with that of Iran and Syria to regain the Palestinian 
land (p.172). This relationship that has given birth to Hezbollah has gradually developed 
and when Assad’s regime was teetering on the brink in 2012, Hezbollah rushed ahead to 
prevent its collapse. Consequently, Hezbollah was protecting its geopolitical interest and 
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that of Iran by safeguarding the route from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad. 
So what Alagha mentioned is not valid anymore and Hezbollah’s operations are not 
concentrated against Israel but it became a regional ANSA operational beyond the 
Lebanese theatre. Further, the dichotomy of autonomous vs proxy is imaginary. 
Hezbollah is part of the axis and acts for the benefit of the latter, namely Iran, while also 
taking into consideration domestic calculations. 
Hezbollah’s political and ideological transformation, according to Alagha (2006), has 
passed by three phases: “Exclusivist religious ideology” from 1978 until 1985; “More 
encompassing political ideology” from 1985 until 1992; and “The down to earth-political 
program” starting in 1992 (p.191). In effect, the first two phases can be merged into one 
phase that includes the formation of Hezbollah and its confrontation with Israel. The 
second phase that started in 1992 ends in 2004. Thereafter, this thesis will tackle the 
phase from 2004 onwards with a focus on its role beyond the Lebanese soil, namely 
Syria. In a very exceptional conclusion, Alagha (2006) highlighted that Hezbollah’s 
pragmatic speech and the changing political statements of its leaders fall under what is 
called “maslaha” (interest), therefore following the jurisprudential philosophy and this is 
to avoid the emergence of Shi‘a Salafism and extremism. He considered that indirectly 
and under the “Middle Eastern theory which says: the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, 
Iran and Hezbollah are serving the United States’ interests through stopping the spread 
of Salafism. Even though the US administration seems to endorse the disarmament of 
Hezbollah and considers it a terrorist movement, however, it prefers that Hezbollah 
maintains its arms and protect America’s interest from the revival of Sunni 
fundamentalism (p.219-220). One can build on this conclusion to argue that it doesn’t 
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seem that the Shi‘a are being targeted but on the contrary, their influence is growing every 
time chaos engulfs a country and they are dividing the pie of hegemony in these countries 
with the US of which Lebanon and Iraq offer two obvious examples. 
Augustus Richard Norton (2007), Hezbollah: A Short History, focused as mentioned 
in its title on the history of the organization and its origins but he had not much to offer. 
He argued that the politicization of the Lebanese Shi‘a since the 1950s was a “conjuncture 
of social facts, regional conflicts and domestic policies”. Like his counterparts, Norton 
referred to the same reasons that were mentioned above as cause of the Shi‘a’s rise, yet 
with more details since he focused on the historical events rather than any theoretical 
framework, i.e. he traced back their connection to Ayatollah Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr of 
al-Najaf, the links to al-Da‘wa party who was the foundational element of the Shi‘a, and 
he gave attention to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon like all other scholars (p.11-41). These 
were common to all authors and even in his conclusion, Alagha (2007) contended that 
Lebanon’s political system has proven once more that is ruled by consensus between all 
parties and that post-2006 war Lebanon will need to mend ties between political rivals to 
avoid chaos (p.157-158). Academically, there was nothing original about Alagha’s work 
and even in the new edition, he was just narrating events that he missed in the first edition 
without deep analysis. 
One of the most informative books is Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year 
Struggle Against Israel by Nicholas Blanford (2011) who narrated the history of Hezbollah 
by explaining the origins as well as the Shi‘a roots of the organization, and emphasized 
the marginalization of the Shi‘a in the Lebanese political system, the importance of faith 
for their partisans, the mechanism of recruitment of the organization, and the 
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unwillingness of the leadership of the Shi‘a Amal Movement to face the increasingly 
oppressive Israeli operations during the invasion of Lebanon. Moreover, in his book, 
Blanford detailed the confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel especially in the 1990s 
and the 2006 July War. Though Blanford’s book is not academic, however he was able 
to get in contact with Hezbollah fighters and gather a wide range of information about 
their thoughts and personal experiences in an informative work. These works were all 
focused on Hezbollah’s emergence, its causes and the confrontation with Israel, but some 
researchers had dedicated their work in other directions as will be shown below. 
For example, Robert Baer (2015), former CIA affiliate who worked on hunting late 
Imad Moughniyeh, then Hezbollah’s prominent military apparatus leader, dubbed his 
book The Perfect Kill. The book was also narrative and not academic but Baer (2015) told 
his story of trying to hunt Moughniyeh and in his lines, one would understand how 
Moughniyeh, and by it Hezbollah, are not a mere guerilla group or insurgency, but 
strategic and have the capability to deliver. “When the pickup finally came parallel with 
the embassy’s covered portico, it abruptly drove through a gap in the oncoming traffic and 
headed up the embassy’s semicircular driveway. When it came to a short flights of stairs 
leading to the front entrance, it exploded. The embassy’s center collapsed like a failed 
wedding cake” (p.23). Baer (2015) accused Moughniyeh of masterminding all these 
operations against the US and westerners for Iran’s favor. One other informative book 
that has been useful to this work was Muhammad Mohsen’s (2017) book Wahm al-
Houdoud: Ma’rakat al-Qusayr [Border Illusion: Qusair Battle]. Mohsen is a reporter for al-
Mayadeen channel who covered Hezbollah’s early involvement in Syria, precisely in al-
Qusayr, a region that converges with the Lebanese border. Mohsen astonishingly 
	 56	
provided details about the confrontations, exact numbers and was in direct contact with 
Hezbollah fighters. Baer, Blanford and Mohsen’s books offered original primary material, 
and for this they stand out as excellent. 
Other scholars and analysts have published works about Hezbollah, some were 
academic and constructive and some were lunched with an obvious bias. Daniel 
L. Byman and Bilal Y. Saab (2014) suggested in “Hezbollah in a Time of Transition” that 
the organization still depends on Iran’s support and looks for strategical and religious 
guidance from Ayatollah Khamenei (p.4), but it gained autonomy and became a partner 
rather than a proxy (Byman, Daniel & Saab, Bilal, 2014). This thesis will focus on this 
exact transition that Hezbollah has undergone and how it became a partner in the axis. A 
wide range of pundits framed Hezbollah as a proxy or even a marionette for Tehran. 
Although it played a proxy role in certain theaters of operation like in Iraq and Yemen, 
visualizing the Hezbollah-Iran connection as a servant-master relationship is, both an 
underestimation of Hezbollah’s role and a superficial attestation centered on political 
allegations. Zayn Knaub (2013) argued that the ideological momentum of Hezbollah is 
the creation of its proxy-relationship with Tehran and that the Faqih’s order to Nasrallah 
is “inherently divine and intertwined within the fabric of Hezbollah”. Similarly, Kip 
Whittington (2012) emphasized that “conventional wisdom among scholars suggest that 
Hezbollah, acting as an Iranian proxy, will retaliate against Israel” and that the Lebanese 
organization will “undertake military action” against Israel if it pursued a policy that 
damages Hezbollah’s “vital geostrategic interest– Primarily regime change in Iran”. To be 
sure, Hezbollah, under Nasrallah’s leadership and throughout Syria’s civil war, has 
developed to a regional ANSA and partner in the axis. It became a quasi-army merging 
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between guerilla and classical warfare tactics, and exploited its endemic sectarian identity 
in the region as this thesis will emphasize; therefore, as a partner in this axis, Knaub’s 
claim is accurate and Hezbollah loudly expressed that any attack against Iran will ablaze 
the region.  
Some scholarly works are distinguished for their contributions in terms of 
methodology and academy. One book is Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance to 
Government, co-authored by James Worrall, Simon Mabon & Gordon Club (2016) who 
related the emergence of Hezbollah to social movements theories: The relative 
deprivation theory and the resource mobilization theory. The former stressed that 
grievance and deprivation lead to social movements while the latter maintained three 
characteristics: political environment, mobilization structure, and ideology (p.22-26). In 
fact, the social movement theory is applicable on Islamic activism, therefore on Hezbollah 
but this thesis will not delve into this frame of work. But it is valid to say that Hezbollah’s 
emergence, endurance and mobilization is based on these dynamics and three factors 
are applicable can be applied: Identity, agency, and urgency. In 2011, the attempt to 
murder the Israeli Consul in Turkey. In 2014, security agencies in Peru thwarted an 
attempt to target Jewish and Israeli interests (Worall et al., 2016, p.66-67). These attacks, 
if true, occurred in delicate times. Had Hariri been really killed by Hezbollah, it would be 
a retaliation against his tacit galvanization of the 1559 UNSCR that was targeting 
Hezbollah and Syria. Although the Special Tribunal officially blamed Hezbollah, the latter 
has denied these premises. As long as the axis remains solid, targeting Hezbollah and 
minimizing its influence seems the hardest milestone for its rivals.  
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Worrall et al. (2016) stated four waves of terrorism quoting David Rappaport and 
placed Hezbollah within the Religious Wave that was sparked by the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran (p.12-15). Theoretically and factually, Hezbollah was the outcome of 
this Religious Wave and Iran’s power projection throughout the Middle East. But the root 
causes of this emergence are much deeper, date back to the pre-1979 Revolution era 
and are more related to the rise of the Shi‘a as part of the rise of Islamic activism. 
However, Worrall et al. (2016) described Hezbollah’s uniqueness and its label as terrorist 
by major Western countries while being admitted as a resistance by the Lebanese 
government and supported by the majority of Shi‘a. Hezbollah, they argued, does not fit 
terrorism characteristics even though it uses political violence (p.15-18). Indeed, these 
labels are terminologies used to undermine states or non-state actors that opposes the 
western camp and stands as a bulwark against its foreign policy plans. For example, anti-
Israel and US authoritarian regimes, such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, had been labeled 
non-grata regimes, while pro-US authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt’s Husni Moubarak 
regime, had been pleasantly accepted. Therefore, labeling actors depends on the 
geopolitical stances of individuals, groups and states. Hezbollah’s labeling has therefore 
been at the discretion of each state.  
Worrall et al. (2016) maintained that while Iran and Syria played a key role in 
establishing Hezbollah, saying that the latter is a proxy that functions as a subordinate for 
Tehran is an oversight of the organizations’ autonomy (p.114); and with the growth of 
Hezbollah’s autonomy from Iran, tension rose between both sides (p.128-129). However, 
this is a misleading argument because Hezbollah’s fate is pegged to Iran and its survival 
would be murkier without Tehran’s support. The relationship is a two-lane route with a 
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shared destiny and deep religious belief under wilayat al-faqih’s authority, and Syria’s civil 
war brought them closer to each other. Moreover, facts on the ground provided 
compelling proofs that in the battlefield, they fight as one entity with mutual trust. In 
chapter 4, they described Hezbollah as socio-political actor who’s shaped by these realms 
and acted in conjunction with both. They argued that Hezbollah’s future is associated with 
its interaction with its social environment and its domestic and external political alliances 
(Worall et al., 2016, p.110-111). This approach is plausible and plausible if one wants to 
understand Hezbollah’s dynamic.  
Worrall at al. (2016) underscored the post-Arab Spring era, Hezbollah’s intervention 
in the Syrian war and its new position among other states and groups in the Middle East. 
They mentioned Hezbollah’s gradual intrusion in Syria and Nasrallah’s arguments 
defending their involvement, in addition to the geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia that pushed the latter and its allies to face Hezbollah considering it as the former’s 
proxy. More than that, they emphasized the rise of sectarianism caused by the Syrian 
civil war that pushed Hamas to oppose Hezbollah’s standing with Bashar al-Assad. 
Hezbollah sought to unite all Arab sects after the upsurge of the Islamic State in 2014 
considering that it is a takfiri threat to everyone that opposes it, not only to Shi‘a or other 
minorities (p.131-148). However, the sectarian splits and geopolitical stances prevented 
such endeavors. They concluded that Hezbollah’s new challenge will be adapting within 
the Sunni surrounding after all these incidences while keeping its resistance face against 
Israel (p.151). This analysis is genuine, but even though Hezbollah’s discourse will always 
seek to prove that its main focus is against Israel, it became clear that its priorities 
fluctuate depending on the events and interest of the axis. When Assad’s collapse was 
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imminent, Hezbollah rushed headlong and fought in Syria. This was a double-edged 
sword, undermining Hezbollah’s Sunni support, but protecting its regional depth and 
geopolitical interest.  
In 2019, Adham Saouli published a book entitled Hezbollah: Socialization and its 
Tragic Ironies, in which he focused on Hezbollah’s socialization throughout its history and 
how the events shaped its identity. Saouli described Hezbollah as a ‘politico-religious’ 
group driven by war-making, and without it, it would be stripped of its identity and 
significance. He considered that the overlap of politics and religion shaped the 
organization’s motives and behavior. Furthermore, Saouli explained that Hezbollah acted 
pragmatically in many occasions by overcoming the social and political restraints. 
Furthermore, he exploited the ideological and political behavior of Hezbollah and its 
hybrid nature and conceptualized it as an armed political movement that was shaped by 
a socialization process. Saouli has taken a new academic approach in addressing 
Hezbollah and his argument about the socialization of the organization is original. In his 
words, “this study has drawn on the rich intellectual tradition of Historical Sociology”. The 
latter, Saouli pursued, “locates actors (such as Hezbollah) within the context; it attempts 
to understand the genesis of actors, their motivations and the constraints and 
opportunities they face as they try to realize their goals” (Saouli, 2019, p.214). Saouli’s 
framework has indeed created a new perspective for the study of Hezbollah. 
Saouli (2019) argued that “there is a strong, organic religio-political connection 
between Hezbollah and the Wilayat al-Faqih in the Islamic Republic” and that even though 
Hezbollah abides by the broad political strategy implemented by the Faqih, nonetheless 
it has a wide margin of freedom (p.150). Hezbollah’s freedom of maneuver has been 
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confirmed even by its foes that have been interviewed for the purpose of this paper. 
Whereas the margin that Saouli described is true in Lebanon, it has restrictions 
elsewhere. And the freedom that Hezbollah enjoys is not unquestionable but on the 
contrary, in some arenas, as this thesis will prove, Hezbollah functions on the Iranian 
clock, namely in Iraq and Yemen. Furthermore, in Syria it operates in conjunction with 
Iranian and Syrian forces, but as a partner not a subordinate. Saouli’s emphasis that on 
one hand Iran’s bolstering has been vital and effective on Hezbollah’s war-making and 
on the other Hezbollah represented a strategic presence for Tehran in the Middle East, 
is valid. Although Saouli addressed a timeframe that matches the one addressed in this 
study, however the purposes, the aims and the approach are different. But, of all the 
works done about Hezbollah, Saouli’s academic contribution has been the most original. 
Writings prior to the Arab Spring were confined to the scrutinization of the emergence 
of Hezbollah, the impoverishment of the Shi‘a in Lebanon and their marginalization and 
rivalry with Israel. Researchers focused on the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, Hezbollah’s 
integration into the Lebanese system and the dichotomies of resistance vs terrorist and 
autonomous vs proxy. While such arguments were either too ancient to speak about or 
falsifying such as for instance speaking about the dichotomy of autonomous vs proxy 
because this misleads the readers into an argument that does not exist as Hezbollah and 
Iran share the same destiny, the overarching aim of this study is to produce a 
comprehensive understanding of Hezbollah’s transition into a regional ANSA. The 
contribution to make here is that this transition was driven by the interplay of three 
variables during Hezbollah’s war of necessity in Syria: First, sectarian identity that served 
as a mobilizational tool; second, its transformation into a quasi-army mixing between 
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guerilla and classical warfare tactics; third, its partnership in the axis and participation in 
the decision-making process from ground offensives to operation rooms. This thesis will 
adopt “the axis” terminology to feature the alliance/partnership between Iran, Syria, 
Hezbollah, Iraqi factions, the Houthis, and to a lesser extent, Palestinian armed groups. 
Above all, it will be opined that Hezbollah played an “all-in” card in its bid to prevent the 
collapse of the Assad’s regime risking to tilt the regional power balance in its rivals’ favor. 
With the de-escalation of the Syrian conflict in 2018, the regime survived and Hezbollah 
emerged triumphant from the regional turmoil.  
2.3 Methodology 
A qualitative research approach will be conducted to elucidate when, why and how 
was Syria’s war a platform for Hezbollah to present itself as a regional mobile ANSA. 
Usually, qualitative methods aim to answer questions about the “what”, “how,” or “why” of 
a research phenomenon rather than “how many” or “how much” (Brikci, Nouria & Green, 
Judith; 2007). Through the analysis of a case study, Hezbollah, this research will highlight 
the importance of ANSAs in world politics. It will elucidate how the Lebanese organization 
played vital and decisive roles in the region and became an effective military power 
politicizing its Shi‘a sectarian identity to implement its geopolitical agenda. “Qualitative 
researchers routinely build on their in-depth knowledge of cases to gain further insights 
about causal process, which among other things can improve causal inference by 
suggesting important missing variables” (Gerardo Munck, 2004, p.120). 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) argued that a researcher chooses 
case studies as a precise feature of a historical episode rather than the event itself (p.18). 
Four major characteristics make case methods credible and give them advantage in 
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testing hypotheses and developing theories: “their potential for achieving high conceptual 
validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful 
means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of 
individual cases; their capacity for addressing causal complexity”. By other means, case 
studies allow scholars to study the theoretical concept they intend to measure, they help 
identify new variables and hypotheses during the research and field work by interviewing 
experts, historians and participants. Moreover, single case studies measure a variety of 
intervening variables and perceive aspects that stimulated the causal mechanism and 
study the complex interaction (George and Bennett, 2005, p.19). Gerardo L. Munck 
(2004) contended that qualitative researchers observe indications about causal activities 
that generated the outcome giving credibility to the tested hypotheses (p.110). 
Furthermore, Munck (2004) considered that single case studies can be used for the 
assessment of theories (p.116), which is the case in this research that is shedding light 
to the importance of ANSA in IR.  
This thesis will use primary and secondary resources such as online database, in-
depth interviews and field work where necessary. Secondary resources are necessary 
and cannot be abandoned in any research. However, Katheleen M. Blee (2002) 
emphasized that interviews give access to scholars to understand the incentives and 
perceptions of social movement participants more than documentation and secondary 
resources (p.93). In-depth interviews give space to the informant to reveal supplementary 
material and nuanced answers making these interviews “a complex array of data” useful 
to challenge or support a theory (Munck, p.116). Bert Klandermans and Suzanne 
Staggenborg (2002) stressed that in-depth interviews are essential in evolving theoretical 
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paradigms, they measure motives, life histories and decode complicated phenomena 
(p.XV). These interviews, will be semi-structured rather than structured. In this type of 
interviews, the interviewer will conduct face-to-face interviews with one person, or can be 
conducted by other methods such as phone call, mail or self-administrated questionnaires 
(Blee, p.100). He will be guided by prearranged questions, yet he has the flexibility to 
deviate based on the collaboration of the informant. Semi-structured questionnaires are 
valuable for understanding social movement mobilization from different standpoints, more 
precisely that of the movement’s actors (Blee, p.92).  
The existing international relations theories are a necessity to the understanding 
of world politics. But the role of NSAs, namely ANSA, have been undermined by most of 
these theories. Consequently, this this will focus on the role of ANSAs in regional politics 
and IR. Therefore, it will analyze Hezbollah as a case study by focusing on its role in Syria 
and how the necessity to engage in the Syrian conflict has transformed it into a regional 
ANSA by the interplay between three variables: sectarian mobilization and the 
instrumentalization of sectarian identity, the shift into a quasi-army and its embed as a 
central partner in the axis. This research will study Hezbollah’s operations on the 
domestic and regional theatres from 2004-05 until the Lebanese parliamentary elections 
in May 2018. It will emphasize how Hezbollah, one among an array of ANSAs, has used 
the sectarian card into what was a geopolitical contest rather than a sectarian conflict and 
has emerged from Syria’s tumultuous civil war a regional ANSA and a key player in the 
regional order.  
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3 Background, Emergence and Religious and Political Allegiances 
3.1 Introduction 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s waliyy al-faqih (Guardian of the Jurisprudence) 
opined: “Take heed, our capacities are not merely those things we possess domestically, 
we also have important capacities outside the country; we have supporters, we gave 
strategic depth … in some cases because of Islam, in others because of language, and 
still others because of the Shi‘a religion. These are the country’s strategic depth; these 
are part of our capabilities; we must use all our capabilities” (Eskandar Sadeghi-
Boroujerdi, 2017, p.129). From the core of this mentality, Hezbollah was hence produced. 
Hezbollah, indeed, embodied the rise of Islamism that replaced the flickering Pan-
Arabism since the end of the 1960s. Backed by Iran, and Syria to some extent, Hezbollah 
emerged amid Lebanon’s civil war, and not only endured in the post-war era, but 
proliferated. Its raison d’être was its struggle against Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, 
promising to pursue the fight until the full liberation of both Lebanon and Palestine, and 
the annihilation of Zionism. Adopting an assertive policy on the domestic and regional 
levels, Hezbollah further increased its influence. In 1992, Hezbollah’s political wing was 
formed through its participation in the parliamentary elections declaring its new infitah 
(openness) policy. In 2000, Hezbollah was accredited for the withdrawal of the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon. 
This chapter will unpack the rise of the Shi‘a which is necessary to understand the 
root causes of Hezbollah’s emergence and its obedience to wilayat al-faqih (The 
Guardianship of the Jurisprudent) –a religious belief implemented by Ayatollah al-
Khomeini in Iran after the successful revolution in 1979 to guide Islamic Umma (Nation). 
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Hezbollah’s loyalty to Lebanon became a subject of doubt because of this doctrinal creed. 
Blamed, by most western and more recently Gulf Countries, for conducting local and 
international operations against civilians and military personnel, and destabilizing the 
region and executing attacks of Iran’s behalf, Hezbollah is listed as terrorist. Though, for 
Hezbollah, and many of its supporters, these accusations are void and based on false 
premises and political stances.  
3.2 Historical Background 
With the demise of Pan-Arabism that was mainly marked by the defeat of the 
charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdelnasser in the 1967 war against Israel, a new 
transnational doctrine amplified, Islamism. It is hard to escape the sense of defeat among 
Arab masses who were dealt an immense blow by the 1967 defeat but also by the failure 
of their nation-states in the post-colonial era to achieve economic prosperity and secure 
better livelihoods for citizens. Islam is the solution, many Arab Muslims believed. That 
said, for our purposes, “Hezbollah”, Aurelie Daher (2019) argued, “is generally defined as 
an Islamist organization” (p.8). This was further emphasized by Hezbollah’s deputy head 
of political relations: Hezbollah is a jihadist ideological movement that intervenes in 
politics.8 It started operating in 1982 and in the ensuing years, it secretly executed 
operations against Israel and other western targets. It was officially launched on 16 
February 1985 by a statement it dubbed “Open Letter”, right after the withdrawal of the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from Sidon, south Lebanon (Joseph Alagha, 2011, p.15). 
The rejection of Israel’s occupation was its first motive, but Islam, was the conduit which 
it used as a “guarantor of the legitimacy of the principle cause” (Daher, 2019, p.8). One 
                                                
8 Interview with author. On 8 September 2018. 
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should state here that Hezbollah was neither the only Lebanese armed group that 
launched operations against Israel nor the first. Anti-Israel parties and armed groups such 
as the Socialist Party and the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) had begun this 
campaign earlier. 
To bring the discussion to the point, it is too narrow to scrutinize Hezbollah without 
understanding the overall posture of the Shi‘a and their rise. Initially settled in Jabal Amil, 
southern Lebanon, and in the Beqaa Valley, eastern Lebanon, the Shi‘a were politically 
and economically marginalized. Genieve Abdo (2017) contended that Shi‘a in Jabal Amil 
and the Beqaa payed taxes but received few services in return with the former merely 
having paved roads and electricity (p.103). Nicholas Blanford (2011) seconded that the 
Shi‘a areas weren’t included in the blossom of the country. “In 1943”, he argued, “there 
was not a single hospital in south Lebanon” (p.14). Augustus Richard Norton (2007) 
added that Shi‘a lacked political influence in Lebanon due to impoverishment and 
underdevelopment (p.12). These cruel financial and economic conditions in their urban 
habitats pressed them to search for prosperity and better livelihood elsewhere; therefore, 
many journeyed to the peripheral neighborhoods of the capital, specifically al-Dahiyah al-
Janoubiyeh (The Southern Suburb). Settling at the edges, they lived under the poverty 
line and moved to Beirut every day to work in factories or as service workers boosting a 
few to be middle-class (Abdo, 2017, p.103). Now at least, living in Beirut’s suburbs 
shortened the distance with the booming city that was witnessing prosper during the 
1950s. 
Sectarian identity being the primary driver of politics in 19th century Mount Lebanon 
and Lebanon since its emergence in 1920, the Shi‘a were sidelined on the political level. 
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Abdo (2017) emphasized that amid an Arab entourage dominated by Sunnis, who 
represented approximately 90%, the Shi‘a were placed at disadvantage. They were 
persecuted and repressed across centuries at the hands of Sunnis and this sharpened 
their attitudes and cemented their Shi‘a identity (p.12). This is plainly not the case and 
scholars such as Abdo provided simplistic explanations for sectarian dynamics. Here, she 
clearly pictures a Sunni-Shi‘a animosity as if both sects were fighting for religious truths. 
Indeed, Shi‘a were oppressed at a certain point in places such as Saudi Arabia where the 
Wahhabi doctrine prevailed spreading mayhem against Shi‘a communities. However, this 
is an exception and generally speaking, sectarian contest was a secondary motive and 
sectarian identity was a mere mobilizational tool. For instance, as the Mamlukis were 
expanding along the Mediterranean in the thirteenth century, they confiscated the lands 
of the Shiʿa and Nusayris (current day Alawites) for their blur stance vis-à-vis the 
Crusaders –expelled by the Mamlukis off Lebanon’s coastline (Kamal Deeb, 2015, p.53), 
and in 1267, the Sultan prohibited the abidance by any creed that does not belong to the 
four Sunni madhabs (Shafiʿi, Hanbali, Maliki and Hanafi) (Kamal Arzouni, 2010, p.143). 
The point to make here is that sectarianism does not give the ultimate explanation to the 
Middle East’s chaos (Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel, 2017, p.6). Fanar Haddad (2020) 
argued that sectarian dynamics are driven by both religion and politics “with the balance 
between the two being dictated by context” (p.59). But the absence of a Shi‘a identity or 
Shi‘a-centric party, they joined secular parties that challenged imperialism, westernization 
and the local government such as the SSNP. 
This status quo altered in mid-20th century that witnessed the rise of the Shi‘a. 
Generally speaking, Tawfik al-Saif (2018) stressed that the sense of victimhood and 
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marginalization has changed over time into a quest in order to find a link between this 
deprivation on one side, and the sectarian and ethnic identity on the other (p.307). That 
said, in 1959, Moussa al-Sadr, an Iranian Shi‘a cleric that traced back his origins to Jabal 
Amil, arrived to Lebanon at the age of thirty-one (Nicholas Blanford, 2011, p.15). 15 years 
later, he started marketing a new movement in Shi‘a areas, namely the Beqaa and 
southern Lebanon, which he called Harakat al-Mahroumeen (Movement of the Deprived), 
with its armed wing called Amal (Afwaj al-Moukawama al-Loubnaniyya or Regiments of 
the Lebanese Resistance) –Amal became later the official name of the party. Al-Sadr led 
a dual confrontation: on one side, he was at odds with Shi‘a feudalists in the south, namely 
al-Ass‘ad family, and therefore challenged their political authority; on the other side, he 
galvanized Shi‘a to resist all sorts of marginalization and deprivation. Further afield, al-
Sadr started establishing institutions for the Shi‘a, i.e. Jabal Amil Institute and the 
Supreme Islamic Shi‘a Council. These establishments survived and are still playing 
important roles within the Shi‘a community and the clerical leadership. In August 1978, 
al-Sadr traveled to Libya and never came back, and Mouammar al-Kaddafi, then Libya’s 
President, was accused of kidnapping him. “Yet many Shi‘a openly cling to the hope that 
Sadr is still alive and will one-day return” (Blanford, 2011, p.32). In 1980, Nabih Berri 
became the new leader of the Amal movement and played a cardinal role in pre and post-
civil war Lebanon. 
Besides, it is necessary to tackle al-Da‘wa party which emerged as a clandestine 
Shi‘a-centric organization and metastasized in the Shi‘a areas across the Middle East. Al-
Da‘wa was led by Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr, a philosopher and Iraqi Shi‘a cleric who was 
executed in 1980 by Saddam Hussein. In Lebanon, Muhammad Mahdi Chamseddine and 
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Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, were the main figures who spearheaded al-Da‘wa in 
coordination with al-Sadr. Blanford (2011) stressed that secret equipped units, called 
Qassam, were established by al-Da‘wa and frequently clashed with the Iraqi Ba‘ath Party 
in Lebanon. Qassam fighters were also protecting key Da‘wa figures who would later play 
significant roles in the formation of Hezbollah (p.35). According to Hezbollah’s cabinet 
member who was previously part of al-Da‘wa, “in Lebanon, each person in al-Da‘wa had 
to join other Lebanese groups such as the Amal movement, “al-Mabarrat al-Khayriyya” 
(an Islamic non-profit organization to help the orphans) and other organizations. Al-Da‘wa 
was indeed an Octopus placing each hand in a different group. I was close to Moussa al-
Sadr and a military leader in Amal while my primary allegiance was to al-Da‘wa party.”9 
Hezbollah’s cabinet member explained that they were funded by al-Da‘wa in Iraq. 
Moreover, he recruited youth fighters through a football club in al-Dahiyah which he used 
to approach them and at that time, he enlisted Mustafa Badreddeen, the successor of 
Hezbollah’s head of security apparatus Imad Moughniyeh and his brother-in-law. They 
were both killed in Syria, the latter by an explosion in 2008, and the former in 2016 during 
the civil war. Additionally, Hezbollah’s Minister traced back their demands to create an 
Islamic State to al-Da‘wa party: “We were determined to create an Islamic Resistance 
and establish an Islamic State long before joining Hezbollah. However, this stance 
changed over time, and Hezbollah was convinced that it is impossible to implement an 
Islamic State in Lebanon. Though, if we were merged with other countries, Muslims would 
be a majority and an Islamic State would then be likely”. This means that the 
implementation of an Islamic State was the desire of zealous Islamists prior to the 
                                                
9 Interview with author. 12 September 2018. 
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establishment of Hezbollah, but also this desire somewhat endures waiting for better 
circumstances. Bringing the discussion back to al-Da‘wa, its fighters were trained by 
Khalil al-Wazir, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) military symbol and leader, 
alias Abou Jihad.10 Norton (2007) also stressed that Amal fighters were trained by Fatah, 
the dominant faction in the PLO (p.17).  
Further afield, from 1980 until the invasion of Beirut in 1982, Iran was assisting the 
Amal movement. However, Berri took a decision not to fight the Israelis and he refused 
to fight even with Iranian assistance.11 Amal’s leadership informed its units not to 
challenge the IDF (Blanford, 2011, p.61). Blanford (2011) cited three key figures that split 
from Amal after this event: Hussein al-Mussawi, deputy leader of Amal; Ibrahim al-Amine, 
Amal’s attaché to Tehran; and Hassan Nasrallah, later Hezbollah’s secretary general 
(p.46). Interviewed by a Lebanese television channel in 1995, Nasrallah traced back the 
defection from Amal to the decision that was taken vis-à-vis the Israeli invasion, claiming 
that it was “more than a tactical misunderstanding.”12 Nevertheless, factions of Amal 
fought the Israelis in some areas in southern Lebanon and in Khaldeh, on Beirut’s 
periphery, along with other factions, despite the decision of their leadership. The battle of 
Khaldeh delayed the advance towards the capital and caused heavy losses in the ranks 
of the IDF. According to a former militia leader who was injured while fighting the Israelis 
in Beirut, “there was a decision by Amal not to fight, yet in the south some members took 
individual choices to face the IDF. In Beirut, they officially informed us of their withdrawal, 
                                                
10 Interview with author. 15 September 2018. 
11 Interview with author. 15 September 2018. 
12 “Interview with Nasrallah”. by Joubran Toueini. On 24 September 1995. LBCI 
Channel. Retrieved from: https://www.lbcgroup.tv/watch/37296/first-interview-with-
sayyed-hassan-nasrallah-in-19/en 
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and therefore they shaved their beards and headed back to their villages. One Israeli tank 
was captured in the Battle of Khaldeh by “Al-Saika” (Thunderbolt), a pro-Syria Palestinian 
military group but Amal took it from them on their way back to Beirut’s suburb, al-
Dahiyah”.13 In light of these events, Blanford (2011) argued that Iran realized that Amal 
was not the appropriate faction to help spreading the Islamic revolutions’ ideas in 
Lebanon (p.35). Had Amal movement’s leadership decided to fight against Israel, it might 
have prevented the establishment of Hezbollah. So Judith Palmer Harik (2005) 
maintained that a group of Lebanese Shi‘a, some who were former Amal figures and 
determined to fight Israel fitted Iran’s foreign policy agenda as several had been 
previously tested by the IRGC through executing operations in its favor. Sharing the same 
goals of the Islamic Republic, it sponsored them and shaped an organization with a 
domestic leadership that would fight against Israel (p.39). Lebanon’s chaotic status and 
the collapse of state institutions during the civil war, made the war-prone country fertile 
for the thrive of armed non-state groups of different backgrounds and ideologies. 
Al-Da‘wa, however, was somehow a transitional organization for these Shi‘a-
centric fighters. In its constitution, it was stated that with the appearance of any Islamic 
State or leading Islamist figure they shall declare their fusion with it, and the subsequent 
emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran was the perfect opportunity14. Besides, 
Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr stated: “melt in Khomeini as he melted in Islam.”15 In late 1980, 
the “Nonet Delegation”, a group of 9 individuals: three representing Amal Movement, 
                                                
13 Interview with author. 18 September 2018. 
14 Interview with author. 12 Septmber 2018.  
15 Hezbollah’s MP Ali Fayad. 3 January 2013. 
http://imamcenter.net/essaydetails.php?eid=89&cid=55 
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three representing the Islamic Committees and three Tajammou’ al-Oulama’ al-
Mouslimeen (The Gathering of the Islamic Clerics), traveled to Iran. In fact, the majority 
were secretly al-Da‘wa16. Likewise, Blanford (2011) confirmed that the delegation, which 
he called “Manifesto of the Nine”, included clerics who studied with al-Sadr in Najaf, and 
praised the establishment of a Lebanese Islamic organization swearing allegiance to 
Khomeini and his jurisprudence (p.46-47). Naim Qssem (2005), Hezbollah’s deputy 
secretary general, traced back the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran to the 
demonstrations that took place in Lebanon after the success of the Islamic Revolution: 
“Prior to this development, there had been no connection with the Iranian Revolution, as 
such matters were in the realm of clerical issues” (p.18). By other words, Qassem tried to 
take responsibility for demanding the foundation of what became later Hezbollah. 
However, Hezbollah was not Iran’s only ideological replica as the latter sought to expand 
from Afghanistan and Pakistan all the way to Lebanon in its bid to amplify its clout. As 
mentioned earlier, the personnel who later formed Hezbollah’s leadership, were eager to 
create an Islamic group but this does dispel Iran’s intention to increase its regional 
influence. 
On this matter, Harik (2005) argued that as Syria sought to defend its own interests 
in Lebanon, Iran wanted to bridge the gap with a wider Arab and Islamic public. So the 
leadership of both countries bargained a deal allowing members of the IRGC to cross into 
Lebanon and establish a camp to train fighters Hezbollah fighters, but Syria controlled the 
timing of the raids against the IDF so that Israel and the US would well receive the 
message (p. 39). To be clear, Syria’s regime wanted to exploit the emergence of 
                                                
16 Interview with author. 12 September 2018. 
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Hezbollah for its own geopolitical agenda and as a leverage on the negotiation table. 
According to Blanford (2011), Syria didn’t want Tehran to start a new fight with Israel that 
had proven costly to the Syrian army, yet it agreed to let them build a resistance force 
instead. In exchange, Iran would assist Syria with nine million tons of free oil every year 
(p.44). Therefore, Iran sent 1000 Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek in the Beqaa Valley 
to train a group of former Amal partisans who embraced wilayat al-faqih’s doctrine 
(Shoghig Mikaelian and Bassel Salloukh, 2016) –which will be explained in the next 
section. IRGC members moved to Zabadani, a Syrian village close to Lebanon’s borders 
and started infiltrating into the Beqaa Valley where they settled and started implementing 
Khomeini’s ideas and beliefs among people. Hezbollah was hence born, and in the 
ensuing decades, it witnessed a variety of transformations and developments on the 
military, social and political levels. 
Since then, Hezbollah has been held responsible of orchestrating many operations 
against western targets, chiefly Americans. Moughniyeh is accused of being the 
mastermind behind all the assaults conducted against western forces, including 
kidnapping foreigners and hijacking airplanes. However, Hezbollah denied all these 
accusations and Nasrallah said that the “Islamic Jihad Organization” (IJO) claimed 
responsibility for these assaults.17 Robert Baer (2015), a former CIA who failed to hunt 
Moughniyeh, believed that the latter organized the attacks under the name of the IJO 
(p.56), giving Hezbollah more room for plausible deniability. William J. Burns (2019) 
maintained that Iran bought arms from the US and helped releasing “the American 
                                                
17 “Interview with Nasrallah”. by Joubran Toueini. On 24 September 1995. LBCI 
Channel. Retrieved from: https://www.lbcgroup.tv/watch/37296/first-interview-with-
sayyed-hassan-nasrallah-in-19/en 
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hostages by their Hezbollah captors in Lebanon” (p.35) –an operation that was later 
dubbed Iran-Contra. The point to be made here is that Hezbollah’s hostages release 
happened on Iran’s demand reflecting the relationship between both and providing a 
damning proof of Hezbollah’s role.  
In fact, Hezbollah’s influence started increasing since 1983 in the predominantly 
Shi‘a-inhabited south increasing the number of attacks against the IDF which started 
paying a high price in terms of casualties. At this state, as mentioned earlier, Hezbollah 
did not yet declare itself and was operating clandestinely. On 11 November 1983, a truck 
full of explosives blasted the Israeli headquarter in Tyre, south Lebanon, killing more than 
70 soldiers. The executioner was Ahmad Kassir, a seventeen years old southerner and 
Moughniyeh’s best friend. Hezbollah would only claim its responsibility for the attack after 
the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from the area. Blanford (2011) stressed that according to Bilal 
Sharara, then a Fatah commander, Khalil al-Wazir provided Moughniyeh with explosives 
as he claimed of recruiting someone to execute a suicide mission against the IDF (p.53). 
Subsequently, the IDF retaliated to each attack by bombing Hezbollah’s camps in the 
Beqaa or by murdering the organization’s personnel. In 1984, Sheikh Ragheb Harb, a 
leading clerical figure within Hezbollah who was using his mosque to mobilize and recruit 
fighters for Hezbollah, was shot dead on his way home.  
On 14 January 1985, Israel declared a three-stage withdrawal plan (p,67-69); 
which was planned to be completed by the end of June. On 16 February, one month after 
the declaration and Israel’s retreat from Sidon further south, Hezbollah announced its 
birth in a press conference in al-Dahiyah where it announced the “Open Letter”, a 
statement explaining its aims. “The chosen date was the first anniversary of the 
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assassination of Sheikh Ragheb Harb” (Blenford, 2011, p.71). The “Open Letter” 
addressed the following points and explained Hezbollah’s stance vis-à-vis each of these 
topics: “oppressors and oppressed; Islamic State; relations with Christians; anti-Zionism; 
Pan-Islamism; anti-Imperialism; and Jihad and Martyrdom” (Alagha, 2011, p.15). Qassem 
(2005) argued that the revelation lifted Hezbollah from a secret resistance movement 
prohibited from political and media exposure to a well-known political faction (p.98). 
Further afield, this was an alteration in the balance of power and in the ensuing months, 
Hezbollah’s influence increased paving the way for recruiting new fighters.  
Fresh recruits received intense trainings to defend their towns against any possible 
raids and conduct attacks against the IDF and the South Lebanese Army (SLA), a Brigade 
headed by general Saad Haddad that defected from the Lebanese Armed Forces at the 
beginning of the Lebanese civil war and was predominantly Christian. The SLA was 
assisted, backed and financed by the IDF and was continuously targeted by Hezbollah 
along with Israeli forces and headquarters. For instance, “On 2 January, 1987, Hezbollah 
launched an assault against SLA outpost on a hill overlooking the village of Braasheet in 
what was the first concerted attempt to storm and overrun a militia position” (Blanford, 
2011, p.85). In effect, the IDF outmaneuvered Hezbollah, therefore, the latter couldn’t 
position in any location and used a guerilla tactic of hit-and-run hoping to overcome its 
enemy before retreating. 
The rising influence of Hezbollah on the ground frightened the Amal movement, 
who was then the only power among the Shi‘a. So while the hostilities of the civil war 
were at its end, Blanford (2011) opined that tensions increased between Amal movement 
and Hezbollah and it seemed that the clash became inevitable (p.87). Further afield, this 
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domestic rivalry was developing in tandem with disagreements between Iran and Syria 
who were sponsoring Hezbollah and Amal, respectively. In 1988, fights erupted between 
both parties starting with slight clashes in several southern villages and then gradually 
spread to al-Dahiyeh in Beirut’s suburbs. Qassem (2005) claimed that Hezbollah sought 
a ceasefire and ordered its units to stop the fighting but when it felt that this is a “fight for 
existence”, the leadership decided to restore the confrontations (p.101). 
In January 1989, the most severe fights took place in Iqleem al-Tuffah hills in the 
south when Hezbollah launched an offensive against Amal strongholds in the area. This 
intra-Shi‘a conflict was one of the fiercest intra-sectarian clashes during the Lebanese 
civil war. While Hezbollah was prevailing, the SAA intervened to prevent Amal, its main 
ally, from a total forfeit. This intervention balanced the flank between both sides, with a 
minor leverage for Hezbollah. The 1988 Shi‘a–Shi‘a confrontation, dubbed the “Brothers’ 
war” was sealed two years later through a consensus between Iran and Syria. In 
November 1990, the so called Tehran-Damascus Agreement ended hostilities between 
the two Shi‘a factions (Nicholas Noe, 2007, p.34). After almost two years of fighting, 
Qassem (2005) argued, consecutive meetings between Syria’s foreign minister Farouk 
al-Shara‘ and his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Wilayati, were held and a compromise was 
reached with the presence of Nabih Berri, Amal’s leader, and Subhi al-Tufaili, then 
Hezbollah’s Secretary General: The immediate halt of hostilities and Hezbollah can freely 
operate in the south (p.102). Hezbollah’s cabinet member considered, by and large, this 
fight as the most remorseful and darkest moment in the organization’s history.18 In fact, if 
anything, Hezbollah’s growth would have been more daunting  and wouldn’t continue to 
                                                
18 Interview with author. 12 September 2018. 
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rise unabated in Lebanon militarily and politically without easing tensions among the Shi‘a 
community. Intra-sectarian harmony was paramount to seek further domestic and 
regional influence. It is necessary to note here that in 1990, Lebanese foes agreed to end 
hostilities sealing the civil war –an agreement that was called the Ta’if agreement. The 
bargain was sponsored by regional and international states, namely the US, Saudi Arabia 
and Syria, giving the latter the upper hand in Lebanon for the next 15 years. With Syria’s 
approval, the agreement legalized Hezbollah’s resistance face and gave it the right to 
maintain its arsenal in order to fight Israel which was still occupying parts of the country. 
Meanwhile, the schism within Hezbollah was deepening between Subhi al-Tufaili, 
a hard-liner and then recently elected Hezbollah’s secretary general, and the soft-liners 
led by Abbas al-Mussawi and Hassan Nasrallah. Parallel to that, the more pragmatic and 
soft-liner Ayatollah Khamenei succeeded the late Khomeini as Iran’s supreme leader. 
With Khamenei now in power, Iran’s foreign policy became more lenient and therefore 
affected the prevail of the soft-liners within its Lebanese ideological replica, Hezbollah. In 
May 1991, al-Mussawi replaced al-Tufaili as Hezbollah’s secretary general and adopted 
a new policy that was called “inftiah policy” (Openness). In February 1992, al-Moussawi 
was assassinated by Israeli Apache helicopters along with his wife and 5 years old son. 
In response, Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets for the first time into Israel. Following this 
event, Hassan Nasrallah was elected secretary general and followed the footsteps of his 
predecessor and idol. Blanford (2011) stressed that with Nasrallah in leadership, the 
organization’s image started moderating (p.100). That year, Hezbollah participated in the 
parliamentary elections for the first time as part of the “infitah policy”. Qasem (2005) 
acknowledged that the decision to participate was under discussion and al-Tufaili was 
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spearheading an anti-participation campaign as he considered that Hezbollah should not 
legitimize a non-Islamic polity (Blanford, 2011, p.100). Therefore, “the council 
[Hezbollah’s highest decision-maker committee] suggested that the mechanism for 
ultimate decision-making should go through a twelve-member delegation grouping the 
most prominent Hezbollah representatives, inclusive of Council members” (Qassem, 
2005, p.187). However, the council voted 10 to 2 in favor of the participation in the 
elections. 
In its electoral program, Hezbollah justified its participation by the following: its 
responsibility towards Lebanon’s oppressed citizens, the neglected rights and people’s 
trust in the party. “We made up our mind, relying on God, and decided to participate in 
electoral politics on the basis of a comprehensive political program, which our candidates 
are obliged to do their utmost best to put it into operation, asking our populace to support 
it and follow up on it” (Joseph Alagha, 2011, p.63-64). Furthermore, it enhanced its “infitah 
policy” by forming cross-sectarian alliances with Christian, Sunni and secular parties. 
Hence, Hezbollah won 8 seats and formed a parliamentary bloc of 12 members. This 
policy was a tacit acceptance of the Lebanese system and a major shift in Hezbollah’s 
modus operandi. Nonetheless, Blanford (2011) considered that the organization’s 
pragmatism since 1992 was to uphold its war against Israel rather than an ideological 
softness (p.102). To be sure, Hezbollah emerged as a sect-centric group and sectarian 
identity was the core machinery of mobilization and this ideology never changed. 
However, the alteration was based on the acceptance of the sectarian and religious 
diversity in Lebanon. In fact, if anything, Hezbollah became rational at this period of time. 
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Fighting to implement an Islamic State would have generated nemesis among other 
Lebanese sects and would have led to Hezbollah’s demise.  
The 1990s witnessed the harshest military confrontations with Israel: the 1993 
Operation Accountability and 1996 Grapes of Wrath. From 1990 to 1992, the yearly death 
toll of Israeli soldiers didn’t surpass two dozen. However, July 1993, witnessed several 
attacks inside the formerly declared “Security Zone” by Israel in southern Lebanon, killing 
7 IDF soldiers. This was followed by firing numerous “Katyusha” rockets into northern 
Israel setting the ground for further confrontations. The then Israeli army chief of staff, 
Ehud Barak, stressed that a “broad operation” against Hezbollah was unavoidable and 
they might be sending Israeli forces north of the zone.19 Subsequently, on 25 July, the 
IDF launched a full-scale operation against Hezbollah that only endured 6 days before 
reaching a ceasefire. “Operation Accountability ended with a secret unwritten agreement 
brokered by Warren Christopher, the US secretary of state, in which both sides agreed 
not to target civilians” (Blanford, 2011, p.147). Norton (2007) stressed that the oral 
agreement that was established decreased hostilities (p.84) but the agreement which was 
written on paper wasn’t really implemented on the ground and didn’t prevent future 
confrontations within the security zone.  
The oral consent, interrupted by violations every now and then, lasted three years. 
Blanford (2011) emphasized that Amnesty International declared that the agreement was 
broken 13 times by Hezbollah and 231 by the IDF (p.154-155). Following the 
assassination of a Lebanese civilian in April 1996, Hezbollah retaliated by firing rockets 
                                                
19 “Clashes Intensify in Lebanon Zone”, by Clyde Haberman. 23 July 1993. The New 
York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/23/world/clashes-
intensify-in-lebanon-zone.html 
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into Israel. For the first time since 1982, the IDF responded by shelling al-Dahiyah, who 
was turning into one of Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut’s suburbs. Hence, the conflict 
escalated from both sides and the IDF launched a campaign against the Lebanese 
organization dubbed “Operation Grapes of Wrath”. Blanford (2011) claimed that while 
Hezbollah’s target was to preserve the ability of firing rocket salvos into northern Israeli 
villages, Israel’s objective was eliminating Hezbollah. During the war, Israel attacked a 
UN base full of civilians killing 106 peoples (Norton, 2007, p.84). Following the massacre, 
Norton (2007) stressed, “then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher succeeded in 
persuading all sides to abide once again by the same rules that had been in place since 
1993. This time, however, the agreement was committed to an unsigned piece of paper” 
(p.85). Blanford (2011) opined that the operation was a tripartite failure to Israel: 
diplomatic, military and political (p.175). Hezbollah was fighting in small groups through 
guerilla tactics against one of the strongest regional armies and therefore it was hard to 
escape the sense of triumphalism for Hezbollah and defeat for Israel’s leadership who 
failed to accomplish the promised victory. 
Undeterred and triumphant, Hezbollah pursued its military acts against Israeli 
forces in the ensuing years altering the balance of power on the ground. On 25 May 2000, 
without former notice, the IDF withdrew from Lebanon leaving its Lebanese informers and 
allies vulnerable. Blanford (2011) stressed that the IDF did not retreat under fire, and it 
was a wise decision by Hezbollah. This was followed by the escape of the SLA members 
along with their families through the “Fatima gate” on the Lebanese borders (p.275-276). 
Qassem (2005) argued that hopes of liberation hovered with the declaration of the political 
programs by the two runners for the Israeli prime ministerial position: Benjamin 
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Netanyahou and Ehud Barak (p.128). The point to make is that Ehud Barak had promised 
during his electoral campaign an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon within 12 months and 
when elected prime minster he had to implement his promised foreign policy agenda 
(Norton, 2007, p.88).  
This departure did not seal the Israeli-Lebanese hostilities. First, Hezbollah’s 
raison d’être is its pledge to liberate both Lebanon and Palestine and Israel didn’t fully 
retreat from Lebanon as it kept the “Sheba’a Farms” under its control. The successive 
Lebanese cabinets avowed that Israel is, hitherto, occupying Lebanese territories and this 
provides Hezbollah with more room to maneuver. More to the point, Hezbollah can at any 
moment, initiate a war against Israel by claiming to recaptured an occupied land. 
Needless to say that Hezbollah might also declare a war if it finds it suitable for the 
regional agenda of the axis. From 2000 until 2004, nothing major occurred vis-à-vis 
Hezbollah’s political or military activities. This section offered a history of the events that 
engulfed Hezbollah’s emergence up until 2000. However, in September 2004, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted the 1559 Resolution which called for the withdrawal of 
the remaining foreign forces from Lebanon and the disarmament of all militias,20 targeting 
Syria and Hezbollah, respectively. Prime minister Rafik Hariri was considered the 
Lebanese godfather of the 1559 UNSCR. On valentine’s day 2005, a massive explosion 
targeted Hariri’s convoy in Beirut killing him along with a dozen people. These two events, 
marked the beginning of a new phase for Hezbollah, which will be the focus of this thesis 
on both the domestic and regional levels. 
                                                
20 “Resolution 1559”, on 2 September 2004. United Nations Security Council. Retrieved 
from: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1559 
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3.3 The Nexus between Hezbollah and Wilayat al-Faqih 
In 1979, Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, an Iranian Shi‘a cleric, presided over Iran’s 
throne and declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic through implementing the 
theory of wilayat al-faqih (The Guardianship of the Jurisprudent). Neither this section nor 
the thesis will delve into the dynamics, events or history that led to the Khomeini’s prevail 
among various actors which were all determined and participated in overthrowing the 
Shah, but books such as “Iran Without Border” by Hamid Dabashi (2016) explain these 
factors. Bringing the discussion back to wilayat al-faqih, Genieve Abdo (2017) 
emphasized that “the senior-most religious jurist, or faqih, was duty-bound to assume 
political and executive authority, the velayat [wilayat], in place of Iran’s corrupt and 
Westernized secular rulers” (p.20). “In early 1970, Khomeini gave a landmark series of 
lectures in which he outlined his theories of an Islamic government, known as wilayat al-
faqih. Khomeini postulated that the laws of a nation should be the laws of God, the Shari‘a, 
and therefore those holding power should possess a full knowledge and understanding 
of the holy laws. The ruler of an Islamic state should be the preeminent faqih, or jurist, 
who must be obeyed because “the law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority 
over all individuals and the Islamic government”” (Blanford, 2011, p.33). 
The wilayat al-faqih theory, according to Qassem (2005), is as follows: The 
Prophet is the. Messenger of God. He announced the holy principle of Shari‘a and is 
chosen to ensure its implication by the nation. After the Prophet come the infallible Imams, 
from Imam Ali ibn Abi Taleb to Imam al-Mahdi. Their role is to explain the Message and 
its features. In their absence, the appliance of the Shari‘a by the public needs to obtain 
guidance (p.51). This guidance is, therefore, spearheaded by the waliyy al-faqih 
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personified in Khomeini who was later succeeded by Khamenei. Khomeini opined that 
embodying the holy message of Islam to the Prophet and his heirs is irrational. Based on 
this opinion, he considered that it is necessary to implement what he called “wilaya” 
(Guardianship) to guide Muslims until the appearance of al-Mahdi. The waliyy al-faqih’s 
authority is thus a prolongation of the supremacy of the Prophet and the infallible Imams. 
The Jurist-Theologian is considered the sole authority with the legitimacy of shaping 
doctrine while waiting for the appearance of Imam Al-Mahdi. Neither geographical 
boundaries nor territory limits his spiritual authority over the Islamic Umma. “The degree 
of authority awarded to the Jurist-Theologian is obviously high, for he is entrusted with 
implementing Islamic jurisprudence, guarding the Islamic structure, undertaking political 
decisions of considerable weight and bearing on the nation’s overall interest” (Qassem, 
2005, p.54).  
Qassem (2005) argued that the waliyy al-faqih preserves and spreads Islam and 
brings the nation together (p.52). It is necessary to make attention to the world Umma or 
nation used here because despite the Shi‘a identity that Iran’s wilayat al-faqih adopts to 
mobilize Shi‘a across the Muslim world, it does not limit itself to the Shi‘a community. This 
narrative brings Iran from a narrower Shi‘a community to a wider Muslim community which 
includes the Sunni. More to the point, the Jurist-Theologian’s authority is not limited to 
any geographical boundaries. It is true, according to Qassem (2005), that Khomeini 
governs and leads the Islamic Republic in Iran, yet he monitors Muslims’ political agendas 
everywhere, from protection of foreign hegemony to the Israeli conflict in Palestine (p.55). 
Everyone who’s under the umbrella of the wilaya is committed to the custodianship of the 
waliyy al-faqih. However, Qassem (2005) stressed that every group’s specificity is taken 
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into consideration depending on the entourage and responsibilities (p.56). By other 
words, Iran does not control Hezbollah’s day-to-day decision making. However, simply, 
there is no need to control day-to-day decision making as Hezbollah does not act against 
the benefit of Iran. 
In its 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah swore allegiance to the wilaya: “We, the sons 
of Hezbollah’s umma, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has 
established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic State. Abide by the orders of a 
single, wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent 
(waliyy al-faqih), currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah Ruhullah al-Musawi al-
Khumayni (Khomeini)… who was detonated to the Muslims’ revolution, and who is 
bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance” (Alagha, 2011, p.40). On another level, 
all Hezbollah members can turn into fighters if they are assigned with a “taklif shar‘i” 
(legitimate assignment) by the waliyy al-faqih (Alagha, 2011, p.41) –a binding religious 
responsibility of being assigned to do a specified job; therefore, “al-taklif” is 
insurmountable. Hezbollah’s leadership can mobilize its personnel whenever they see 
necessary based on this taklif. For example, in the parliamentary elections, Hezbollah 
can circulate a taklif to vote blindly for a certain candidate that the leadership nominates.  
Furthermore, “Hezbollah’s commitment to such jurisprudence is a link in the chain. 
It is work within the sphere of Islam’s implementation, a behavioral given that is an integral 
part of the directives and rules drawn by the Jurist-Theologian. Following this main 
category come the tasks of administration and oversight of details and particulars; 
implementing procedures; daily political, social and cultural work; and jihad against Israeli 
invader, in all senses. Such responsibility is assumed through Party members elected 
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according to the internally adopted consultation system, and is headed by the Party’s 
Secretary General. The setup earns its legitimacy through the Jurist-Theologian and thus 
receives the authority and accreditation necessary for it to perform its duties with a margin 
of maneuvering room left to the Party’s leaders and consultations enabling them to decide 
and evaluate what is applicable and appropriate in their fields” (Qassem, 2005, p.56). 
One Hezbollah fighter, killed in Syria in 2013, explained: “I write these words as 
my heart beats with love/passion for God and as it is craving for jihad to cleanse itself of 
this corrupt life and its embellishments and indulgences” (Adham Saouli, 2019, p.73). 
Hezbollah believes in what is called military jihad and its dual offshoots: “offensive jihad” 
and “defensive jihad”. The former is only applicable with the return of al-Imam al-Mahdi, 
or the “awaited Imam”, whereas the latter obliges Muslims to defend their territory against 
any occupation. Blanford (2011) contended that the call for “defensive jihad” relays in the 
hand of the Jurist-Theologian (p.107). Furthermore, Qassem (2005) argued that issues 
of war and peace are in the hands of the waliyy al-faqih (p.53). As Subhi al-Tufaili placed 
it, Khamenei gave the green light allowing Hezbollah members to run for parliamentary 
elections in 1992 (Blanford, 2011, p.101). Additionally, Naim Qassem maintained that the 
fighting against Israel since 1982 was religiously approved by Khomeini (Blanford, 2011, 
p.111).  
This undermines Hezbollah’s narrative of autonomy and contradicts Qassem’s 
comment on the “specificity for every group”. Consequently, key decisions, i.e. war and 
peace, need approval by the Jurist; yet, planning, executing and implementing don’t need 
authorization. To this moment, Hezbollah managed to convince a wide range of people 
that it does not act on Iran’s behalf. So far, it tries to justify every conflict by linking it to a 
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national security agenda or a mix of national and sectarian security dilemma. However, 
Qassem (2005) emphasized that the obedience to the wilaya does not prevent domestic 
relations with any Lebanese faction, nor prevent regional or international collaboration if 
needed. Moreover, Hezbollah’s personnel are Lebanese and Islamic matters do not 
contradict the organization’s interest on the national level. The corps of Hezbollah and 
Iran, he pursued, are not intertwined, yet they both commit to the command of the waliyy 
al-faqih whose power extends all over the Muslim world (p.56-57). 
Nasrallah stressed that Hezbollah perceives the faqih as a religious symbol like 
any other sect recognizes its symbols.21 In fact, the faqih for those abiding by his rule, is 
similar to the Pope for Catholics, but with more political authority over his followers. 
Moreover, Hezbollah uses the faqih as a symbol as much as Imam Hussein and other 
figures as a mobilizational tool. Indeed, sect-symbolism is paramount for a sect-centric 
organization such as Hezbollah. The Hezbollah-wilaya relationship is indeed complicated, 
but Saouli best unfolded it. Although Hezbollah is committed to the wilayat al-faqih, Saouli 
(2019) argued, “it offers a framework of religio-political authority” (p.65). Therefore, he 
maintained that the organization’s doctrine overrides the Lebanese national state and its 
religio-political authority separates it from the Lebanese institution and balance of power, 
but this does not strip it from its Lebanese identity and Arab origins (p.66).  
3.4 Debating Hezbollah 
Hezbollah stated in its 1985 Open Letter its determination to implement an Islamic 
State; an appeal that will never change but what changed is the persistence and 
                                                
21 Interview with Nasrallah. Interview done by Joubran Toueini. On 24 September 1995. 
LBCI Channel. Retrieved from: https://www.lbcgroup.tv/shows/en 
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adaptation. Hezbollah recognized that such step is bound to fail in a multisectarian 
country such as Lebanon and pursuing this endeavor will impede its national progress on 
the political level. Further afield, it might create a sense of security dilemma for other sects 
and end up initiating a military conflict in the war-prone and fragile Lebanese polity. 
Interviewed in 1995, Nasrallah claimed that the implementation of an Islamic State is a 
purpose that endures; yet, rather than forcing Lebanese of other sects to live under the 
umbrella of such state, the only way to do it is through elections with the approval of the 
majority of Lebanese. “I mean the vast majority, not 51%”, Nasrallah said, “because if we 
have to force 49% of the people to live in such circumstances without their tolerance, it 
will never survive.”22 Regardless of Nasrallah’s statement and the high proliferation 
among the Muslims –both Sunni and Shi‘a, causing demographical alterations, such state 
can never be implemented in a country cohabited by 18 different sects with western 
influence on their daily life.  
Giving up on such ambitions, at least until further notice, was translated by a 
tangible shift: Hezbollah’s “infitah policy” that was mentioned earlier. The edict by 
Khamenei regarding the participation in the legislative elections “was affirmative, meaning 
that the establishment of an Islamic order in Lebanon was no longer viewed as an 
imminent political objective but only as a horizon” (Avon & Khatachadourian, 2012, p.41). 
Hezbollah’s Minister argued that instead of self-isolating, we adopted an agenda of 
political openness and participated in a system that we rejected for a while; and for this 
reason we are a “modern and distinguished Islamic party.”23 One Lebanese Shi‘a 
                                                
22 Interview with Nasrallah. Interview done by Joubran Toueini. On 24 September 1995. 
LBCI Channel. Retrieved from: https://www.lbcgroup.tv/shows/en 
23 Interview with author. 12 September 2018. 
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politician close to Hezbollah, emphasized that they started as a radical and ideological 
movement attached to its devotions, but they then evolved to a realistic and pragmatic 
entity. They now better understand the environment, he pursued, and they recognize the 
unlikelihood of creating an Islamic State in Lebanon, hence they became a national party 
with an Islamic face.24 The first transition has therefore occurred in the early 1990s and 
not only did they adapt, but they participated in the confessional system that they long 
refused. That said, there was no chance for survival without this necessary transitional 
period. 
The examination of Hezbollah necessitates the understanding of this transition 
because the attacks that it was accused of conducting on Iran’s behalf waned. While 
accused of orchestrating these attacks by Western countries but also fighting to liberate 
Lebanon from the Israeli invader, it created the dichotomy of terrorist vs resistance. The 
US, Canada, followed later by the United Kingdom, labeled Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization. In the post-Arab Uprisings era and amid the rising rivalry between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, the Arab League, chiefly the Gulf Countries also labeled Hezbollah as 
terrorist. At the time of writing this paper, most European Union countries have 
differentiated between Hezbollah’s political and military wings as it only categorized the 
latter as terrorist, but this can change at any moment. Some countries, however, such as 
Russia, China, Venezuela and Iraq, rejected this stereotype and maintained their 
relationship with Hezbollah. “Until al-Qaeda, Hezbollah had more American blood on its 
hands than anyone outside traditional war. In the eighties, Hezbollah blew up two of our 
embassies in Beirut; murdered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief there; and 
                                                
24 Interview with author.  9 September 2018. 
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truck bombed the Marine barracks near the airport, killing 241. They spread mayhem 
around the rest of the world, from Bangkok to Buenos Aires, from Paris to Berlin” (Robert 
Baer, 2014, p.xiii). As mentioned before, the IJO adopted all the kidnappings and the 
explosions that occurred during the Lebanese civil war. Western countries and 
intelligence agencies all relate this group directly to Hezbollah, yet without any tangible 
proof. Robert Baer (2015), former CIA, stressed that the Marine barracks blast in Beirut 
is only related to Imad Moughnieh, Hezbollah’s strongman, by rumors (p.34). “As we’d 
come to learn”, Baer (2015) stressed, “Hajj Radwan – Moughniyeh’s nom de guerre– 
headed the Islamic Jihad Organization” (p.71). Thus, he claimed that Moughniyeh used 
the name “Islamic Jihad” to cover the organization’s involvement (p.56). This rhetoric has 
been rejected by Hezbollah, and Nasrallah maintained that a jihadist movement existed 
back then dubbed IJO, not committed to Hezbollah’s leadership, claimed responsibility of 
all these operations.25  
Worrall & al. (2016) called Hezbollah the “A-Team of terrorists” and held it 
responsible for the suicide bombings that killed more than 300 French and US soldiers 
(p.1). Worrall & al. (2016) named 4 waves of terrorism and placed Hezbollah within the 
Religious wave (p.12). Although they accused Hezbollah of executing these operations, 
they argued that it is a nationalist movement with a wide range of supporters that 
participates in the Lebanese system. “The act of labeling, while providing a normative and 
punitive function, can also be counterproductive in discouraging and ending terrorism, 
especially when they have significant internal support” (p.18). Blanford (2011) claimed 
                                                
25 The Hunt. On 14 April 2015. AL jaded TV. Retrieved from:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcW-kpEsmOA 
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that Subhi al-Tufaili, Hezbollah’s former secretary general, confessed that Hezbollah was 
responsible for the US marine barracks blast (p.59). On 4 July 1983, coming back from 
Syria, 4 Iranians of the diplomatic corps were arrested at a checkpoint controlled by the 
‘Lebanese Forces’, then a Lebanese Christian militia that built relations with Israel. In 
response, Patriarch Elias al-Zoghbi along two other clergies, and David Dodge, President 
of the American University of Beirut, were kidnapped for an envisioned exchange 
(Dominique Avon and Anais-Trissa Khatchadourian, 2012, p.26).  
However, Bassel Salloukh, a Lebanese academic and scholar, argued that the 
executioners are not known, because back then, there was many shadowy organizations, 
but Hezbollah was not operational as a party.26 Although Hezbollah could have been 
operating under the name of the IJO, nothing tangible confirmed its involvement. Had 
Hezbollah truly orchestrated these operations, its behavior had clearly changed since the 
1990s. The demise of such operations is linked to the “infitah policy” and its adaptation to 
the rules of the game, as mentioned earlier. At least, Hezbollah seemed to avoid targeting 
US citizens and focused on attacking Zionists, had it been behind these attacks. 
Hezbollah is blamed for conducting various attacks in foreign countries, i.e. Argentina in 
1992 and 1994, against the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community, respectively. 
Furthermore, Hezbollah members have been detained for bombing attempts in countries 
such as Thailand, Uganda and Cyprus. It is important to mention here that Hezbollah was 
a tool for Iran’s regional and international agenda providing it with leverage and at the 
same time, plausible deniability.  
                                                
26 Interview with author. 1 October 2018. 
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Amid these controversies, Baer (2014) best analyzed it by stressing that for 
Moughniyeh, and by it Hezbollah, the end justified the means. Moughniyeh kidnapped the 
CIA chief because he was looking for leverage on the negotiation table by pressuring 
western countries (p.40). The identity of William Buckley’s kidnappers, Beirut’s CIA chief, 
was completely unknown, but later, an Arab government informed the Americans that 
Moughniyeh was behind it (Baer, 2014, p.47). Blanford (2011) claimed that the CIA built 
a signal intelligence site during Lebanon’s civil war at Sannine, one of the highest peaks 
in the country, where they were able to spy on Hezbollah. According to Blanford’s source, 
“it was known that William Buckley was one of several western hostages then held at 
Sheikh Abdullah Barracks” (p.76) –a training sight for Hezbollah in the Beqaa mountains 
where they first settled and created camps alongside the IRGC personnel.  
In 1985, a TWA plane was hijacked and driven to Beirut. The tacit purpose behind 
the hijack of the airplane was the exchange of prisoners, mainly Mustafa Badreddeen.27 
The latter was arrested in Kuwait for planning to blow the US and French embassies in 
parallel to the 1982 invasion of Beirut by the IDF. Of 17 Shi‘a members arrested in Kuwait 
for planning attacks against Western embassies, two, Mustafa Badreddeen with a fake 
passport named Elias Saab, and another comrade, were directly related to Hezbollah’s 
leaders Imad Moughniyeh and Hussein Mussawi, respectively (Blanford, 2011, p.73). 
However, the plan of prisoners’ swap did not work and Badreddeen had to wait until the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 to escape from prison. Worrall & al. (2016) confirmed that 
the plane and the abductions were both committed by Hezbollah for prisoners’ exchanges 
                                                
27 The Hunt. On 14 April 2015. AL jaded TV. Retrieved from:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcW-kpEsmOA 
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(p.9). Some argue that were the planned explosions in Kuwait executed, it would have 
been an indirect message from Iran since France and the US were backing Iraq in the 
Iran-Iraq war. Theoretically speaking, this argument is plausible but there is no damning 
evidence to prove it.  
However, the situation in Lebanon was/is complicated for normal observers and 
therefore, the understanding of Hezbollah’s position needs further scrutiny. First of all, 
Hezbollah was not popular among Christians whose stance vis-à-vis Israel was normative 
and some of their prominent leaders have cooperated with it during the civil war. More to 
the point, popularity of a Muslim armed group such as Hezbollah among Christians was 
nearly impossible. Nevertheless, post-2000 Lebanon witnessed the thrive of Hezbollah 
among the Muslim community as it was the first actor to withstand Israel’s plans in the 
region since the implementation of the Zionist state. Although Hezbollah had adopted a 
sectarian mobilization agenda and sectarian identity was paramount, it was popular 
among the Sunni community. However, when prime minister Hariri was assassinated in 
2004, in parallel to the rise of the Sunni-Shi‘a schism in Iraq, Hezbollah’s image was 
becoming hollow. The eruption of the July 2006 war against Israel boosted Hezbollah 
once again as it stood as a bulwark against the IDF and emerged as a key player in the 
regional order. Subsequently, Hezbollah’s flags rose in the streets of many Arab countries 
and in Sunni inhabited areas in Lebanon such as Tripoli further North. This short ecstatic 
moment of popularity collapsed when Hezbollah unleashed its fighters to capture Beirut. 
On 7 May 2008, clashes erupted in Lebanon and Hezbollah raided Beirut and overran its 
Sunni counterparts. The fights later spread to the Druze area in Mount Lebanon. These 
clashes will be detailed in chapter 4, but it is necessary to mention that for the first time, 
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Hezbollah fought against Lebanese political rivals since the clash with Amal in the civil 
war. These foes were predominantly Sunni and this standoff disarrayed Hezbollah of 
many supporters among non-Shi‘a Lebanese and soured its relationship with most Sunnis 
who were outmaneuvered during the clashes. This was not a sectarian confrontation as 
the primary motive was political but sectarian tensions increased in parallel to the rise of 
Sunni-Shi‘a bickering in the region, namely Iraq. 
Hezbollah was further demonized among the Sunnis when it engaged in Syria’s 
civil war to fight alongside the SAA in its bid to prevent the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime, a strategic ally for both Iran and Hezbollah. The Syrian war, like the 7 May 
clashes, was a political conflict and sectarian tension was a key driver rather than a causal 
factor. But the conflict took the form of a sectarian war for the normal observer because 
sectarian discourse increased and it was wrongly argued that sectarian dynamics were 
wrongly driving the power dynamics in Syria. That said, Hezbollah was protecting its 
interest rather than the so called Alawite regime – a discourse adopted by the Sunni 
groups and clerics to mobilize Sunnis across the world in their fight against the regime. 
This culminated by calling the Party of God [Hezbollah] as the Party of Satan [Hezb al-
Shaytan] by most anti-Assad Sunnis across the Arab world. A minority if compared with 
the Sunni Arabs, the Shi‘a and by it Hezbollah, were always cautious vis-à-vis Sunni-
Shi‘a tensions. Nonetheless, when the war drums beat, it had no choice but to intervene 
to prevent the change of the regional power balance in its rivals’ favor.  
A Christian anti-Hezbollah former Member of Parliament (MP) described 
Hezbollah as a “representative of an overlap between a regional and domestic projects 
representing the Shi‘a sect. It is a puzzled movement, illegally armed and commanded by 
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an external power, mainly Iran. Hezbollah is the child of the IRGC, and therefore Tehran 
controls its geographical presence and decision-making.”28 To be more accurate, the Iran-
Hezbollah relationship is deeper, and more strategic than this. To be sure, Hezbollah is 
not a puppet for Iran, but it is an ideological replica whose fate is pegged to Tehran and 
act as a partner rather than a surrogate. A spokesman of the “Lebanese Forces”, a far-
right anti-Hezbollah party, defined it as a “political, military and intelligence apparatus that 
emerged during the Lebanese war after the PLO’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the first 
exported movement by the Iranian revolution outside Iran’s borders. It is an unusual 
organization that brought a creed –that of wilayat al-faqih, in tandem with a military role 
that the Shi‘a were not historically accustomed to. With the end of the civil war, Hezbollah 
was supposed to submit its arsenal similarly to all Lebanese militias. Nevertheless, the 
changing geopolitical situation that hit the region with Kuwait’s invasion, pushed the US 
to authorize a full domination by the Assad regime over Lebanon. Thereby, this gave the 
green light to support Hezbollah as an armed resistance. As a Christian, it is hard not to 
suspiciously observe an armed movement. State-Revolution combination can’t work; 
therefore Hezbollah is a militia.”29 Coming from an anti-Hezbollah Christian party, it should 
be mentioned that this view is acceptable as it is not bias and objective. 
Controversially, a Lebanese Shi‘a politician close to Hezbollah emphasized that 
the region witnessed the rise of multiple resistances against imperial hegemony, yet in 
the 70s Islamism progressed: “Islam is the solution”. The difference between Hezbollah 
and other Islamic factions, he maintained, is that its military accomplishments are 
                                                
28 Interview with author. 9 October 2018.  
29 Interview with author. 20 October 2018. 
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numerous, from liberating south Lebanon to facing terrorism in Syria. Hezbollah is new 
on many levels: hierarchy, military and politics; and the organization was smart enough 
to follow a different path than its previous revolutionary counterparts which raised the 
motto of “State vs Revolution”. Hezbollah only filled the vacuum left by the state instead 
of replacing it everywhere.30 Al-Mayadeen channel reporter labeled it as a Lebanese party 
with both military and political wings representing an Iranian expansion in Lebanon. 
Domestically, Hezbollah proved its autonomy from Iran; but regionally, it is part of the 
Iranian camp and represents its interests.31 This is plainly not the case, however. Rather 
Hezbollah operates as a partner in the axis and namely, in tandem with Iran. Hezbollah’s 
Minister stressed that what was only an armed resistance, developed to a political party 
afterwards pledging to protect Islamic and Arab causes and bring Palestine back to its 
people.32 Similarly, Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations said that Hezbollah is a 
Jihadi faithful movement involved in politics. “At the beginning, we refused the de facto 
narrative of the “undefeated Israel”, therefore, we started as a resistance to its occupation 
of Lebanon. We have faith in the Quran that stated: “if you support God, he will support 
you.””33 Hezbollah’s former private universities spokesman argued that Hezbollah is an 
ideological organization that abides by a religious belief. Thus, injustice targets all sects, 
therefore collaborating with all sects is a necessity.34 Therefore, it should be clear by now 
that Hezbollah’s situation in Lebanon depended on the events and it fluctuated over time. 
                                                
30 Interview with author. 9 September 2018. 
31 Interview with author. 11 September 2018. 
32 Interview with author. 12 September 2018. 
33 Interview with author. 8 September 2018. 
34 Interview with author. 5 September 2018. 
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Moreover, it was seen differently by each sect and group as it was praised by some and 
maligned by others. 
On another disputable matter, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran has been under 
scrutiny narrowing the debate to proxy vs autonomous. In fact, Hezbollah has certainly 
been Iran’s most valuable geopolitical asset in the region. As mentioned above, Hezbollah 
abides by the rule of wilayat al-faqih and its supreme leader who provides a religious and 
political umbrella for the organization. Saad-Ghorayeb (2012) argued that Hezbollah’s 
dedication to the concept of wilayat al-faqih mainly comes in a religious context and it 
does not mean an unquestionable allegiance to Tehran. The status, Saad-Ghorayeb 
(2012) claimed, of Hezbollah and its existence as a Shi‘a Islamic organization derives 
from the faqih. “The legitimate leadership is designated to the Jurist-Theologian who is 
considered to be the successor to the Prophet and the Imams. The Jurist-Theologian 
draws the general guiding direction for the nation of Islam. His commands and 
proscriptions are enforceable” (Qassem, 2005, p.19). Further afield, doctrinal affiliation 
was one factor, as Iran also supports Hezbollah financially, militarily and politically.  
Iran spends large amounts of money on its foreign policy of which Hezbollah 
receives the lion’s share. Roy Keyes (2016) estimated that after 2000, Iran increased its 
financing for Hezbollah to more than 100 million dollars a year (p.251), but these 
estimates are not necessarily precise because Hezbollah is known being reticent to reveal 
such matters. The Lebanese organization also receives money from Shi‘a businessmen 
in Lebanon and foreign countries. However, the sanctions imposed by the US on many 
companies and personnel linked to Hezbollah seemed to have limited this income. But 
Nasrallah have repeatedly confirmed that the organization receives cash money from Iran 
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and these sanctions have not harmed Hezbollah’s financial status.35 Moreover, many 
Shi‘a, according to Nasrallah, donate their “khums” to Hezbollah.36 In Islam, “al-khums” 
(the fifth) or “al-zakat” is the obligation to donate every year the fifth of one’s net profit to 
clerics or clerical institutions. Furthermore, Hezbollah is accused of collecting cash 
through money laundering and drug trafficking. Josh Meyer detailed how a campaign 
called Project Cassandra, launched in 2008, in a DEA facility in Virginia mapped 
Hezbollah’s network with the assistance of various security agencies. He linked the 
organization’s cocaine shipments and money laundering to a route they use to sell used 
cars from the United States to African countries, passing through South America and 
Europe and finally reaching the Middle East. Meyer opined that Hezbollah is rallying up 
to 1 billion dollars annually from “drug and weapons trafficking, money laundering and 
other criminal activities.”37 
The political relationship is mutually beneficial for both sides as it allows Iran to 
have a footstep on Israel’s northern border and therefore a geopolitical extension in the 
region, and in return, Hezbollah benefits from a regional partnership that provides it with 
a political umbrella. Saouli (2019) argued that Hezbollah presented a strategic presence 
for Tehran in the region (p.150). In fact, hoping to play a regional role, Iran reckoned that 
it has to hold the torch of the Palestinian cause. So they built a Lebanese Shi‘a 
                                                
35 “Nasrallah: Hezbollah’s budget is fully and directly through Iran”. On 25 June 2016. 
Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoALpLpRpvo 
36 Interview with Nasrallah. Interview done by Joubran Toueini. On 24 September 1995. 
LBCI Channel. Retrieved from: https://www.lbcgroup.tv/shows/en 
37 “The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah off the hook”, by Josh Meyer. 
Published on Politico. Retreived from: 
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-
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organization with Islamist fighters who were keen to fight for the liberation of both Lebanon 
–then occupied by Israel, and Palestine. At the time, Lebanon was enmeshed in a 
devastating civil war and therefore the collapse of the state presented the perfect 
opportunity for Tehran to implement its regional agenda. This political relationship was 
cemented by the military cooperation between both sides. Iran trained and poured 
Hezbollah with weapons: from small and medium weapons to a large flock of heavy 
weapons. That said, Hezbollah is obviously Iran’s ideological replica and its ally and most 
important investment in war and peace. As mentioned earlier, the rise of the Shi‘a in 
Lebanon began prior to the establishment of Iran’s Islamic Republic in 1979, and Islamist 
fighters were determined to resist Israel’s occupation. Therefore, it can’t be argued 
whether Hezbollah would have thrived without Iran’s backing which was paramount from 
the outset. Furthermore, the Shi‘a in Lebanon might have remained in al-Da‘wa and Amal 
had Iran not meddled. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) opined that it would have taken much 
longer for Hezbollah to prevail the way it actually did without Iran’s support (p.14). 
Although Qassem (2005) argued that both sides profit from this connection with total 
independence in the work field (p.237), Hezbollah’s loyalty to Lebanon has always been 
under scrutiny.  
While some pundits argue that Iran dictates Hezbollah, other scholars adopt a 
more lenient point of view. Qassem (2005) placed the relationship with the Iranian state 
in the context of an alliance. He opined that they both believe in the jurisdiction of the 
Jurist-Theologian, hold the same Islamic principles, and share the same political 
understanding vis-à-vis the hegemony of world superpowers and the confrontation with 
Israel (p.236). All Lebanese parties, Qassem contended, have built relations with foreign 
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states, however, Hezbollah’s connection with Iran is not a leader-follower relationship. 
This alliance is beneficial for Lebanon because Iran supports Hezbollah and other Islamic 
movements such as Hamas in Palestine, in their battle against Israel and US hegemony 
(p.238). Daniel L. Byman and Bilal Y. Saab (2014) contended that Hezbollah looks for 
strategical and religious guidance from Ayatollah Khamenei (p.4). In fact, if anything, 
Hezbollah and Iran are partners on all levels: military, political and religious. Saad-
Ghorayeb (2002) quoted Hezbollah’s secretary general when talking about Iran’s role 
apropos Hezbollah. In Nasrallah’s argument, the decision-making of the organization 
emerges directly from the Lebanese leadership, and the territory that Hezbollah is aiming 
to liberate is Lebanese not Iranian. Even if Iran or other countries benefit from the 
outcomes of Hezbollah’s confrontations, Nasrallah said, this “does not detract it of its 
nationalism or Lebanonism” (p.83). Nasrallah tries to provide here, a simple explanation 
and a justification by saying that the territory is Lebanese. However, the relationship is 
deeper and following Hezbollah’s intervention in the Iraqi, Syrian and Yemeni theatres, 
such argument becomes invalid because the causal factors of these engagements are 
not within the frame of liberation anymore but falls in the context of a geopolitical 
confrontation, as will be seen throughout this paper.  
Deeb (2006) emphasized that the organization’s decisions are made 
independently and in accordance with the views of Hezbollah regarding Lebanon as well 
as its interests within the Lebanese politics. Therefore, Hezbollah’s national interest does 
not clash with its devotion to wilayat al-faqih. Saouli (2019) underscored that Iran is 
Hezbollah’s religio-political patron when it comes to its commitment to the wilayat al-faqih, 
but also an ally since the faqih gives it a wide margin of freedom (p.150). Saad-Ghorayeb 
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(2002) underscored that according to Nasrallah, if it had to choose between Lebanese 
and Iranian interests, Hezbollah will not hesitate to choose Lebanon’s interest (p.83). 
Saad-Ghorayeb wrote the book in 2002. The point to make here is that at the time, 
Hezbollah was acting in Lebanon against Israel and it hadn’t yet played regional roles. 
This somewhat poses many questions such as: What is Lebanon’s interest in fighting or 
training the Houthis in Yemen? What is its interest in intervening in Iraq? In Syria, for 
instance, as we will see in chapter 5 and 6, Hezbollah justified the intervention as being 
a pre-emptive war to prevent the Lebanon from undergoing the same fate of Iraq and 
Syria, in reference to ISIS’s invasions –an argument that that does not really explain the 
deployment of its fighters to Damascus. Worall & al. (2016) argued that numerous 
researchers conclude that Hezbollah is a proxy to both Iran and Syria, and is subject to 
their direct orders. Thus, regardless of the role that both countries played in the creation 
of the organization, Hezbollah functions autonomously (p.113-114). Moreover, 
Hezbollah’s Minister, explained Hezbollah’s independency from Iran by speaking about 
the 1983 suicide bombing against the IDF headquarters. “The suicide operation of Ahmad 
Kassir”, he said, “that we take responsibility of, was not by any means orchestrated by 
the Iranians.”38  
That said, many believe that Hezbollah operates beyond the Lebanese theatre for 
Iran’s interest. Keyes (2010) emphasized that Iran and Syria consider Hezbollah as their 
proxy and their first line of defense against Israel (p.251). Furthermore, Ilan Berman, Vice 
President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, said that Hezbollah is ready 
to act in case of the defection of the nuclear deal with Tehran (Sharp & Jense, 2012, 
                                                
38 Interview with author. 12 September 2018.  
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p.292). In a different article, Sharp and Jensen (2012) referred that Hezbollah sent a 
drone into Israel on Iran’s behalf, and in any future conflict in Lebanon, “Iran’s proxy, 
Hezbollah” will offer protection to the Christian community (p.334). However, providing 
such explanations shows a lack of knowledge vis-à-vis Lebanon’s multisectarian society 
because Hezbollah will not be able to operate in non-Shi‘a territories in case the country 
disintegrated into chaos. Accordingly, John Sullivan (2016) defined Hezbollah as a militia 
abiding by Iran’s proxy role assigned to it (p.731). For instance, Rodger Shanahan (2017) 
argued that Hezbollah helped enforcing Iran’s foreign policy agenda by fighting for its 
interests in Iraq and Syria. Many scholars and journalists take a bias position in this regard 
and this is the reason why their articles are not objective. This does not mean that 
Hezbollah does not take Iran’s interest into consideration or act to implement Iran’s 
agenda, but it is a partner not a mere proxy or subordinate as described by many casual 
observers and researchers alike. 
Paradoxically, though ideologically dissimilar and deeply opposed to Hezbollah, a 
spokesman of the “Lebanese Forces” argued that Hezbollah is not directed by Iran, but 
on the contrary it takes its own decisions based on the benefits of the axis.39 Coming from 
Hezbollah’s rival, this approach overlaps with what this thesis hopes to offer by arguing 
that Hezbollah became a partner during Syria’s civil war in the axis that extends from 
Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad. Fanar haddad (2020) emphasized that 
“Arab regimes and less charitable Arab voices tend to overstate the commonalities 
between Arab Shi‘a and Iran and to exaggerate their potential to act as a vehicle for 
Iranian penetration of the Arab world” (p.212). For most of the work done vis-à-vis 
                                                
39 Interview with author. 20 October 2018. 
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Hezbollah, researchers have been confined to the dichotomy of autonomous vs proxy. 
However, this is not only a false and falsifying binary but also a misleading debate. 
Hezbollah’s fate is pegged to Iran and the former does not act against the latter’s interest. 
Hence, during Syria’s civil war, Hezbollah acted as a partner and decision maker in the 
axis, namely in coordination with Iran and Syria.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The rise of Shi‘a Islamism emerged prior to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran in 1979, but this event was paramount to further amplify the Shi‘a activism in the 
Middle East and beyond. Therefore, Iran’s revolution was not the causal factor of the rise 
of Shi‘a armed groups in the region, but it was indeed Hezbollah’s sponsor. It exploited 
its sectarian identity to further mobilize Shi‘a fighters who were operating in Lebanon with 
parties such as Amal and al-Da‘wa in order to help shape an organization under its 
influence. For its own security and foreign policy agenda, it worked in tandem with Syria 
to establish Hezbollah during the Lebanese civil war. Since its emergence in 1982, 
Hezbollah faced several political and military challenges that it all endured –until now. 
This chapter examined the history of the events that engulfed Hezbollah from its 
emergence until 2004-05, an era that also witnessed new transformative domestic and 
regional events for Hezbollah.  
Moreover, the chapter unpacked the background of Hezbollah’s figures and how 
they joined the group under Iran’s supervision. It debated the binaries that engulfs 
Hezbollah: terrorist vs resistance and proxy vs autonomous. The Lebanese organization 
has been accused of orchestrating and executing a variety of operations against western 
targets, an accusation that it dispels. While many states labeled Hezbollah as a terrorist 
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operating on Iran’s behalf, others were more lenient. In Lebanon, the situation was more 
complicated as the acceptance or rejection of Hezbollah depended on the time and the 
point of view of each person or group. It was mainly driven by the political disputes and 
the subsequent sectarian dynamics which were always a key driver but not a causal 
factor. However, without hyperbole, Gerald Seymour (2015) best explains such 
dichotomies: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (p.78). 
This chapter also focused on explaining the transition that Hezbollah has 
undergone in the 1990s when it adopted the “infitah policy” amid the prevail of the soft-
liners within the organization. This era witnessed the beginning of its participation in the 
parliamentary elections as a sign of its adaptation to the Lebanese system and the 
multisectarian community. A key point that this section shortly examined is the wilayat al-
faqih theory and Hezbollah’s allegiance to it. Consequently, the discussion regarding 
Hezbollah’s relationship to Iran has been put forth on the religious, political, military and 
financial levels. This chapter paved the way for further debates vis-à-vis Hezbollah. The 
next chapter will examine Hezbollah’s maneuvers in the Lebanese theatre where it 
palpably became an insurmountable force and a prominent actor on all levels.  
4 Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Den 
4.1 Introduction 
When Lebanon disintegrated into the chaotic civil war (1975-1990), a myriad of 
armed factions emerged as new entities or armed wings of the existing parties. All groups, 
however, dissolved their militias and abandoned their arsenal, except for Hezbollah. 
Bolstered by Iran, and Syria to some extent, Hezbollah started operating by conducting 
operations against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the early 1980s and survived the 
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Ta’if agreement that ended the hostilities of the civil war by keeping its arsenal. 
Afterwards, it faced two full-scale wars: the 1993 Operation Accountability and the 1996 
Grapes of Wrath. During both confrontations, the IDF hoped to annihilate the organization 
but failed to accomplish its endeavor. A decade later, in July 2006, Hezbollah confronted 
Israel once more but this time, the former was much stronger and imposed a new 
deterrence in the region. This new balance of power wouldn’t have been achievable 
without the flux of weapons from Iran through Syria, bridging the gap between Tehran 
and Beirut.  
This chapter will review the most significant events that faced Hezbollah on the 
political and military levels in the Lebanese theatre. As mentioned in chapter 3, Hezbollah 
started participating in the 1992 parliamentary election. It will examine this first transition 
by adopting what was called “infitah (Openness) policy” because it had refused for years 
the Lebanese confessional system and pledged the implementation of an Islamic state. 
This transition became possible in early 1990s due the prevail of the soft-liners within the 
organization such as its would-be secretary general Hassan Nasrallah. Instead of 
imposing such a doomed state, it kept its religious devotion to wilayat al-faqih but adapted 
to Lebanon’s multisectarian community. 
Then, it will trace Hezbollah’s first engagement in the cabinet to fill the power 
vacuum after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005. It will also tackle 
the memorandum of understanding signed by Nasrallah and Michel Aoun, then president 
of the Free Patriotic Movement and later President of the Lebanese Republic and the 
subsequent July war against Israel. Thereafter, it will illustrate the stalemate between 
Hezbollah and the government followed by the 7 May clashes in 2008 deepening the 
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Sunni-Shi‘a schism. Doctrinal truth was not the reason behind this confrontation but it was 
framed as a sectarian standoff. The chapter then moves to explain the pressure put by 
Hezbollah to elect Aoun as president in 2016 as a payback for his political stances 
towards the Lebanese organization. The war against terrorist movements on the 
Lebanese-Syrian border, namely ISIS and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (previously al-Nusra), 
will also be examined. The chapter closes with a significant political transformation: the 
parliamentary victory in May 2018 by Hezbollah and its allies who secured the majority of 
the seats.  
4.2 First Parliamentary Elections: Infitah Policy 
Hezbollah emerged as a military organization in 1982 designed to curtail the Israeli 
aggressions against both Lebanon and Palestine and in parallel, to create an Islamic state 
in Lebanon. Therefore, it refused to participate in domestic politics considering the 
Lebanese government corrupt and despairing of any attempts to reform it (Augustus 
Norton, 2007, p.38). In the 1990s, along with the rising to power of the more moderate 
Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, a dispute arose 
between the hard- and soft- liners within Hezbollah. This disagreement culminated in a 
divergent point of views towards the participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections as 
the hard-liners refused to participate in a system they had long rejected. Therefore, a 
committee of 12 high-ranked figures was selected for a vote. The soft-liners prevailed by 
10 to 2 and Hezbollah ran for elections.  
According to Richard Augustus Norton (2007), this move was endorsed by Sayyed 
Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, who was then Hezbollah’s mentor and the first to argue 
that due to Lebanon’s multisectarian society, creating an Islamic State is unlikely (p.99). 
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This transition was dubbed “infitah policy” through which Hezbollah opened up, and 
according to Norton (2007), participated along cross-ideological and cross-sectarian 
electoral alliances (p.99-100). Hezbollah was able to secure 8 Shi‘a seats (Shoghig 
Mikaelian and Bassel Salloukh 2016, p.29), and formed a block of 12 members along with 
its allies. This was Hezbollah’s finest moment. More to the point, 10 years of military 
struggles culminated in a political victory increasing its clout among the Shi‘a. And in the 
ensuing decades, pursuing an increasingly assertive policy, Hezbollah continued to rise 
unabated on the military and political levels. This rise was coupled with further openness 
and acceptance of the status quo. 
Naim Qassem (2005) contended that the organization’s decision to run for 
elections was blurry, and therefore a choice was taken to establish a twelve-member 
committee that includes major Hezbollah representatives who will vote on the decision 
(p.187). Opposing the system, according to Qasem (2005), wouldn’t give Hezbollah any 
political leverage, but on the contrary, outsiders lack the knowledge, and the 
organization’s involvement would be a tool for achieving change (p.189). Qassem (2005) 
referred that 10 out of 12 members voted with the participation in the parliamentary 
elections, both as a necessity but also because it was in Hezbollah’s best interest (p.194). 
The electoral platform did not include any religious themes, rather it called for battling 
economic shortcomings, discrimination, unemployment, and securing the country’s 
frontlines (Joseph Alagha, 2011, p.64). So its new strategy was mainly focused on the 
deprivation of poor rural areas, namely the Shi‘a areas such as al-Dahiyah, Beirut’s 
southern suburb, a predominantly Shi‘a inhabited area, by the government, and on the 
shortages in social services in these areas (Norton, 2007, p.107). However, after almost 
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three decades of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Lebanese system and its eagerness for 
change, it has failed to accomplish any remarkable improvement and Lebanon and the 
Shi‘a are still running short from economic prosperity.  
That said, Hezbollah started establishing a chain of institutions responsible for 
providing social services in the Shi‘a areas: al-Dahiyah, southern Lebanon and Beqaa. 
However, prior to its involvement in domestic politics in the 1990s, Hezbollah has been 
offering health services since 1983 (Judith Palmer Harik, 2005, p.83). In 1988, Harik 
(2005) argued, two institutions functioning under an Islamic umbrella were launched: al-
Rassoul al-A‘zam Hospital and mosque complex. Another foundation is the Martyrs 
Foundation “which pays all of the medical expenses for Hezbollah’s wounded fighters and 
70% of the wounded for civilians injured in fighting”. These hospitals, located in the south 
and the Beqaa Valley, contain professional and well experienced employees. Jihad al-
Bina’, a construction company created by Hezbollah, is responsible for infrastructural 
projects, and undertook the “installation of drinking fountains and decent toilets at public 
schools in the Dahiyah”. Through Jihad al-Bina’, Iran funded an emergency water delivery 
that has been a permanent problem. Moreover, families of the martyrs have always been 
taken care of by providing education for their children and distributing books every year 
with discounted prices (p.83-86). 
In fact, Lebanon is a failed state that was not only wrecked by the 15 years’ civil 
war, but also by a clientelestic system that presses the population to ask for basic services 
or jobs from politicians who have access to state institutions. This system had long 
existed, and many casual observers and even researchers blame Hezbollah for state 
failure. However, this is not only a void argument, but false and falsifying either on 
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purpose or by lack of knowledge. The point to make here is that this clientelistic system 
and state failure pre-dated the civil war and Hezbollah, but the latter adapted to this status 
quo and became one among many actors who exploited it rather than seeking a total 
change. Salloukh and Mikaelian (2013) stressed that Hezbollah created a network of 
institutions ranging “from the reconstruction of houses destroyed by Israel, the provision 
of financial support and social services to the families of the injured and martyred 
Hezbollah fighters, and the provision of health services to the public, to the production of 
nonmaterial symbolic capital targeted at the party’s constituency” (p.523). These 
institutions were supported by Tehran hoping to help Hezbollah embed itself within the 
Shi‘a community. Aurelie Daher (2019) disagreed on this matter saying that “contrary to 
the widely held theory, the Hezbollah social apparatus lay claim to having constructed a 
clientilized community network around the party that could guarantee continuity of its 
mobilization” (p.121). Indeed, this is paramount for Hezbollah and without these 
institutions and the support it offers to the Shi‘a community, its popularity would be at risk. 
Nevertheless, this network, which was launched in parallel to the military confrontations 
against Israel, represents one layer of a multilayered mobilization, at its core lay the 
sectarian mobilization policy which Hezbollah had, and will always adopt.  
By establishing these institutions, Hezbollah filled the gaps where the Lebanese 
government was absent. To compensate Hezbollah for the services it had been offering, 
voters pledged their votes to the candidates on its electoral lists. It was at that moment, 
that Hezbollah marked its first transition from a rejectionist Islamist military group to a 
more lenient Islamist party participating in the Lebanese confessional system. Adham 
Saloui (2019) argued that Hezbollah changed from “a narrow, revolutionary, ideological, 
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violent and Islamist movement in the 1980s to become a moderate and pragmatic political 
actor in the 1990s” (p.4). It was important to mention this stage in Hezbollah’s history so 
that one can understand the first step that it took towards opening-up to other Lebanese 
and to the world. When this transition happened in the post-civil war Lebanon, Syria had 
already gained the upper-hand in Lebanon. As explained in chapter 3, the Iran-Syria 
agreement had provided Hezbollah with more room to maneuver and allowed it to keep 
its arsenal and operate outside the control of the state, despite that all other armed groups 
gave up on their weapons. For more than a decade, Hezbollah’s political engagement 
was confined to the parliament but this situation has changed in the post-Syria withdrawal 
in 2005. 
4.3 Post-Syria withdrawal: Into the Government 
In 1976, one year after the eruption of the civil war, Syrian troops leapt into 
Lebanon’s quagmire. When the Ta’if Agreement –a consensus that ended the civil war, 
had been implemented, it loosened Syria’s control in Lebanon providing it with regional 
and international cover, namely by Saudi Arabia and the US. This culminated in Syria 
manipulating Lebanon’s domestic politics and foreign policy for the ensuing 15 years, in 
tandem with many Lebanese figures such as Rafik el Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri. 
The acceptance to give Syria the upper-hand in Lebanon by Saudi Arabia and the US 
had broader regional causal factors. When the US sought to gather as much support as 
it could as a prelude for its offensive against Iraqi forces in 1991, who had captured 
Kuwait, Hafez al-Assad, then Syria’s president and father of Bashar, approved the 
deployment of US troops. At that moment, the US needed as much approvals by Arab 
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regimes as it can get for its operation. Therefore, as an endearment for this stance, the 
US accepted to give Syria the upper-hand in Lebanon.  
These events were altering the regional order and Assad’s regime knew best how 
to manipulate and exploit this geopolitical contest. However, while Hafez provided the US 
invasion with further Arab cover, Bashar did not only oppose the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003, but engaged in counter-balancing the Americans, a policy that would cost him a 
geopolitical loss. Daher (2019) stated that “along with its involvement in Iraq, the US 
escalated its pressure on Syrian-Lebanese relations” (p.183). This was followed, Daher 
(2019) pursued, by a pressure from Jacques Chirac, France’s president, who asked for a 
“road map” for both countries, and by the US House of Representatives which “passed 
the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act” authorizing the 
imposition of sanctions against the Syrian regime (p.183). In fact, if anything, it isn’t clear 
whether the US wouldn’t have pressed a Syrian withdrawal had Assad agreed on the Iraq 
invasion because the regime was afraid to be next. 
Bringing the discussion back to Lebanon, in the following year, tensions mounted 
in parallel to the regional winds of change, and new alliances were formed: Hariri and 
Jumblatt, along with Christian allies, started spearheading an opposition front against 
Syria. As a response, Syria’s leadership sought to extend the presidency of Emile 
Lahoud, Lebanon’s president and a close ally. The newly-formed opposition refused, and 
prime minister Hariri made no secret of his dissatisfaction, yet since Lebanon was merely 
a Syrian protectorate, Hariri unwillingly obeyed Syria’s demand. Assad had informed 
Hariri that opposing the extension meant a direct challenge to him. This extension was 
opposed by western countries, namely the US, France, and the United Kingdom, but 
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“Damascus and Beirut turned a deaf ear” and Lahoud was granted a three years’ 
extension (Daher, 2019, p.183). On another side, for Hezbollah, Lahoud was an ally and 
an endorser of its military arsenal (Norton, 2007, p.125).  
To make things worse, France and the US passed the 1559 United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), asking indirectly for Syria’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah (Julia Choukair, 2005). Hariri refrained from 
forming a government raising the stakes in the country. More and more, Lebanon was 
teetering on the brink of further escalations amid a geopolitical confrontation on its soil 
that consisted of domestic, regional and international alliances on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Consequently, a pro-Syria government was formed and commanded 
by Omar Karami. Few months later, on Valentine’s day, February 2005, a huge explosion 
targeted Hariri’s convoy in Beirut killing him with more than 20 others. Accusing Syria for 
the blast, thousands of demonstrators took the streets of the capital and gathered in the 
“Martyrs Square” demanding an immediate withdrawal of the Syrian army. One month 
later, on 8 March, pro-Syria parties, spearheaded by Hezbollah, organized a 
demonstration they dubbed “Thank you Syria” refusing these accusations and accusing 
the west of conducting a conspiracy against Lebanon.  
A Shi‘a pro-Saudi journalist close to the Hariri family contended that the 
assassination orphaned the Sunnis by the murder of who can be called their godfather 
[in reference to Hariri], leaving a gap in the leadership of the Sunnis who became 
politically rudderless. The Syrian withdrawal, he followed, left a power vacuum in Lebanon 
and troubled the equilibrium between political rivals. In his view, the consensus between 
Syria and Iran was to divide the pie in Lebanon, and interestingly, Nasrallah declared 
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himself the heir of Syria even before its actual withdrawal. “In his speech on 8 March, 
Nasrallah thanked Hafez al-Assad for long-defending Lebanon against Israel, and 
thanked Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). While the latter retreated on 
26 April, Nasrallah thanked Syria one month before its departure. In fact, he was 
announcing the end of the Syrian era and the beginning of the Iranian dominance over 
Lebanon.”40 In response, anti-Syria parties prepared a demonstration 6 days later, on 14 
March –commemorating a month since the death of Hariri. This deep disagreement and 
conflicting support divided Lebanese between two camps: the anti-Syria 14 March and 
the pro-Syria 8 March alliances. Under pressure, Karami delivered a speech in the 
parliament announcing the cabinet’s resignation. These standoffs were part of a broader 
geopolitical confrontation in the Middle East which changed the balance of power. 
Although many Lebanese consider that their demonstrations against Syria’s 
presence in Lebanon have culminated in the withdrawal of the SAA, it is important to 
maintain that the opposition of Syria to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, as mentioned 
above, led to international pressures hoping to punish it for its regional anti-US stance. 
But of course, the mounting demonstrations and outrage by many Lebanese helped 
pressure Assad’s regime. After Syria’s withdrawal, Nicholas Blanford (2011) opined, 
Hezbollah’s political cover had vanished and it had no other choice but to “become more 
politically engaged to safeguard its own interests” (p.364). Palpably, this marked the 
beginning of new phase for Hezbollah, and under fears of crippling it from within the 
government, it decided to participate in Fouad Seniora’s cabinet, a pro-US prime minister. 
The aforementioned woes and the subsequent domestic and international struggle over 
                                                
40 Interview with author. 13 November 2018. 
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Lebanon catalyzed the need to a direct participation in Fouad Seniora’s cabinet formed 
in 2005 (Krista E. Wiegand, 2009; Salloukh and Mikaelian, 2013). 
This was considered Hezbollah’s second engagement in the system and the first 
in the cabinet. Hezbollah’s Lebanese private universities spokesman argued that with 
Syria’s presence, the situation was under control, yet Hariri’s murder was a conspiracy 
orchestrated to accuse Hezbollah by convincing the Sunnis that the Shi‘a assassinated 
your leader. “We” [Hezbollah], he pursued, “had to put some domestic efforts to avoid 
internal calamity.”41 Al-Mayadeen channel reporter seconded that the Syrian presence 
formed an umbrella for Hezbollah since the Ta’if agreement but the 1559 UNSCR was a 
direct challenge for Hezbollah forcing them to participate in the government to prevent 
being backstabbed by governmental decisions.42 Also, Hezbollah’s deputy head of 
political relations emphasized that before the Ta’if agreement, the consecutive Lebanese 
governments were more westernized, namely through close ties with the US, but with 
Syria’s presence, our back was protected. However, following its departure “we had to 
participate in the cabinet.”43 
A Lebanese Shi‘a politician close to Hezbollah considered that even though 
Hezbollah was qualified to play Syria’s role and fill the vacuum, they hitherto refused it. 
“Their performance differed from that of Syria as they refused to dictate anyone nor forced 
anybody to commit to their decisions, not even their allies, and this was proven in many 
occasions.”44 Despite of the accusations that held Hezbollah responsible for controlling 
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key decisions in Lebanon, its behavior was different than that of the Syrians, and indeed, 
it avoided imposing its decisions on its allies when they dispute. For instance, Amal 
movement, its Shi‘a ally, and the Free Patriotic Movement, its Christian ally, deeply 
disagree on internal matters but Hezbollah never insisted to mediate a long-term truce 
between both sides. Soft-power was always the norm, at least explicitly. 
However, this point of view has been rejected by Hezbollah’s rivals. A Christian 
anti-Hezbollah former Member of Parliament (MP) argued that after the Syrian 
withdrawal, Hezbollah sought to build its own plan by becoming an orphanage to pro-
Syria parties in Lebanon and established the 8 March alliance.45 Interestingly, a 
“Lebanese Forces” spokesman, a former militia and anti-Hezbollah party, framed the 
situation as follows: With the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
from Lebanon in 1982, Iran took a strategical decision to implement a strong Shi‘a 
organization in Lebanon. In case Iran ever loses its regional impact, this organization 
can’t be removed from domestic politics since its partisans are Lebanese. So with Syria’s 
retreat, Hezbollah tried to fill the vacuum. Notably, Lebanese have always been ruled by 
many foreign forces such as the Ottomans; however, and proven by many failed 
experiences, it is impossible to accept the supremacy of any Lebanese counterpart. 
Gradually, Hezbollah realized that its priority was controlling Lebanon’s foreign policy and 
key positions in the government rather than controlling others, and in that, they 
succeeded.46 Similarly, Future Movement’s deputy secretary general argued that 
although Hezbollah tried to play Syria’s role, they did not succeed. There’s a great 
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difference between Hezbollah and Syria, he said, while Syria was given a mandate over 
Lebanon, Hezbollah is a partner and therefore can’t play the role of guidance.47 
After Syria’s departure, Hezbollah sought to cement itself domestically. First, it 
tightened its relationship with the Amal movement, the other strong Shi‘a party. The 
political consent and partnership between both sides would be called the “Shi‘a duality.” 
This step was paramount for Hezbollah because it hoped to secure its first line of defense: 
the Shi‘a community; minimizing the possibility of any intra–Shi‘a conflict. Second, it 
struck a deal with the Muslim leaders of the 14 March coalition in order to run for the 
parliamentary elections on consensus lists. The partnership was called the “Quartet 
coalition” and shaped by 4 major Muslim parties: Hezbollah (Shi‘a), Amal Movement 
(Shi‘a), the Future Movement (Sunni), and the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze). The 
Future movement, headed by Saad Hariri, son of late Rafik Hariri, the Progressive 
Socialist Party by Walid Jumblatt, a former pro-Syria Druze leader who changed positions 
and became the hawk of the anti-Syria 14 March alliance. “Nasrallah knew that this 
coalition will give the majority of the parliament to the 14 March alliance, but he explained 
to me that he had no other choice. Either we give them the parliament or they will accuse 
us of killing Hariri.”48 By other words, this short-term coalition was not meant to survive 
but was merely a political honey moon to avoid any confrontation. 
Hezbollah’s former private universities spokesman confirmed that through this 
coalition, Hezbollah hoped to overcome a political stalemate or military conflict.49 Third, 
“in February 2006, it [Hezbollah] signed a memorandum of understanding with Michel 
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48 Interview with author. 4 December 2018. 
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Aoun, a once-vociferous anti-Syrian Christian leader” (Blanford, 2011, p.364). Hezbollah 
was looking for a strong Christian ally for one obvious reason: a cross-sectarian alliance 
with the strongest Christian party will protect Hezbollah’s back in Lebanon and will 
ameliorate its international image. In fact, Aoun by its turn, knew that a quid pro quo with 
Hezbollah will be the fastest route to the presidential palace. More to the point, the 
relationship between Aoun and Hezbollah was strategic and a long-term alliance that 
serves both sides. 
Afterwards, a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was formed to investigate Hariri’s 
assassination after a consensus between Lebanon’s government and the United Nations 
Security Council. The mandate of the STL would be for 3 years and could be renewed by 
the end of the term and Lebanon would cover all costs. Quickly, the STL ordered the 
arrest of the head of all security apparatuses who were loyal to Syria without any damning 
proofs or charges of their involvement in Hariri’s assassination.50 After four years of 
detention, they were released. Therefore, Hezbollah and the 8 March coalition accused 
the STL of being politicized and leading a conspiracy against Hezbollah on behalf of Israel 
and America. Nasrallah and al-Manar, Hezbollah’s TV channel, accused the STL of hiring 
CIA members and therefore, having prejudices against Hezbollah rather than damning 
evidences.51  
However, Robert Baer, the former CIA officer working in the STL, claimed that he 
has been contacted long after being released from the CIA and accused Hezbollah of 
                                                
50 “Lebanon tribunal orders release of generals” by Aaron Gray-Block & Nadim Ladki. 
On 20 April 2009. Reuters. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-
tribunal/lebanon-tribunal-orders-release-of-generals-idUSTRE53S4JP20090429 
51 “The Hunt”. By Jad Ghoson. Al-Jadeed TV. Retrieved from: 
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murdering Hariri. He said that the Lebanese people always believe in conspiracy theories 
which is a false and falsifying premise.52 Baer (2014) reasoned that al-Manar referred to 
his former work in the CIA when he tried to hunt Imad Moughniyeh in the 1980s and 
predicted that “the indictments refer to new leaks that the STL is about to name 4 
Hezbollah members in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the billionaire and former 
Lebanese Prime Minister” (p.xiv-xv). In September 2018, “4 Hezbollah members have 
been tried in absentia for participating in the murder of Hariri.”53 The tribunal blamed 
Moustafa Badreddeen, Moughnieh’s brother-in-law and his successor, killed in Syria in 
2016, for orchestrating the operation. 
The assassination was a turning point in the history of Lebanon with domestic and 
regional ramifications. Adham Saouli (2019) argued that Hariri’s assassination ended 
Lebanon’s stability and opened “a new chapter in the country’s turbulent history” (p.163). 
It created a schism between two camps: the pro-Syria 8 March and anti-Syria 14 March. 
Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s participation in Seniora’s cabinet failed to remedy the Sunni-
Shi‘a split generated after Hariri’s murder that was paralleled with the rise of sectarian 
bickering in post-2003 Iraq. Nasrallah’s main objective, however, was to counterbalance 
external pressures on the organization in a bid to force it to abandon its arsenal.54 
Hezbollah felt confined in the ensuing years by both domestic and external pressures: the 
STL, the Seniora government and its international backers who intended to isolate the 
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organization, the 2006 war, and lastly, the threat of a Sunni-Shi‘a war, Hezbollah’s worst 
nightmare (Bassel Salloukh and Shoghig Mikaelian, 2013, p.525). The withdrawal of Syria 
from Lebanon left a power vacuum in the political system and Hezbollah was the strongest 
force that was qualified to fill it, but generated as much nemesis as support. The decision 
to participate initiated from al-Dahiyah rather than Tehran and it was Hezbollah’s choice. 
Therefore, driven by the events, Hezbollah had to participate in the cabinet for the first 
time and start a new phase in the history of the organization.  
4.4 Memorandum of Understanding 
The transformative regional events that were engulfing the Middle East had placed 
Lebanon on a slippery slope. Michel Aoun, then Army Chief who rejected the Ta’if 
agreement and fought against the SAA, returned to Lebanon in 2005 after 15 years of 
exile in France. Aoun was a key figure in the 14 March coalition but abandoned it after 
Syria’s withdrawal, established a new party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and 
when the “Quartet coalition” emerged, Aoun, against all odds, participated in the elections 
and formed the largest block in the parliament. Thereafter, Hezbollah, looking for a strong 
ally to provide it with the perfect cover, sought to mend ties with Aoun who was open for 
this alliance. This cross-sectarian alliance eased tensions that were mounting against 
Hezbollah. Despite its Shi‘a identity and its devotion to wilayat al-faqih, a long-term 
relationship with a the strongest Christian figure proved to be a beneficial endgame. 
Therefore, the dual talks between both sides culminated on 6 February 2006 in signing a 
memorandum of understanding between Nasrallah and Aoun at the Mar Mkhayel Church 
in Haret Horeik. 
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Following are the key points of the memorandum: First, dialogue is the only path 
for Lebanon’s crises based on consensual will; second, reflecting the spirit of the 
constitution and the essence of shared coexistence, consociational democracy remains 
the essential basis for governance in Lebanon; third, the reform and arrangement of 
political life in Lebanon necessitate a modern electoral law, proportional representation 
may be one of its effective shapes; forth, state building; fifth, the missing during the 
Lebanese civil war and the uncover of their fate with collaboration of all parties; sixth, a 
call upon the Lebanese in Israel to return to resolve their case; seventh, on security 
issues: the condemnation of any political assassination in general and those that occurred 
in Lebanon specifically such as Hariri’s assassination or other figures, so the investigation 
must continue until justice prevails; eights, maintaining good relations with Syria and 
rejecting any sort of external guardianship; ninth, Palestinians in Lebanon must abide by 
the authority of the Lebanese government and their case must be looked at from a global 
approach and the same time the solidarity with their cause; tenth, the protection of 
Lebanon and the preservation of its independence and sovereignty as a national 
responsibility, being guaranteed by international treaties and the right of confronting any 
threat. Moreover, Hezbollah’s arsenal must be tackled as a general approach linked to 
the reasons behind its existence. Lebanese must share the burdens of protecting their 
country and maintaining its stability through liberating all prisoners in Israel, the liberation 
of the Shebaa farms, and the protection of Lebanon through national dialogue that shapes 
a strategic national defense plan.55 
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In fact, if anything, the essence of the memorandum laid in the last point that 
legalized Hezbollah’s arsenal and presence as a resistance movement, not only to defend 
its territory, but also to liberate inmates from Israeli prisons. On the commemoration of 
the 10th anniversary of the memorandum, Aoun commented that “everybody must 
understand that Lebanon is built upon balance and participation and the agreement 
between us was built upon our word and there are ethics in our relationship.”56 Daher 
(2019) opined that the agreement was a triumph for Hezbollah: “profiting from the inter-
Christian rivalries, it had succeeded in attracting a significant part of a community which 
a priori had no reasons to favorably inclined towards the party” (p.199). Even when 
Hezbollah faced the biggest war of elimination in July 2006, Aoun remained loyal to this 
alliance endearing him further in the former’s eyes. This culminated in 2016, as will be 
argued in section 7 of this chapter, in electing Aoun as president after Hezbollah’s 
insistence on the following: Aoun or vacuum. By and large, this relationship proved to be 
a mutually beneficial long-term alliance rather than a modus vivendi. 
4.5 The July War: Towards a New Power Balance? 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon gave momentum to the emergence of Hezbollah. 
Although it was not the only organization that fought the IDF, Hezbollah, backed by Iran 
and Syria, had the means to endure and improve on the military level. Pursuing an 
increasingly assertive foreign policy, both countries rushed to counterbalance Israel and 
play a regional role by bolstering Hezbollah. This does not mean that Iran and Syria 
shared the same goals, but at that moment they had a shared interest. On 25 May 2000, 
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the IDF withdrew from Lebanon and Hezbollah was praised for this liberation after almost 
two decades of confrontations with Israel and its Lebanese allies. Now that Israel 
withdrew, Hezbollah’s priority became the release of all Lebanese inmates from Israeli 
prisons. In 2004, a prisoners’ swap culminated in the release of hundreds of Lebanese, 
Palestinians and Arabs in exchange for three Israeli bodies captured in 2000 and an IDF 
colonel that was previously kidnapped by Hezbollah. Among the Lebanese liberated were 
two key Hezbollah figures: Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Abdel-Karim Obeid (Blanford, 
2011, p.365).  
Although Israel didn’t release Samir al-Kuntar, named in Lebanon the “dean of 
prisoners”, alongside 4 other inmates, Hezbollah was unyieldingly determined to release 
all prisoners. Celebrating the exchange, Nasrallah pledged to release all the remaining 
prisoners (Daher, 2019, p.201). This left Hezbollah with more room to maneuver. By other 
words, Hezbollah was given the chance to launch a war against Israel under the narrative 
of releasing the hostages. Had Israel released all inmates, Hezbollah wouldn’t have used 
this excuse to generate a confrontation. In 2005, “in the early afternoon of November 21, 
the Islamic Resistance launched a coordinated multipronged assault against Israeli 
positions in Ghajar village and the adjacent Sheb‘a Farms in what was the largest and 
most complex operation since the October 2000 abduction of three soldiers” (Blanford, 
2011, p.366). On 24 April, 2006, Nasrallah referred to Hezbollah’s intentions of kidnaping 
Israeli soldiers to free Kuntar and the rest of the prisoners (Nicholas Noe, 2007, p.370). 
The big confrontation was yet to come, however. 
On 12 July 2006, at 9:05 am, a top-notch Hezbollah unit attacked an IDF convoy 
in a cross-border raid, killing six soldiers and capturing two. Shown in the released footage 
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by Al-Mayadeen channel for the 10th anniversary of the war, this special unit had planned 
and trained for the operation beforehand and was supervised by Moughniyeh who 
appeared giving instructions during the final drill.57 Soon after the operation, Nasrallah 
issued a public statement claiming that he had expressed many times during that year 
about Hezbollah’s determination to kidnap Israeli soldiers in its hope for a bargain to 
release the prisoners. Since neither the international community nor any country have put 
efforts to release the Lebanese hostages, according to Nasrallah, it is our right and the 
only logical solution left for us to accomplish our promise. Releasing the hostages, 
Nasrallah said, was our priority since the beginning of 2006 in order to permanently seal 
the prisoners’ dossier.58 Nasrallah emphasized that the decision to capture soldiers rather 
than civilians was taken months before executing the operation by the Shura Council –
the highest decision-making council, and was later sent to the Jihadi Council for 
execution. Nasrallah declared that a special unit crossed several times into the 
Palestinian territories but the operation did not happen because the targets were 
civilians.59  
 As a matter of fact, Hezbollah did not expect Israel to launch a war and Nasrallah 
explicitly expressed that their only target was a swap rather than a confrontation in south 
Lebanon. “Our intensions are neither to raise tensions on the borders nor to spark a full-
scale war with Israel, rather we are seeking a consensus for a prisoners’ exchange 
                                                
57 Hezbollah releases never seen footage from the ambush that sparked the 2006 war. 
Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8mQH6n2zRR4 
58 Nasrallah’s conference to explain the operation “Truthful promise”. Published on 11 
July 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfsqZ05gmuE 
59 “Hezbollah Leader reveals secrets of the July 2006 War, by Ibrahim al-Amine; Wafic 
Kanso; Hassan Illaik; & Maha Zureikat, 14 August 2014, Al-Akhbar Newspaper.  
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through indirect channels. However, we are prepared and ready if the enemy wanted a 
confrontation.”60 More to the point, Nasrallah palpably explained that Hezbollah did not 
want a war and designed a route to reach a solution rather than a conflict. In fact, 
Lebanese prime minister Fouad Seniora asked Nasrallah’s advisor, Hussein Khalil, of the 
expected reaction from Israel and the answer was “nothing” (Blanford, 2011, p.379). 
Daher (2019) argued that Nasrallah absolved Seniora’s cabinet from any responsibility 
claiming that the government was not informed beforehand (p.201). If Hezbollah’s 
purpose was to conduct a full-scale war it would have pursued its attack on IDF headlocks 
and fired rockets into Israel instead of adopting a calmative narrative and pushing towards 
indirect negotiations for hostages’ exchange. That said, there were no Iranian orders to 
initiate a war because Hezbollah wouldn’t have halted if it wanted to launch a 
confrontation on Tehran’s behalf. Simply, the decision to execute the operation was to 
fulfil Nasrallah’s earlier pledge to release all inmates in the Israeli prisons.  
Nasrallah announced the success of the operation, which he dubbed al-Wa‘d al-
Sadeq” (Truthful Promise), in reference to his earlier pledge to liberate all Lebanese 
inmates in Israeli prisons. However, “Truthful Promise” quickly cascaded out of control 
and shifted from a small operation to a full-scale war. Augustus Richard Norton (2007) 
argued that Israel’s offensive was beyond Hezbollah’s expectations (p.136). Israeli 
miscalculations led to false presumptions of its ability to eliminate Hezbollah within days. 
Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmart, rushed to express that the IDF’s purpose is to 
destroying Hezbollah. Indeed, the Israeli cabinet had agreed for an aerial and naval 
                                                
60 Nasrallah’s conference to explain the operation “Truthful promise”. Published on 11 
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assault on Lebanon assuming that Hezbollah will shortly be seeking armistice (Blanford, 
2011, p.379). Daher (2019) noted that Olmart pledged to “set Lebanon back 50 years” 
(p.201), a promise that he would soon realize was doomed.  
Soon after these events, Rafik Hariri’s airport runways were hit and Hezbollah’s 
headquarters where Nasrallah resided were turned into debris. Correspondingly, 
Hezbollah’s rocket bases were bombarded alongside other infrastructures. Daher (2019) 
emphasized that the IDF pilots demolished Hezbollah facilities from the air, including 
buildings, offices, hospitals, schools, charities, and its leaders’ residences (p.202). 
Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the IDF Chief of Staff, declared that “90 percent of 
Hezbollah’s long-range rocket arsenal was destroyed” (Blanford, 2011, p.380). However, 
against all odds and the propaganda machination of the Israelis, Hezbollah responded by 
firing rocket salvos into Israel undermining Halutz’s claims and Israel’s hope of a quick 
triumph. 
Despite the lack of precision, on July 14, Hezbollah fired missiles into Haifa for the 
first time. This was an important military development for both sides since Hezbollah had 
used new weaponry and Israel, unaccustomed to be targeted this deep at home, was 
now under scrutiny. After that, Nasrallah stressed: “You [Israel] wanted an open war, an 
open war is what you will get” (Blanford, 2011, p.381). At the same time that Nasrallah 
was speaking and in a very well-coordinated strike, a land-to-sea missile hit an Israeli 
warship in front of Beirut’s shores. As he had vowed surprises if a war erupted, Nasrallah 
announced: “Now, in the open sea, off Beirut’s coast, the Israeli warship that has been 
bombarding our infrastructure and homes, look at it as it burns and will sink with tens of 
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Zionist soldiers, and this is only the beginning.”61 “Clearly, the Israeli warship had turned 
off its anti-missile system because it lacked intel vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s ownership of such 
missiles.”62 In the post-war, the IDF confessed that the hit was due to a missed 
Information from the intelligence vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s possession of C 802 land-to-sea 
sophisticated rockets.63 This was not a mere minutiae, somewhat, it was an alteration in 
the history of the Arab-Israeli wars because the former had not known any victory or even 
military balance since the beginning of the confrontations in 1948. In fact, if anything, it 
endeared Nasrallah further in the eyes of his supporters and of many Arabs raising his 
credits across the Arab world. Furthermore, this blow altered the balance of power in the 
confrontation and crippled the IDF by dealing it a military blow.  
Amid these confrontations, Shi‘a areas in the south and al-Dahiyah, were 
evacuated and refugees relocated to Druze, Sunni and Christian areas and to Syria. 
Thousands of refugees fled their villages to Nabatiyeh and escaped to other locations far 
from the frontline. 5 days after the beginning of the war, Olmart announced the 
prolongation of the strikes until the following aims were reached: “The return of the 
hostages, a complete cease-fire, deployment of the Lebanese army throughout south 
Lebanon up to the blue Line, the expulsion of Hezbollah from the border district, and the 
party’s disarming under UNSCR 1559” (Blanford, 2011, p.389). Underestimating 
Hezbollah by Israel and blatantly expressing that it can achieve the previously mentioned 
goals undermined it because at the end of the war, it was obliged to succumb to reach a 
                                                
61 Hezbollah’s Nasrallah target Israeli warship live on T.V. 25 November 2013. 
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62 Interview with author. On 18 December 2018. 
63 Hezbollah’s Nasrallah target Israeli warship live on T.V. 25 November 2013. 
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ceasefire. Adham Saouli (2019) opined that after one week of bombardment against 
Hezbollah, the Israelis failed to achieve their aims or to soothe the Lebanese organization 
(p.174). 
On the same day, IDF troops launched their ground offensive by advancing into 
the Lebanese village of Maroun al-Ras. Unpredictably, Hezbollah fighters resisted for 7 
days before the village fell into the hands of the attacking forces. Blanford (2011) assumed 
that “Hezbollah’s men were fighting from well-prepared defensive positions. Far from 
hitting the Israelis and then disappearing in the usual guerilla fashion, the Hezbollah 
fighters had their ground and within hours the soldiers had taken casualties and were 
surrounded” (p.390). During the confrontations in the 1990s, Hezbollah fighters had 
adopted a hit-and-run strategy as they were not capable of withholding their positions. 
This time, the guerilla tactics changed and Hezbollah troops fought back hoping to thwart 
ground advances. Meanwhile, Israeli air force kept bombarding Hezbollah’s strongholds 
and the latter retaliated by firing rockets into Israel. Daher (2019) argued that during the 
offensive Israel was forced to admit that Hezbollah’s military arsenal and capabilities were 
unharmed and was still able to outmaneuver the Israeli air forces (p.205).  
On average, 170 missiles were launched from Lebanon into Israel during the first 
week, and numbers kept increasing afterwards to reach 350 on July 18 (Blanford, 2011, 
p.393). Every time Israel’s scope of targets grew against Lebanon, unyielding in its 
determination to hit back, Hezbollah launched missiles deeper inside Israeli territories. 
Furthermore, Nasrallah threatened to target Tel Aviv, Israel’s capital, had Beirut been 
under fire (Daher, 2019, p.204). On another level, even under heavy air assaults and 
ground offensives, the communication between Hezbollah fighters and their leadership 
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endured because the units on the ground were keeping up with Nasrallah’s pledges. To 
communicate, they used an internal telecommunication network that they have been 
building for years, keeping it out of reach for the Israelis as it works through underground 
cables. While some Hezbollah personnel had specialized in Hebrew to intercept Israeli 
messages whenever they can, Blanford (2011) confirmed that technicians in the 
organization were able to analyze which frequencies were surveilled by the Israelis so the 
fighters would know which walkie-talkies frequency was safe to use (p.394).  As it should 
be clear by now, the modus operandi of Hezbollah seemed organized and everyone pre-
acquired his responsibility. 
On July 24, the IDF advanced to Bint Jbeil, but Hezbollah fighters didn’t budge an 
inch and clashed face to face with the Israeli soldiers, and after 4 days of draconian 
fighting, the IDF retreated. The latter, Blanford (2011) argued, explored Hezbollah’s “new 
military doctrine of defensive resistance” (p.391). It had built underground tunnels in all 
frontline villages which gave it leverage during battles. Not only did Hezbollah fighters 
held their grounds, but they were also using these underpasses to surround Israeli troops 
and launch attacks from all sides (Blanford, 2011, p.391). One sample of these secretive 
underpasses was later revealed in Mlita, a southern village, and is open for visitors and 
tourists. Furthermore, when battles turned into street fights, Hezbollah combatants were 
able to cross the village from house to house, through holes in the walls that they had 
dug, without being detected, and therefore attacking the IDF from multiple positions. This 
strategy would make the Israelis overestimate the numbers of fighters as they become 
under fire from different locations and wouldn’t be able to detect their whereabouts. The 
Israeli army described the clashes in Bint Jbeil as “the fiercest battle in years” (Daher, 
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2019, p.205). Hezbollah’s stand as a bulwark against the IDF might look normal for the 
casual observer, but brief though it was, these confrontations demoralized Israel and 
boosted Hezbollah fighters, its supporters and many Arabs. An armed group defeated 
one of the strongest armies in the Middle East and dealt it an immense military blow. In 
fact, the leitmotif that the Israeli army is invincible proved to be incorrect. 
Hezbollah introduced new sophisticated rockets and missiles to the battle that 
were of surprise for the IDF: BM-27 Uragan 220 mm, Fajr-3 240 mm, Khaibar-1 302 mm, 
Zelzal-1 610 mm. Additionally, it used the C 802 land-to-sea rockets at least once when 
the warship was hit, the Russian 9M133 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles that proved fatal 
to the Merkava-4 Tanks –considered impenetrable and undefeated in the pre-war 
rhetoric, the Miras-1 UAV (drone) which didn’t have any effect but rather destroyed by the 
Israeli air force (Blanford, 2011, p.394). Blanford (2011) revealed that both, a former 
senior Israeli military intelligence and some Hezbollah fighters, confirmed Hezbollah’s 
possession of the anti-helicopters SA-18 shoulder-fired. Moreover, it had Zelzal-2, with 
an eleven-hundred-pound warheads and a far reaching distance but it kept them as a 
surprise in case the war escalated even more (p.395). The defeat of Hezbollah was 
therefore not as easy as Olmart had claimed.  
On 24 July, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State arrived to Beirut to 
bargain with Lebanon’s prime minister, Fouad Seniora. It wasn’t until then, that she 
realized the failure of the “birth pangs of the New Middle East” plan she hoped for 
(Blanford, 2011, p.399), and that Israel was unable neither to destroy Hezbollah nor to 
help shaping a new Middle East in this war. It seemed that everyone underestimated 
Hezbollah’s capabilities. In parallel, international meetings were held separately, i.e. in 
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Rome, to reach a cease-fire; however, memorandums were rejected by either Hezbollah 
or Israel. Détente was far from happening. So these doomed negotiations were coupled 
with mounting fights and confrontations reached their apogee. On July 30, Israel 
bombarded a civilian house in Qana village, south Lebanon, killing dozens of civilians. 
The same village had witnessed a ferocious assault by Israel 10 years earlier during the 
Operation Grapes of Wrath, slaughtering tens of civilians in the UN headquarters. In both 
wars, the massacres were a turning point, but although it led to a written cease-fire in 
1996, it failed to do so in 2006. However, pressured by the US and western countries, a 
48 hours’ aerial truce was agreed upon by Israel. 
By the beginning of August, the IDF summoned its reserve to assist their 
counterparts in a large ground assault against Lebanon. Another cease-fire failed on 11 
August, and Olmert ordered the invasion of Lebanon up until the Litani river. With the plan 
ready, the IDF advanced into Lebanon and air-dropped some units into the Ghandourieh 
village, adjacent to the Litani. With the IDF troops arriving to Wadi al-Hujair valley, they 
found their selves trapped and under heavy fire again.64 Wadi al-Hujair, a geographically 
stiff valley with steep and well covered hills, made a good location for an ambush. “In all, 
thirty-three soldiers were killed and eleven of twenty-four Merkava Mark 4 tanks had been 
hit” (Blanford, 2011, p.407). Al-Manar TV, Hezbollah’s channel, was streaming part of the 
confrontations, namely the Israeli Mirkava tanks when they were set ablaze by Hezbollah 
cornet guided missiles. This standoff helped boost Hezbollah’s morale and increased its 
credibility among all Arabs, who had suffered endless forfeitures against Israel since its 
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emergence. Hezbollah has proven its ability to deliver and moved from the underdog to 
a player in the regional power balance. Accordingly, international intervention increased 
when Israel realized that its hope of annihilating Hezbollah was waning. Consequently, 
indirect negotiations were held between Hezbollah and the Israeli government through 
the UN and the Lebanese government. On 12 August, Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
cabinet accepted UNSCR 1701 that sought to terminate hostilities. The next day, the 
Israeli government had no option but to approve the resolution that ended the war on the 
morning of August 14. The cease-fire was due at 8 am but 5 minutes before, at 7:55 am, 
Hezbollah launched the final round of rockets towards the Israeli territories. 
On one side, UNSCR 1701 conditioned that Hezbollah release the kidnapped 
soldiers and prevent it from deploying any military equipment south of the Litani river. On 
the other side, it guaranteed Israel’s departure from Lebanon and the restoration of the 
old rules of the game between Hezbollah and Israel, namely to avoid targeting civilians. 
Moreover, Nasrallah rejected the discourse that argued about an Iranian role in the 
maneuver to kidnap the soldiers and avowed that all personnel who participated in the 
operation were Lebanese.65 He argued that it is better not to use misleading premises by 
dovetailing domestic and regional factors vis-à-vis this operation.66 In fact, if anything, 
had Israel freed all Lebanese prisoners in the 2004 swap, it would have left Hezbollah 
with no justification for any assault against its troops. And in case Hezbollah had initiated 
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the war on Iran’s behalf, it would have disarrayed it and put it under scrutiny of many 
Lebanese.  
In 2008, Israel released al-Kuntar and his companions in exchange for the bodies 
of the two Israeli soldiers who Israel thought were still alive. The 33 days’ war led to some 
1200 Lebanese death, and another 121 on the Israeli side, in addition to large 
infrastructural damages on the Lebanese side. Tens of thousands of houses were 
smashed in Lebanon and certain villages in the south were almost entirely leveled. “The 
government estimated direct damages from the 2006 war at $2.8 billion and lost output 
and income at $2.2 billion” (Blanford, 2011, p.412). Al-Mayadeen chanel reporter, who 
covered Hezbollah’s Qusayr battle in Syria, considered this war a whopping military 
progress that transformed the organization into a regional actor.67 Despite the losses that 
struck Lebanon and Hezbollah, the latter, ecstatic of its endurance and its ability to stand 
its ground against a ground and aerial Israeli assault, declared itself triumphant. In fact, 
from the outset, Israel belittled Hezbollah and declared its purpose of annihilating it and 
this was a genuine mistake. Had it not stated its target, it might have been able to 
undermine Hezbollah’s triumph discourse which retroactively used Israel’s pledge to 
praise itself.  
“It is our right,” Nasrallah claimed, “according to the international law, to conduct 
attacks against Tel Aviv as long as one meter of our lands is occupied.”68 This claim was 
no more than an overture for possible raids against Israel which did not retreat from the 
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Sheb‘a Farms. Moreover, with the war unfolding, Hezbollah has proved its credentials. It 
did not only fight a traditional guerilla warfare through hit-and-run tactic like the pre-2000 
era, but it also used a mixture of classical army-guerilla tactics to face the IDF. Hezbollah 
declared itself victorious not by defeating the IDF, but because it survived a war of 
extinction, aborted the Israeli plan and caused high damages for the IDF. Saouli (2019) 
emphasized that Hezbollah has survived against “one of the world’s most powerful 
armies” and prevented Israel from achieving its political and military goals (p.176).  
Moreover, Nasrallah argued that the Washington Post Journal wrote about the American 
experts who studied the war and its implications, in reference to the triumph of the 
organization’s military tactics69. It was hard to escape the sense of triumphalism that 
reverberated across Lebanon and the Arab world. Further afield, Hezbollah imposed itself 
as a stalwart ANSA and generated a new balance of power in the region. However, this 
finest moment for Hezbollah did not last long. The events that engulfed Lebanon 
enmeshed Hezbollah in a domestic confrontation, coupled with the rise of the Sunni-Shi‘a 
schism, distorting its image in the eyes of many Lebanese and Arabs.  
4.6 7 May clashes and the Doha agreement 
In the ensuing months after the 33 days’ war, tensions mounted in the cabinet 
between Hezbollah and its foes. On 11 November, two days before the cabinet meeting 
which was supposed to approve the STL, the Shi‘a ministers resigned accusing the 
international community of seeking to blame Hezbollah for Hariri’s assassination as a 
prelude for its disarmament after two failed attempts: the 1559 UNSCR and the July war 
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(Daher, 2019, p.231). Despite the resignation, the cabinet approved the implementation 
of the STL. Consequently, Hezbollah and Amal insisted that given the absence of a major 
sect from the state’s highest executive body, cabinet decisions were void and illegitimate. 
As a sign of opposition, along with their 8 March allies and Aoun’s Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM), Hezbollah organized massive demonstrations and a sit-in in downtown 
Beirut insisting that the cabinet must resign.  
This political dispute plunged the country into a stalemate that would endure for 
almost two years. Seniora turned a blind eye to the demonstrators who camped just a few 
meters away from both the parliament and the Serai, the cabinet’s headquarters. It is 
important to mention here that these political disagreements were taking place amid the 
rise of Sunni-Shi‘a tensions in Iraq, which also started affecting Lebanon since Hariri’s 
elimination. A Druze citizen recalled, “my mother always taught me to say that I am 
Lebanese when asked about my sect. I never knew the sects of my friends before 2005 
but when Hariri died it all changed. After three days of national mourning, we came back 
to school and everyone was asking about the other’s sect. The sectarian division that 
started with Hariri’s assassination seemed to have been restored in 2008.”70 Although 
Hezbollah has always avoided being placed at rivalry with Sunnis, the escalating events 
put it in a critical situation. 
Following the demonstrations and sit-in held by Hezbollah and its allies, clashes 
started occurring every now and then. Daher (2019) reported about the murder of an Amal 
supporter in December 2006 by a sniper in Kaskas, a Sunni neighborhood in Beirut 
(p.231). “Between early 2007 and the spring of 2008 the ultra-polarization on the political 
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stage led partisans of the two sides to clash repeatedly on the ground” (Daher, 2019, 
p.238). One example is the fight at the Arab University that started as a quarrel between 
Sunni and Shi‘a students and developed to clashes after requesting back up from both 
sides. By early 2008, the prices of weapons in black markets doubled if compared with 
their 2006’s value (Blanford, 2011, p.448). Palpably, the generating nemesis was taking 
the form of sectarian disputes and chaos was engulfing Lebanon. At that moment, the 
cabinet took the decision that would sour the situation even more igniting a bloody conflict. 
On 5 May, 2008, the cabinet took a tremendous decision to shut down Hezbollah’s 
internal telecommunication network and to remove Beirut’s airport security chief, General 
Wafic Shkeir, from his position. On 2 May, Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, had 
emphasized that Hezbollah is directing a telecommunication network linking all Shi‘a 
areas and that containers were spotted on the runway 17 of Beirut’s international airport 
–in reference to Hezbollah (Daher, 2019, p.239). The day after, Hezbollah’s secretary 
general stated that the government’s action is tantamount to a declaration of war and 
demanded that it be reversed immediately.71 Moreover, he emphasized that the 
“communications network was the most important weapon in the resistance” (Blanford, 
2011, p.447). This same network leveraged Hezbollah’s fighters as it provided them with 
undetected and safe communication throughout the July 2006 war. When asked about 
the next move, Nasrallah refused to reveal it as it will be based on daily decisions.72 
Hezbollah was suspicious of the decision claiming that it was part of a grandiose plan to 
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direct a blow against it. Therefore, on 7 May, Hezbollah and its allies, mainly Amal 
movement and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), blocked main streets in 
Beirut and the road leading to the airport claiming a national strike. In the ensuing hours, 
pressures amplified and quickly turned into street fighting. Subsequently, Hezbollah led 
a lightening foray of west Beirut and occupied the port of the city. Additionally, its fighters 
surrounded the houses of the 14 March leaders, namely Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt. 
Few days later, fights escalated and spilled over outside Beirut. In Tripoli, up north, 
clashes erupted between pro-government Sunnis and pro-Syria Alawites and then spread 
to Mount Lebanon between Jumblatt’s supporters and Hezbollah fighters. There were no 
remarkable fatalities during the clashes in Beirut as Hezbollah easily overran its 
opponents but it is estimated that 40 fighters were lost from both sides during the turmoil 
in Mount Lebanon. For an entire week, it looked like Lebanon was disintegrating into 
chaos which if escalated, can lead to a new civil war. But external intervention led to a 
cessation of hostilities and to the intervention of the Lebanese army to prevent further 
fighting. “Starting on 11 May, Arab foreign ministers met with the secretary-general of the 
Arab League, who was presiding over a gathering that had been arranged to address the 
Lebanese situation. They aimed to end the fighting on the ground and to find a way out 
of the deadlocked issues” (Daher, 2019, p.243).  
Following the cease-fire, delegations of both 14 and 8 March alliances journeyed 
to Doha, Qatar, where they negotiated an agreement under Arab and International 
auspices. Qatar’s mediation succeeded in resolving the first internal Lebanese military 
conflict since the end of the civil war. The outcome of the “Doha Agreement” was as 
follows: First, Michel Suleiman, then Army Chief, would be elected president within 24 
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hours. Second, a national unity cabinet composed of 30 ministers would be formed, of 
whom 11 would be pro-Hezbollah. Third, the “Qada’” would be adopted as the electoral 
constituency in the 2009 elections according to the 1960’s law. Forth, all weapons are not 
to be used for political gains in any future internal political conflict.73 But firstly, the 5 May 
decisions by the Seniora’s cabinet were withdrawn and neither Hezbollah’s 
telecommunication network nor General Shukeir were removed. 
Al-Mayadeen channel reporter considered that Hezbollah succeeded in protecting 
itself during the clashes but at a high cost as it lost popularity among Sunnis and Druze.74 
Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations argued that politics in Lebanon is full of 
traps, however, Hezbollah succeed in dealing with it. He opined that they [Hezbollah] 
never acted emotionally but on the contrary, it maneuvered with full rationality.75 This 
justified the danger that Hezbollah sensed when the 5 May decisions were taken. A former 
Christian anti-Hezbollah MP argued that Hezbollah addresses the Druze with mercy and 
indirectly refers to its ability to enter their leader’s house but they didn’t –in reference to 
the grip on Jumblatt’s house. Moreover, it blackmails the Sunnis by referring to what 
happened to their Sunni counterparts in post-civil war Syria and post-2003 Iraq.76 The 
Future movement’s deputy secretary general emphasized that Hezbollah failed to prevent 
domestic chaos but on the contrary, the organization might have played a role in 
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reinforcing it.77 In fact, each actor in Lebanon tackled these matters depending on its 
political stance vis-à-vis Hezbollah. 
The “Doha Agreement” was the fruition of an eighteen-months’ deadlock that 
culminated in a bloody havoc. It created a new domestic order and power balance in 
Lebanon drawing a new redline that Hezbollah’s foes are not allowed to cross in the 
future. “Violence and the threat of its use now became a Hezbollah asset in its domestic 
rivalries. In long-term strategic calculations, Hezbollah established itself as Lebanon’s 
most powerful actor” (Saouli, 2019, p.183). Hezbollah stretched its muscles by blatantly 
attacking its Lebanese counterparts to thwart what it perceived a domestic and external 
threat against its arsenal. However, this conflict implemented asymmetric fissures that 
straddled the sectarian fault-lines of the country. The Sunnis, outmaneuvered by 
Hezbollah fighters, felt belittled by the Shi‘a. Clearly, Hezbollah didn’t pick this battle and 
was not fond of it. Its ministers resigned at the first place after the political dispute with 
Seniora and 14 March, and the decision to protest afterwards was discussed with other 
allies, including the former 14 March figure, Aoun. Also, had the cabinet retrieved its 
decision on 5 May, the 7 May confrontation wouldn’t have materialized. Therefore, the 7 
May clashes were the outcome of a sequence of events imposed on Hezbollah that have 
shown once again, the autonomy of its leadership in the Lebanese theatre. 
4.7 Presidential elections: Aoun or vacuum 
Indicated in the Lebanese constitution, an elected president needs at least 2/3 of 
the parliament’s votes. In 2014, the term of Michel Suleiman, elected president after the 
7 May clashes, came to an end. Though elected with Hezbollah’s approval, Suleiman’s 
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discourse diverged and he gradually started criticizing Hezbollah, namely for its 
intervention in Syria since mid-2012. Therefore, undeterred in the Syrian battlefield, 
Hezbollah objected the election of any candidate for presidency but Aoun. As mentioned 
above, Aoun was Hezbollah’s Christian ally who signed the “Memorandum of 
Understanding” with Nasrallah in 2006, praised the organization during the 33 days’ war, 
and demonstrated and camped with it against Seniora’s government. Not only did 
Hezbollah endear Aoun’s political stance, but the latter also owned his legitimacy as the 
strongest Christian figure in the Lebanese scene. That said, after 45 attempts, the 
cleavage between 8 and 14 March alliances prevented the election of a president and 
Lebanon was without a head of state for two years and a half. Nevertheless, on 31 
October 2016, Michel Aoun, bolstered by Hezbollah, was elected president by a majority 
of 83 votes. 
It is necessary to recall that the “Memorandum of Understanding” was signed in 
2006 and after the 7 May turmoil in 2008, the “Doha Agreement” ensured the election of 
Suleiman. By other words, questions can be raised vis-à-vis the election of Suleiman 
rather than Aoun at that moment although Hezbollah had the upper hand in the Doha. 
Three possible explanations can be reasoned: first, Hezbollah might have been 
compensating Suleiman, then army chief, for not intervening against its fighters during 
the 7 May clashes which would have had wide conflagrations; second, it didn’t trust Aoun 
enough back then; third, there was no regional and international agreement on electing a 
pro-Hezbollah president. The first and third point are the most reasonable explanations. 
After all, Lebanon’s “consociational system” is built on the consensus between both 
domestic and external powers; therefore, the election of a president needs an agreement 
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of the regional and international states. Samir Geagea, head of the “Lebanese Forces” 
and backed by the 14 March coalition, was running against Aoun. However, prime 
minister Hariri shifted his rudder and sought to suggest the election of Suleiman 
Frangiyeh, Hezbollah’s closest Christian ally who didn’t enjoy as much support as Aoun. 
Hariri thought that Hezbollah would turn a blind eye on electing Aoun because it can’t 
reject Frangiyeh’s election, who’s also a close friend of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s 
president. However, Geagea, Frangiyeh’s rival since the Lebanese civil war, rushed to 
sign a “Reconciliation Memorandum” with Aoun, agreeing on his nomination to avoid 
electing his foe. Aoun and Geagea together represent the majority of Christians and their 
agreement forced Hariri to announce in a press conference his approval to elect Michel 
Aoun in one last trial to save the country because Hezbollah had insisted that the only 
choices were a presidential vacuum or Aoun’s election.  
Aoun’s appointment occurred amid military victories in Syria by Hezbollah, the 
Syrian regime and Iran, tilting the balance of power in their favor. In fact, while Hezbollah 
and the SAA were marching on Aleppo, Aoun was being elected in Lebanon. “While 
visiting Aoun earlier,” a former Lebanese minister said, “I asked him: when do you expect 
to be elected president? When Aleppo falls into the hands of Hezbollah and the regime, 
he answered. And that is what actually happened. While the opposition was retreating 
from Aleppo in the green buses, Aoun was being sworn president.”78 More to the point, 
Aoun recognized that facts on the ground dictate the Lebanese theatre. The timing of the 
election was seen as a political triumph for the axis, namely Hezbollah, who was able to 
invest in Lebanon its prevail in the region. This narrative was indeed plausible because 
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Hezbollah had struggled to guarantee the election of its ally as president. Benedetti Berti 
(2016) suggested that Aoun’s election was a political win for Hezbollah.79 Despite the 
media statements and political analysis which alleged that Hezbollah scored a political 
gain, the decision was taken by Hezbollah with the end of Suleiman’s turn, who they 
consider has turned against them.  
Iran had been accused of hampering the presidential elections and preventing 
Hezbollah from attending to the parliament and Hezbollah’s rivals accused the 
organization of intentionally obstructing the vote. Future Movement MP, Jamal al Jarrah, 
argued that there was a clear Iranian decision to block the election of a president.80 But 
Nasrallah insisted that Hezbollah’s decision for Lebanese Presidency was issued in 
Lebanon and Iran “has stated that the election is a Lebanese matter that is decided by 
Lebanese only”.81 In fact, during that time, Hezbollah had proven its credentials in Syria 
and embedded itself as a partner and decision-maker in the axis. Therefore, operating for 
the benefit of the axis that extends from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad, 
Hezbollah didn’t need guidance by Iran. However, this does not mean that Tehran didn’t 
indirectly supervise the political agreement that brought Aoun to presidency because as 
many opined, it was a US-Iran deal. Here, it is important to state that the election of 
presidents in Lebanon, has always been confined to external agreements. It is almost 
impossible to elect a Lebanese president without a nod by the Americans. Also, since 
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Hezbollah represents the axis, Aoun’s election was backed by Tehran. In previous 
elections, however, Tehran’s role was minor, especially when consensuses in Lebanon 
were spearheaded by Syria, Saudi Arabia and the US. A Shi‘a pro-Saudi journalist close 
to Hariri reasoned that Hezbollah managed to freeze the presidential election imposing 
the appointment of its ally, so Hariri had no choice but to elect Aoun. “We were facing two 
options”, he said, “the first was to refuse Aoun’s election while risking a clash with 
Hezbollah that would result in enforcing a new constitution, new prerogatives and terms, 
new legacy, and the dismantling of the Ta’if agreement. The second was to elect Aoun 
with the possibility of having nuances with him every now and then, but within the current 
political system. So Hariri preferred the second option rather than the first one. Moreover, 
if we didn’t elect him, the vacuum would have endured for a very long time.”82 Former 
Christian anti-Hezbollah MP argued that Aoun is acting with pure transparency regarding 
his relationship with Hezbollah. By other means, he provides the legal cover for their 
illegal arsenal and in return they support him for all governmental positions.83 Hezbollah 
considered the election a payback to Aoun for standing alongside the organization during 
the July 2006 war, but also because Aoun’s regional choices overlaps with it.  
Bassel Salloukh (2017) argued that Syria’s civil war produced a presidential 
vacuum as political protagonists and their sponsors waited for the Syrian conflict to settle. 
From the outset, Hezbollah unyieldingly insisted to elect Aoun and didn’t budge an inch. 
Although Hariri nominated Frangiyeh, the historical Christian ally of Hezbollah, thinking 
that it was a gift hard to decline, Hezbollah was eager to keep his promise, which was 
                                                
82 Interview with author. 13 November 2018. 
83 Interview with author. 9 October 2018. 
	 143	
outspoken by Nasrallah, of nominating Aoun. For sure, Aoun’s election was the outcome 
of a political consensus between Iran and the US. Thanassis Cambanis seconded that 
Hariri and Aoun reached an agreement after years of discussion with the mediation of 
foreign countries, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US.84 As the Shi‘a pro-Saudi 
journalist placed it: “Aoun’s election is an overlap of internal and external factors. 
Hezbollah represents an extension of Iran’s interests in the region, so if the Lebanese 
organization accepted, it means Iran did.”85 Yet, political factions such as the Future 
Movement and the Lebanese Forces are the ones who changed their choice rather than 
Hezbollah and this is most probably because Hezbollah and the axis, prevailing in the 
regional theatre, had the upper had on the negotiation table. 
4.8 En ‘Odtom ‘Odna  
The Beqaa valley, a predominantly Shi‘a inhabited area on the Lebanese-Syrian 
borders, has always been Hezbollah’s linchpin and its perpetual backyard and reservoir. 
It has been a base for its training campuses since its foundation in 1982, a permanent 
route for its weapon shipments from Iran via Syria, and since 2012, a frontline against the 
Syrian opposition and a starting point for its full engagement in Syria’s turmoil. Chapter 5 
will unpack the clashes that occurred in the area and how Hezbollah began its gradual 
intervention through this region but it is important to mention in this chapter the 
confrontations that erupted on the Lebanese side of the border. Flanked by large numbers 
of Shi‘a, Arsal, a Sunni village of approximately 40,000 citizens, sits atop the Beqaa 
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mountains and converges with Syria’s border. The Sunni citizens of this village, along 
with other Lebanese Sunnis, had accumulated their antagonism towards Hezbollah for 
years, namely driven by the 7 May clashes that was paralleled with the rise of the Sunni-
Shi‘a schism in the region. With the eruption of Syria’s civil war, Arsal became a sanctuary 
for jihadist factions, namely Hay’at Tahreer al-Sham (HTS), formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, and 
ISIS later, who were taking refuge in its mountain tops.  
In 2014, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) executed a clandestine operation 
leading to the arrest of a military leader of HTS. In retaliation, the village was overrun by 
HTS and ISIS kidnapping 30 Lebanese soldiers and police officers before retreating to 
the barren hills of the village. Under political pressures spearheaded by Sunni clerics and 
figures, the LAF weren’t given permission to advance to the rescue of their comrades and 
the attack was halted. However, with Aoun in office since late 2016, the situation changed 
and the confrontation in the hills started looming. Additionally, Hariri, supported by the 
US, agreed to conduct the operation by the LAF to cleanse these mountains from 
terrorists. But before plunging into the war, the Lebanese political elites, hoping to ease 
sectarian tensions, expressed that this operation was directed against terrorism rather 
than Sunnis. Sectarian otherness was never the causal factor of most confrontations, and 
if occurred, it was an exception. But it was easy to malign the other by using a sectarian 
discourse and victimhood. During this period of time, HTS and ISIS had clashed multiple 
times in the hills for a battle of domination but with little advancements from either side.  
	 145	
While the preparation for the confrontation was ongoing, Hezbollah stepped in on 
20 July, and launched an offensive against HTS-dominated peaks.86 Aram Nerguizian 
(2017) accused the organization of preventing the LAF from executing a dual plan to 
attack both together, HTS and ISIS.87 Regardless, with Hezbollah closing up on al-Nusra 
from all sides, the latter bargained a deal for a safe retreat towards Idlib, northwestern 
Syria. One month later, on 19 August, Aoun initiated an offensive he dubbed “Fajr al-
Jouroud” (Dawn of the Barren Hills) conducted by the LAF against ISIS fighters “Dawn of 
the Barren Hills”. Tacitly coordinating with the LAF, yet without public confirmation, 
Hezbollah and the SAA declared too, the beginning of a raid they called “En ‘Odtom 
‘Odna” (If you’re back, we’re back), against ISIS’s strongholds from the Syrian side of the 
borders. These confrontations were dictated by the overlap of politics and facts on the 
ground. 
“The United states and the United Kingdom have stated clearly that as members 
of the US-led counter-ISIS coalition, they stood ready to assist the Lebanese armed 
forces, should Lebanon and the armed forces request it.”88 Donald Trump, the US 
president, indirectly stood against Hezbollah’s claims of defending Lebanon saying that 
“American assistance can ensure that the Lebanese army is the only defender Lebanon 
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needs.”89 This statement remains confined to the political dynamics rather than facts on 
the ground. “Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF is not new but rather perpetual, so how 
come they would not cooperate with them while both are attacking the same target in one 
geographical zone.”90 However, Nerguizian (2017) insisted that “elements close to 
Hezbollah” are promoting the rhetoric of collaboration between the LAF on one side and 
their Syrian counterpart and Hezbollah on the other. Nerguizian’s argument is misleading 
from a military point of view because facts on the ground dictated the rudder of the 
confrontation and it impossible not to coordinate the attacks. 
The triumph of the LAF was considered quick in rock-solid terrains, full of hidden 
caves and elevated hills. Cornered between the LAF from one side and Hezbollah from 
the other, ISIS bargained a deal with the latter allowing them to journey to the then ISIS 
controlled area of Deir ez-Zor in northwest Syria. In exchange, ISIS pledged to release 
Hezbollah captured fighters and to reveal the place of the bodies of the LAF and police 
soldiers which had been abducted in 2014. Hezbollah tried to promote itself as the 
redeemer by bringing back the bodies of the dead soldiers of the LAF. As a matter of fact, 
Hezbollah was keen to appear as the defender of Lebanon’s soil and overstated the 
battle’s results when Nasrallah claimed that this is “the second war of emancipation.”91 
By the expulsion of these jihadist fighters who found sanctuaries in the Beqaa’s barren 
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hills, Lebanon secured the last enclave on its territory. If compared to its full-scale 
intervention in Syria’s civil war, the decision to conduct this offensive by Hezbollah was 
minor. In parallel to the ground assault, it also led the negotiations with these groups. 
Taking part in the assault did not need the approval of Iran as Hezbollah had already 
been enmeshed in Syria’s civil war for years now. 
4.9 2018 Parliamentary elections: Massive win 
Parliamentary elections in Lebanon take place every four years. However, 
gridlocked in the turmoil caused by the civil war in Syria and its political and security 
spillovers into Lebanon, elections were adjourned 3 times. The elections that were 
supposed to be held in 2013, were postponed twice on conditions of security threats and 
the possible terrorist attacks that might occur. On 16 June 2017, after a long governmental 
stalemate, political factions agreed, some reluctantly, on a new proportional 
representation (PR) law for the first time since independence. Therefore, a technical 
extension for 11 months was to postpone the elections until 6 May 2018. The new 
electoral law gave voters the choice of one preferable vote within the list they choose to 
elect, called single transferable vote (STV). Pundits have criticized this suggestion by 
pointing out that it “redraws electoral districts in an overly sectarian fashion, insuring that 
parliamentarians are elected mainly by their co-religionists.”92 Although PR is better than 
the majoritarian system as it gives the opportunity for minorities and small parties to be 
represented, the religious and sectarian mindset of most voters would drive them to give 
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the preferable vote for a candidate of their sect. This is not the norm in other countries, 
however. 
The amendment of the electoral system was the hardest milestone. Their mutual 
antagonism notwithstanding, Aoun and Geagea had always appealed to change the 
majoritarian electoral law to a more democratic PR system. In his inauguration speech, 
Aoun insisted that a new electoral law must be implemented and hence allowing a fair 
and better representation for all Lebanese groups.93 As mentioned in the “Memorandum 
of Understanding” signed between Aoun and Nasrallah in 2006, a new electoral law 
based on PR must be implemented. Hariri and Jumblatt, however, both afraid to lose 
seats for their political opponents and hoping to confiscate the decision-making in their 
sects, were opposed to any kind of PR. But to gain their approval, many constituencies 
were gerrymandered in their favor. Hezbollah knew that a PR system will give them a 
majority in the parliament because the majoritarian system will not allow their Sunni and 
Druze allies to be elected as they don’t represent a majority in their sects. Palpably, 
Hezbollah’s foremost target is bringing to the fore its Muslim identity rather than confining 
itself to the Shi‘a sect, especially after the sectarian splits in the region and its accusation 
of targeting Sunnis. So once their Sunni allies get elected, the organization will counter-
argue the “Shi‘a identity” label.94 Nevertheless, such attempts were nearly impossible as 
will be shown in chapter 5 and 6, because Hezbollah helped aggravate the Sunni-Shi‘a 
schism by instrumentalizing further its sectarian identity.  
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A Pro-Saudi Shi‘a reporter accused the organization of pressing everyone to 
accept the new law in order to politically breach other sects representation, namely 
Sunnis. He contended that Hezbollah’s identity politics within the Shi‘a sect is 
impenetrable, which is not the case for other sects or parties. Therefore, this new PR 
system leveraged Hezbollah’s allies which now form a cross-sectarian alliance, but didn’t 
harm Hezbollah since its milieus are closed either by ideology or power of arms.95 The 
“Lebanese Forces” spokesman argued that Hezbollah has supporters among all sects 
even though the percentages fluctuate from one sect to another, but they were always 
outnumbered in the majoritarian law. This is not the case anymore because the new PR 
system cleared the path for the triumph of its Sunni allies.96 The Future Movement deputy 
secretary general seconded that Hezbollah succeeded by insisting on a new electoral law 
which gave it, along with allies, a parliamentary majority, but “what is winning or losing in 
Lebanon?”, he ended.97 The outcome, however, was a clear win for Hezbollah and its 
allies, an endgame that the organization has always wished for.  
Furthermore, in previous elections, not all Shi‘a seats were allocated by the 
Hezbollah-Amal coalition, i.e. Beirut Shi‘a seats were dominated by Hariri’s Future 
Movement who benefited from the majoritarian law in a Sunni majority district. Such 
prevail was only possible by the majoritarian system and all largely-represented parties 
have always took advantage of this system to marginalize their foes. Consequently, 
Hezbollah’s first priority in the May 2018 election was securing all Shi‘a seats. The second 
priority was to secure as much seats as it can for their Sunni allies; therefore, the 
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organization urged its supporters to vote for their allies in districts where Hezbollah has 
no Shi‘a candidates. As an outcome, 6 pro-Hezbollah Sunni figures won of which 4 formed 
a block in the post-election period that was called by the media and Hariri’s supporters 
the “Sunnis of the 8 March coalition”. By doing that, Hezbollah’s opponents tried to strip 
these MPs from their Sunni identity as being pro-Hezbollah, and therefore, pro-Shi‘a. 
Stripping people of their identity because of their political stances had always been the 
norm in Lebanon. 
The tricky calculations of the new electoral law placed allies on rival lists. Some 
coalitions were a short-term marriage with electoral benefits rather than long-term political 
programs. The result was catastrophic for Hezbollah’s opponents as the latter secured, 
along with its allies, 71 out of 128 seats in the parliament: 29 seats were allocated for the 
FPM, 29 for Hezbollah and Amal, and 13 other seats for minor allies, including 6 Sunnis. 
However, the 14 March coalition only secured 38 seats: Future movement suffered the 
biggest lost as it only withheld 20 seats, the “Lebanese Forces” secured 15 seats, and 
“al-Kata’ib” (The Phalangists) won 3 seats. Jumblatt, however, won 9 seats but at this 
period of time he wasn’t completely sidelining with the 14 March coalition. But even with 
Jumblatt, they would count 47. 10 remaining seats were allocated for independents. 
Compared with the 57 MPs in the former parliament, Hezbollah and its allies were able 
to secure a majority in the parliamentary elections of 2018 surpassing the MPs of the 14 
march block. Therefore, Hezbollah’s persistence to implement a new PR electoral 
system, together with its key ally, President Michel Aoun, proved fruitful. The 2018 
elections marked the end of an era in Hezbollah’s history during which it reached the 
apogee.  
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4.10 Conclusion 
Since its emergence, Hezbollah has continued to rise unabated. Despite its loathe 
by the West and many Arab regimes in later stages, the operational status of Hezbollah 
gradually gained credibility. In the 1990s, it witnessed its first transition by adopting the 
“infitah policy” leading to the heralding of its first participation in domestic politics. Faced 
by a multisectarian society, Hezbollah recognized that implementing an Islamic State in 
Lebanon was nearly impossible. Subsequently, it participated in the 1992 parliamentary 
elections amid internal debates creating the dichotomy of soft- vs hard-liners. While the 
latter rejected the participation in a confessional system that it had long pledged to thwart, 
the former adopted a more lenient stance by pressing towards an adaptation with the 
status quo. This chapter unpacked the maneuvers of Hezbollah in the Lebanese theatre 
from 2004 until its prevail in the 2018 parliamentary elections. Hezbollah sensed that a 
quite war is being waged against it by external and internal actors threatening its interests 
in the Lebanese theatre. Therefore, it explained the conditions that pushed Hezbollah to 
participate in the cabinet in the post-Syria withdrawal era, marking its second engagement 
in the Lebanese system.  
Consequently, it unpacked the important agreement called “Memorandum of 
Understanding” that Nasrallah signed with Aoun, representing the strongest party among 
Christians, in 2006. This was few months before the cross-border raid that Hezbollah 
orchestrated against the IDF and culminating in the kidnap of 2 soldiers. Nasrallah sought 
to exchange these prisoners for the Lebanese inmates in the Israeli prisons who 
Nasrallah promised earlier to release. Unexpectedly, Israel launched a full-scale war that 
proved to be a fiasco. Tel Aviv failed to accomplish its earlier claim of annihilating 
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Hezbollah and therefore the latter declared itself triumphant at the end of the conflict. The 
chapter examined the domestic split after Hariri’s assassination between pro- and anti-
Syria coalitions, 8 march and 14 march, consecutively. In 7 May 2008, Lebanon 
disintegrated into chaos as clashes erupted between both sides. Hezbollah overran its 
opponents and captured Beirut, further exacerbating the Sunni-Shi‘a tensions. The 
conflict was sealed by the “Doha agreement” which took place in Qatar.  
This chapter scrutinized the presidential elections that brought Aoun to presidency 
and the military operation conducted by Hezbollah on the Lebanese-Syrian borders 
against ISIS and HTS, it dubbed “En ‘Odtom ‘Odna”. Finally, it underscored the 6 May 
parliamentary elections and the triumph of Hezbollah and its allies by securing the 
majority of the seats. This triumph in the legislative council posed a new challenge for 
Hezbollah, as it “would have to seek to improve state services, stabilize government 
finances, spark regional development, and spearhead administrative reforms.”98 Now, 
more embedded in the system, they will have to fulfil the voters’ expectations or risk losing 
supporters. Further afield, by 2018, Hezbollah had clearly become a regional ANSA 
operating for the benefit of the axis that extends, from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus 
and Baghdad.  
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5 The Regional Geopolitical Contest: Hezbollah’s Operations beyond 
the Lebanese Theatre 
5.1 Introduction 
Beyond the Lebanese theatre, Hezbollah mainly operated in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, 
and bolstered Palestinian groups through channeling weapons and training but without 
direct engagement. Furthermore, with the eruption of the Bosnian civil war in the 1990s, 
it sent small units to provide military training for the Muslim community. In all these fields, 
Hezbollah cooperated with the Quds Force, the external branch of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, the role that Hezbollah was aiming to 
play was never confined to the Lebanese theatre but was also directed by facts on the 
ground. That said, this chapter will examine Hezbollah’s proxy role vis-à-vis Iran in 
Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen. It will maintain that in these countries, Hezbollah’s fighters 
were executing Iran’s geopolitical agenda. It will open with examining Hezbollah’s role in 
supporting Palestinian factions, namely Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). 
This support would have not been possible without Iran’s financial and military 
sponsorship.  
Afterwards, the chapter will tackle Hezbollah’s proxy role in the post-Saddam Iraq 
by training, arming and organizing Shi‘a groups to fight under the supervision of the IRGC. 
These groups, in coordination with Hezbollah and the Quds Force, fought the Americans 
for years, and in later stages, they spearheaded the offensives against ISIS. The chapter 
will thereby address Hezbollah’s minor role in Yemen and will contend that its role in 
buttressing the Houthis in San‘a was performed on Iran’s behalf. However, Hezbollah’s 
most eloquent role in its history had been in Syria. The groundswell of the Arab Uprisings 
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reached Syria in 2011 and quickly escalated to a devastating civil war between Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime and the host of opposition groups. As the situation cascaded out of 
control, Syria’s turmoil turned into a geopolitical confrontation between domestic, 
regional, and international powers. In parallel, it became with Iraq a fertile terrain for the 
blossom of terrorism. For Hezbollah and Iran, Assad was a key ally and Syria was the 
bridge for the weapon shipments en route from Tehran to Beirut. Losing Syria in favor of 
their rivals would tilt the regional power balance against them; therefore, preventing 
Assad’s collapse was a bid that Hezbollah was forced to take.  
Hezbollah didn’t rush headlong, but bit by bit since mid-2012, it started its 
engagement in the war of necessity that brought a great geopolitical risk for it. This 
chapter will unpack the intervention from the outset, its motives, its causal factor, its 
achievements and ramifications. It will argue that Hezbollah adopted a sectarian 
mobilization agenda to marshal arrays of Shi‘a fighters fanning the flames of sectarian 
discord. As will be observed in this chapter, Hezbollah instrumentalized sectarian identity 
for geopolitical ends, but it was not the primary motive for conflict. The factual reason was 
to protect its interest, and by that, the interest of the axis. “The Axis of Resistance” (which 
is dubbed the axis in this paper), Sullivan (2014) explained, “is an Iran-led alliance of state 
and non-state actors in the Middle East that seeks to confront Western interests in the 
region, namely those of the United States (US) and Israel. Historically, this alliance has 
included the Assad regime in Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah. In recent years, Iran has 
also cultivated Iraqi Shi‘a militants as the newest members of this alliance” (p.9). The 
turmoil in Syria has shaped Hezbollah as a quasi-army mixing between guerilla and 
classical army tactics and formations and a partner in the axis. By examining these 
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events, this chapter will therefore note that Hezbollah has become a regional armed non-
state actor (ANSA) during Syria’s civil war. 
5.2 Hezbollah’s first proxy role: Palestine 
In its Open Letter addressed to the world on 19 February 1985, Hezbollah stated 
its fundamental objective: “To expel Israel for good from Lebanon, as a prelude to its total 
annihilation, and the liberation of Jerusalem and its holy cities from the occupation” 
(Joseph Alagha, 2011, p.43). In 2000, Israel withdrew from Lebanon, except for the 
Sheb‘a Farms and Tilal Kafarshouba, and therefore, Hezbollah’s discourse in post-Israel 
Lebanon consisted of three priorities: The liberation of all occupied Lebanese territories, 
the release of all prisoners from Israeli prisons –achieved in 2008, and the freedom of 
Palestine. These pledges are Hezbollah’s raison d’être. Abandoning them would be a 
somewhat political suicide for the organization with devastating backlashes. Therefore, 
from its 1985 Open Letter to its 2009 manifesto, the organization’s beliefs vis-à-vis the 
Arab-Israeli struggle did not change: “we [Hezbollah] invite and call upon Arabs and 
Muslims at both the official and popular levels, and on all countries that are devoted to 
world peace and stability, to coordinate their efforts and resources for the liberation of 
Jerusalem from Zionist occupation, and to work on maintaining Jerusalem’s true identity, 
and Islamic and Christian sacred sites” (Alagha. 2011, p.134). 
Hezbollah’s support was not merely verbal, it rather provided weapons, money, 
and training when and where possible. It assisted and trained many Palestinian groups, 
including Hamas, Fatah, and the PIJ. “Through Hezbollah, Iran also provides a 
tremendous amount of funding and logistical support to Hamas, in addition to funding 
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Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”99 It is easier for Hezbollah to operate clandestinely 
in Arab countries as the complexion will help them maneuver undetected and will reduce 
the chances of catching them. Iran took advantage of this fact and used Hezbollah’s 
personnel to smuggle weapons into Palestinian territories, namely through Sinai-Gaza 
and Jordan-West Bank borders. There, Hezbollah operated as a proxy for Tehran driven 
by its unyielding support for the Palestinians. Many Arabs perhaps share the same 
ambition as Hezbollah, however the organization’s assistance for Palestinians wouldn’t 
have been achievable if it wasn’t for Iran.  
Al-Akhbar, a Lebanese pro-Hezbollah newspaper, reported that during the first 
hours of the Israeli offensive against Gaza in 2012, Hezbollah and the IRGC raised the 
alert of their personnel who are specialized in smuggling weapons Iranian and Syrian 
harbors to Gaza via Sudan and Sinai in Egypt.100 According to Rola el-Hussaini (2010), 
Hezbollah has been accused for smuggling massive arm cargos from Iran to 
Palestine. Rafael Frankel (2006) seconded that documents seized in busts on 
Palestinian offices and interrogations of many detainees over the years, revealed the 
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relationship between Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as Fatah and the PIJ.101 
Furthermore, Frankel (2012) opined that the development of the relationship between 
Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the PIJ, during the years of the Oslo Accords was an 
attempt to impede the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks (p.59). More to the point, 
Hezbollah refused any normalization with Israel, and therefore was lurking to 
sabotage the talks conducted by Yasser Arafat, the late Palestinian president. 
However, if all Palestinian groups had agreed on a peace plan, Hezbollah’s 
momentum to pursue its struggle against Israel would have been undermined. 
The PIJ, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), was the first Palestinian 
organization to join the axis that had then started emerging under Iran’s supervision. 
Following the exile of the PIJ’s leaders to Lebanon in the 1980s, they initiated a 
partnership with the Quds Force and Hezbollah.102 The fingerprints of Hezbollah and 
the IRGC were soon to be remarkable when in the 1990s, the PIJ started conducting 
successful attacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Therefore, Hezbollah’s 
touches were salient and it was obvious that new tactics were implemented in these 
operations. Daniel Levin (2018) emphasized that the PIJ’s military wing, al-Quds 
Brigades, has conducted a variety of suicide bombings against the IDF.103 Moshe 
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Ya’alon, then Israel’s Defense Minister, reasoned that Hezbollah and the PIJ in Gaza 
wouldn’t exist without Iran’s financial, military and training support.104 
 However, Iran’s relationship with the PIJ faced a sit back after the former’s 
intervention in the Yemeni and Syrian conflicts to back the Houthis and Assad’s 
regime, consecutively. Despite the close relationship between Iran and the PIJ, it has 
been affected by the deepening Sunni-Shi‘a schism in the post-Uprisings Middle East. 
The spillovers of the wrongly framed sectarian conflicts and the sectarian mobilization 
it caused has soured this relationship as the PIJ was pressed to side with its Sunni 
brethren. Few years later, ties were mended between both sides and water returned 
to its streams. Therefore, on the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
Hezbollah invited the newly elected PIJ secretary general to give a speech in 
Dahiyah, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut’s suburbs. In December 2018, Ayatullah 
Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, met with PIJ leaders in Tehran as a sign of the 
restoration of the friendship.105 However, this rift has laid bare the fragility of the PIJ’s 
relationship with the axis because it was not an ideological replica of Iran, but on the 
contrary a jihadist Sunni group. 
Another faction that Hezbollah and Iran buttressed was Hamas, also a MB 
offshoot. At the outset, the Israelis cleared the air for Hamas’ personnel to blossom and 
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thrive as they thought that this was the only strategy to counter-balance the supremacy 
of the then strongest Palestinian faction, Fatah. Avner Cohen, retired Israeli official who 
worked in Gaza for two decades, stressed that “Hamas, to my great regret, is Israel’s 
creation.”106 However, Hamas amplified its clout and gradually developed to stand as a 
bulwark against Israeli ambitions on Palestinian territories. Furthermore, Frankel (2012) 
emphasized that Hamas has maintained close relations with Hezbollah and Iran 
tracing back the relationship between both sides to the 1992, when hundreds of 
Hamas leaders were expelled to Lebanon by Israeli forces (p.57). Indeed, Hezbollah 
arranged meetings between Hamas and the IRGC in Beirut and later in Iran.  
Daniel Levin (2018) contended that in 1992, at a conference in Tehran, Iran 
declared its sponsorship of Hamas with $30 million yearly and training its fighters 
under the supervision of Hezbollah and the IRGC.107 Frankel (2012) seconded that at 
that time Hezbollah and Iran began training, arming and funding Hamas. Furthermore, 
“it is no coincidence”, he said, “that the first successful suicide bombings perpetrated 
by Hamas came in the beginning of 1994, after the group received instruction from 
Hezbollah” (p.59). Establishing such proxies was paramount for Iran giving it, by and 
large, more room for plausible deniability while advancing its regional agenda. 
Through Sinai in Egypt, Hezbollah smuggled weapons, including short and mid-range 
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missiles to Hamas’ jihadi wing, Izz ed-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Obviously, this early role 
proved that Hezbollah was never confined to the Lebanese theatre. 
Augustus Richard Norton (2007) argued that Egyptian authorities arrested, in April 
2009, 25 people including Sami Shehab, who Nasrallah acknowledged of sending to 
Egypt to smuggle weapons for Hamas, and 21 others were condemned for espionage 
and holding weapons (p.187). Hezbollah’s secretary general argued that after the arrest 
of Shehab by the Egyptian authorities for smuggling weapons into Gaza, Egypt’s media 
conducted a campaign against Hezbollah and Hamas. Nasrallah admitted that “brother 
Sami” is a Hezbollah member and his role was logistical on the Egyptian-Palestinian 
border as he was helping transfer armaments to the Gaza Strip. However, he accused 
the authorities of providing false and misleading information about Hezbollah’s role and 
intentions announcing that Shehab was in contact with no more than 10 people not 50, 
as the Egyptians claimed. More importantly, Nasrallah made it clear that if helping the 
“oppressed Palestinians is a crime and we are being sentenced for it, I officially announce 
today that we are proud of these charges.”108 Sami Shehab is one among many others 
directing cells for Hezbollah in Egypt. 
They smuggle these weapons through underground tunnels linking Gaza to Sinai 
allowing them to go undetected by the Israeli border security. Underground tunnels had 
been primarily used by Hezbollah to outmaneuver the IDF during the confrontations in 
Lebanon. Shaul Michal and Avraham Sela (2006) argued that these tactical techniques 
were transmitted from Hezbollah to Hamas fighters when they were expelled to Lebanon 
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in the 1990s. However, this had retroactively backlashed on Hezbollah when it became 
salient that Hamas diverted this tactic to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), previously Jabhat 
al-Nusra, al-Qaeda branch in Syria, which used it against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 
strongholds. HTS fighters even upgraded this tactic as they loaded tunnels under the 
regime’s security buildings and headlocks with bombs and detonated them. In the early 
days of the war, this proved fatal for the regime as it was used as a prerequisite for each 
HTS-offensive. Similarly to the PIJ, with the eruption of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided 
with the opposition, namely jihadist groups, and closed its bureaus in Syria. This was a 
damning evidence of the fragile bond that linked Hamas to the axis. The Sunni-Shi‘a rift 
overpowered the partnership that Hamas and the PIJ shared with Hezbollah and Iran for 
two decades and the former seemed more inclined to leap into a Sunni alliance than risk 
losing credibility among the wider Sunni Arabs. Frankel (2012) argued that Iran’s financial 
backing to Hamas degraded after its positioning in the camp that opposed the Assad 
regime in Syria (p.59). Levin (2018) prescribed that Iran cut off its financial support to 
Hamas from $250 million to $23 million in 2012.109 For sure, there are no accurate 
numbers of the amounts transferred to Hamas, but these amounts have definitely 
increased because of this political diversion. “Despite the shared history, Hamas’ 
relationship with Hezbollah and Iran was more a marriage of convenience than true 
ideological kinship” (Frankel, 2012, p.59).  
The Sunni-Shi‘a divide has always been Hezbollah’s biggest fear as it would 
detach it from a wider Sunni supporters in the Arab world. When it intervened in Syria, 
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Hezbollah was aware that the Sunni-Shi‘a schism might be one among many other 
collateral damages having no choice but to fight alongside the regime or be overburdened 
by the outcomes of Assad’s removal. Despite the cold relationship between Hamas and 
Iran, Nasrallah eschewed blaming Hamas or criticizing it for its political stance but on the 
contrary he argued that Hezbollah maintained close connections with the Palestinian 
resistance and is always ready to back it up.110 In fact, Hezbollah and Iran recognized 
that losing the only Sunni card in the region would not only reduce the axis’ influence but 
prove its Shi‘a identity mobilizing more Sunnis against it. The rational reaction by 
Hezbollah and Iran by containing the clash rather than widening it reopened the doors to 
reinstate the relationship in 2017. Yehya Sinwar, a senior Hamas military leader, argued 
that ties are being restored more than before and Iran is the main supporter of Izz ad-Din 
al Qassam Brigades with weapons and money.111 “The relationship between Hezbollah 
and Hamas – which strikingly bridges the Shi‘a/Sunni divide– is one of broad ideological 
affinity and of emulation on the part of Hamas” (Rola el Husseini, 2010). In earnest, this 
dispute somewhat laid bare the vulnerability of the relationship with the axis. Furthermore, 
would doctrinal otherness be the causal factor of future conflicts rather than political, this 
alliance will not survive. 
However, while preserving its relations with Hamas and tightening the ties more 
with the PIJ, Tehran pushed the IRGC to form a new organization with unquestionable 
loyalty to it with Hezbollah’s help. Since 2015, the Quds Force and Hezbollah, have 
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financed and provided media support for an emerging group called al-Sabireen (The 
Patient Ones) in the Gaza Strip.112 Iran’s fund for the PIJ shifted to the new group which 
is led by the former PIJ leader, Hisham Salem.113 Indeed, Iran might have cut some 
funding for the PIJ, but the latter still function in coordination with Tehran. Israel exploited 
the Sunni-Shi‘a schism linking al-Sabireen to Hezbollah and Iran hoping to detach it from 
its Sunni context. Al-Sabireen spokesperson, Abou Youssef, denied any connection to 
Hezbollah and insisted on the group’s Sunni identity but was open to cooperation with it 
and to learn from its long experience in the confrontation with Israel.114 Nonetheless, the 
flag and the logo of al-Sabireen represented a new Hezbollah in the Gaza Strip. Al-
Sabireen is Tehran’s ideological replica.115 Against all odds, al-Sabireen personnel 
changed their sect from Sunni to Shi‘a.116 This is a compelling proof of Hezbollah’s lost 
trust in Palestinian Sunni factions and its preference to buttress a Shi‘a group. Therefore, 
it used its sectarian identity to establish more groups pledging allegiance to the wilayat 
al-faqih in Tehran and to the axis. Sect-centricity has therefore become paramount for the 
axis and sectarian identity the primary mobilizational tool for these actors. In Palestine, 
as well as in Syria and Iraq as will be tackled later, building ideological replicas was a 
priority for Hezbollah and the Quds Force. 
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Hezbollah’s fingerprints also appeared in the majority of the attacks conducted 
in the West Bank and imprisoned Fatah operatives confessed that the Lebanese 
organization is sponsoring all operations.117 Matthew Levitt (2003) referred to the capture 
of two individuals in Jordan for smuggling arms to the Palestinians in 2001, and after the 
arrest, it came out that they were both involved in the failed attempt to blast the Israeli 
embassy in Thailand –in reference to Hezbollah. Since the 2000 al-Aqsa intifada, 
Hezbollah focused on operating in the West Bank and was keen to recruit Fatah members 
and train and arm them to conduct operations against Israeli targets.118 For Hezbollah, 
assisting Palestinians financially, militarily or even morally is an obligation. As Qassem 
(2005) contended that jihad highlighted that armed resistance in the region is the only 
solution to maintain the Palestinian national identity alive (p.171). In 2002, an Israeli 
security official accused Moughniyeh of smuggling the arms shipload “Karine A” from 
Tehran to Palestine, whereas Hezbollah and Iran denied any connection with the incident 
(Judith Palmer Harik, 2005, p.186). Identifying himself as Abbas Noureddine, Harik (2005) 
argued, Moughniyeh and the IRGC have both participated in smuggling weapons from 
Jordan to the West Bank. Moreover, three Lebanese have been arrested and accused of 
transporting Katyusha rockets to the Palestinians (p.186). Nasrallah claimed that 
Hezbollah’s relationship with all Palestinians is robust and that he continuously meet with 
all groups.119 In the ensuing years, the grip of the Israelis on the West Bank limited the 
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weapons smuggling and the area is almost entirely under surveillance. Hezbollah’s 
personnel have grown accustomed to fighting Israel and that liberating Palestine is a 
jihadi duty. However, Iran has used the organization as a proxy to implement its foreign 
policy agenda through exploiting the Israeli-Arab animosity.  
When Hezbollah captured 3 Israeli soldiers in 2000, Nasrallah announced that the 
prisoners exchange will not only include Lebanese but also Palestinians (Adham Saouli, 
2019, p.151-152). That said, Hezbollah was always determined to solidify the unity 
between both countries who formed one front in this struggle giving the axis more room 
to maneuver. Naim Qassem (2008) opined that Hezbollah has played a significant role in 
transferring knowledge, experience and weapons to Palestinian factions (p.336). “For 
Hezbollah, the attacks Hamas and the Islamic Jihad inflicted on Israel increased the 
pressure on the Zionist enemy and kept the ‘culture of resistance’ alive against the ‘culture 
of submission’ of the Palestinian Authority” (Adham Saouli, 2019, p.151). Further afield, 
despite that Hezbollah’s position vis-à-vis the Palestinians had not budged an inch, 
Tehran’s benefit from the organization’s support to Palestinian movements is immense. 
Hezbollah was always keen to provide the oxygen needed to fan the flames of chaos to 
serve the geopolitical interest of the axis, and chiefly Tehran’s. In this theatre of operation, 
Hezbollah functioned as a proxy for Iran by implementing its regional agenda and 
leveraging its position in the Middle East. 
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5.3 Hezbollah in Post-Saddam Iraq 
Up until 2003, Iraq, ruled by the late president Saddam Hussein, has always been 
a direct menace for Iran and a threshold against its regional ambitions. Iran and Iraq had 
fought an 8 years’ war that costed millions of death and casualties, and huge damages in 
the infrastructure of both countries. In 1991, Saddam conducted an assault against Iraqi 
Shi‘a accusing them of receiving aids from Iran to overthrow him. However, the US 
invaded Iraq in 2003 vandalizing the country and causing, by and large, a short and long-
term wave of unrest with transformative regional events. The sectarian distort it created 
has continued to rise unabated in the Middle East bringing regional rivalries to its apogee. 
This was Iran’s perfect opportunity to expand its regional clout through the muddy 
quagmire of Baghdad. Imad Salamey (2017) argued that “the power vacuum left by the 
collapse of the Iraqi regime brought the rivalry between Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia 
for regional control to its climax” (p.23). Therefore, right after the invasion, Iran started 
establishing Shi‘a proxies in a bid to exploit its sectarian identity and fill the power vacuum 
in post-Saddam Iraq, putting it on a collision course with regional Sunni actors, namely 
Saudi Arabia, which also leapt into Iraq.  
Salloukh (2013) argued that sabotaging Iraq became the purpose of Washington’s 
foes and allies alike, namely Saudi Arabia. “By 2004, King Abdullah in Jordan was already 
talking about fears of a Shi‘a crescent, arcing from Iran and sympathetic Alawite allies in 
Syria to Lebanon” (William Burns, 2019, p.197). Amid this chaos, Hezbollah’s fingerprints 
started immediately floating to the surface along with the Quds Force. Although it did not 
engage in any direct battles, yet it played a cardinal role in helping Iran expand its 
influence in post-Iraq Saddam by assisting, training and funding the Iraqi armed groups 
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under the IRGC’s supervision. Matthew Levitt and Nadav Pollak (2014) argued that in 
2003 the Quds Force urged Hezbollah to further Iran’s influence in Iraq. Therefore, on 
Tehran’s behest, Hezbollah established a special force, Unit 3800, designated for training 
and assisting Shi‘a groups to target multinational forces in Iraq.120 This unit contained a 
small number of Hezbollah fighters who headed to Iraq and some Iraqi fighters who were 
brought to the Lebanese camps for advanced training.121 The primary focus of these 
armed groups was conducting operations against the US army corps and its 
headquarters. 
Hezbollah’s former private universities spokesman argued that Iraqi people were 
oppressed and “wherever there are oppressed people we fight”; however, the 
organization’s role was limited to training Iraqis in order to fight the Americans.122 
Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations contended that the organization always 
studies the benefits of intervening anywhere before putting boots on the ground saying 
that Nasrallah had urged Iraqis to reach an internal agreement with Saddam before the 
invasion, regardless of Hezbollah’s stances against the then Iraqi president “who’s a 
dictator that committed atrocities against his people”. However, he neither confirmed nor 
denied their involvement in direct clashes in Iraq, but “after the invasion”, he pursued, “we 
definitely helped the Iraqi resistance in any possible means.”123 On the contrary, 
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Hezbollah’s minister denied any direct fighting but confirmed sending military trainers to 
assist Iraqis.124 Hezbollah, as always, denied its role in intensifying sectarian tensions, 
but paradoxically, facts on the ground were clear as Hezbollah helped establish 
ideological replicas on Iran’s behalf. And it is normal that the creation of such sect-centric 
groups would generate further sectarian antagonism. 
In 2006, Moughniyeh had traveled to Iraq and helped training the Mahdi Army.125 
The latter was created in 2003 under the leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr and was banned 
in 2008. The name of the organization has been derived from the 12th Shi‘a Imam, al-
Mahdi or the redeemer, who they believe will appear someday to reinstate justice in the 
world. The mere use of such sect-specific symbols rubbed more salt to the wound of the 
Sunni-Shi‘a schism because it inflated resentment among Sunnis who became the 
underdogs in the post-Saddam Iraq. Furthermore, the Badr Organization, a pro-Iran 
faction that played a major role in the 1991 revolution against Saddam, had also been in 
close contact with Hezbollah. Bringing the discussion back to the fighters of Unit 3800, 
they headed to Shi‘a regions for consulting and training the Badr Organization as well as 
the Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq who are also Iranian-backed groups.  
In 2004, a group has split from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to establish an 
independent organization under Iran’s direct supervision and is considered one of the 
closest factions to Hezbollah: Special Groups which later became known for Asa’ib Ahl 
al-Haq. Hezbollah played a whopping role in its foundation and they both share the same 
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creed of the wilayat al-faqih swearing allegiance to the Iranian Supreme leader. 
Hezbollah’s maneuvers in the Iraqi theatre of operations to establish Shi‘a groups loyal 
to Tehran served best the axis and Iran’s agenda. It was clear that trusting Hezbollah with 
such proxy missions proved the deep relationship that it shares with the IRGC. Moreover, 
Kata’ib Hezbollah’s leader, Abou Mahdi al-Muhandis, killed in early 2020 along with the 
Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani by a US missile, had long served Iran’s geopolitical 
agenda and executed its orders. 
On 20 January 2007, the Joint Coordination Center in Karbala was attacked, 
resulting in the deaths of four American soldiers. Levitt (2013) maintained that the 
militants were trained by the Quds Force and Hezbollah to carry out this operation (p.285). 
In 2007, Ali Mousa Daqdouq, a Hezbollah member, was arrested and accused for 
planning the operation in cooperation with the Quds Force, in addition to his involvement 
in other operations, i.e. kidnapping a British soldier.126 Daqdouq was captured along with 
Qaisa al-Khaz‘ali, head of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, then called Special Groups. Levitt (2013) 
reported that documents captured with Khaz‘ali were directly linked to the involvement of 
the Quds Force in the operation (p.286). More to the point, the key figures who 
established the Iraqi Shi‘a factions had been operating in tandem with Hezbollah since 
the 1990s. The overlap of Shi‘a identity and geopolitics served Iran’s assertive foreign 
policy hoping to be further immersed in the region. However, the withdrawal of the US 
troops from Iraq in December 2011 ended an era of a bloody confrontation with Iran’s 
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proxies and paved the way for a new level of cooperation. The debacle of Saddam paved 
the way for Iran to increase its regional clout. In fact, if anything, it appeared as if the US 
invasion removed the final obstacle that was standing as a bulwark against Iran’s 
influence. 
 Soon after, the upsurge of an unpredictable ordeal made matters worse in 
Baghdad unleashing a new wave of unrest. In June 2014, a terrorist group called the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) overran the Iraqi army conquering one third of Iraq’s 
territory and took over Mosul, the second largest city in the country. In 2010, Abou Bakr 
al-Baghdadi had become the leader of the then called Islamic State in Iraq, which didn’t 
draw much attention at that time as its role was finite. Nevertheless, when the Arab 
Uprsing’s wave reached Syria, al-Baghdadi started unleashing jihadists across the Iraqi 
border to recruit, assist and train fighters to combat Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 
Subsequently, in 2013, the name of the organization changed to the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) or Da’esh in Arabic. While the focus was on the Syrian civil 
war and Assad’s removal/survival, all the world switched focus to the events coming from 
Iraq. Da‘esh’s draconian massacres became the new fear that swept across vast swathes 
of the Middle East. In 2015, operating internationally and attracting foreign fighters to its 
ranks, Da‘esh changed its name to the Islamic State. It is necessary to mention here that 
the latter, an ANSA, played a prominent role in altering the regional balance of power in 
the Middle East during this time. On the other side, the rise of ISIS further mobilized many 
Shi‘a to fight in the ranks of pro-Iranian groups which were the only recourse as the Iraqi 
army quickly collapsed. Sectarian violence increased creating communal danger and 
further demarcating geographies. 
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 Amid the unceasing waves of attacks, conquers and atrocities, Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani, the most prominent Shi‘a Iraqi cleric, issued a fatwa to fight Da‘esh and establish 
al-Hashd al Sha’bi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF). But Sistani, represented by 
Sayyed Ahmad Safi, stressed that the call is for all Iraqis, not only for Shi‘a, considering 
this a threat for everyone (Genieve Abdo, 2017, p.22). This was the perfect opportunity 
for Iran to further entrench itself in the region by organizing, assisting, funding, and more 
importantly, institutionalizing Iraqi Shi‘a groups to fight ISIS. Abdo (2017) opined that the 
Quds Force sought to co-opt and micromanage any clerical decision issued by the Iraqi 
clergy (p.22). Besides, Iraqi Shi‘a had no other choice because Iran was the only back up 
which was able to act fast and assist them. Consequently, most armed Iraqi factions, of 
which many swore allegiance to wilayat al-faqih, were united under the PMF. This 
coalition included about 60 factions, predominantly Shi‘a controlled by Iran, such as the 
Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali and Kata’ib 
Abu Fadhl al-Abbas. Their names referred to Shi‘-specific symbols and some had fought 
to protect Shi‘a shrines in Syria. Sect-specificity has been paramount for these groups. 
Similarly to Hezbollah, ahead of each offensive, they pronounce the names Shi‘a-specific 
symbols and slogans. Falih al-Fayyad became the Chairman of the PMF, and Abou Mahdi 
al-Muhandis, leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah, his Deputy and military commander. Some 
Sunni tribes, Christians, Turkmenistan and Yezidis fought in the ranks of the PMF, but 
this did not erase its sectarian label as the Shi‘a were dominant. The situation, according 
to Abdo (2017), was that Arab Shi‘a factions, taking orders from a Persian Shi‘a group, 
the IRGC, to fight the Sunni ISIS, that has some support among Iraqi Sunnis (p.14). 
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During the same month of the Mosul offensive which aimed to recapture the city 
from ISIS, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah is ready to sacrifice 5 times more martyrs in 
Iraq than it did in Syria to defend the Shi‘a holy sites referring that those sites are far more 
important than the ones in Syria.127 Hezbollah’s justification to intervene in Syria’s civil 
war, as will be elaborated in the next section, was to protect Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine, 
along with its claim to protect Shi‘a on the Lebanese-Syrian borders. This speech, among 
many others, helped sectarianize the conflict in Iraq. Sectarian otherness was not the 
primary driver of the conflict as Hezbollah was not seeking religious truth in Iraq. On the 
contrary, the instrumentalization of sectarian identity was used for Shi‘a mobilization and 
solidarity but it also antagonized anti-Shi‘a Sunnis. James Worall & al. (2016) claimed 
that Hezbollah fighters and the IRGC presence in Iraq reflected “broader sectarian 
concerns” (p.145). In 2015, Nasrallah maintained that they limited their presence in Iraq 
“at the moment.”128 Therefore, sending more fighters to Iraq was to be determined by 
facts on the ground.  
Muqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi Shi‘a cleric and leader, has criticized Nasrallah and the 
involvement of Shi‘a factions in battles outside of their country’s borders.129 In 2017, 
Nasrallah contended that “after the final triumph” against ISIS, “we [Hezbollah] will 
reassess the situation with our brothers in Iraq and we might be pulling our forces if we 
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considered that our mission is accomplished.”130 In fact, Nasrallah had then become a 
fundamental partner in the axis capable of playing a role in the regional power balance. 
Despite the rejection of certain Shi‘a figures, these events strengthened the ties within 
the axis, with now a recent loyal host of Iraqi Shi‘a groups. Iran is responsible for arming 
and assisting many of the PMF groups while the Iraqi government pays their salaries. 
“For months prior to the offensive, Iran, and its Iraqi proxies pressured the Iraqi 
government to accept the militias’ role in the Mosul offensive, a move that could give them 
a share of victory and provide them with a pretext to justify their activities long after the 
defeat of ISIS.”131 Also, Hezbollah has sent its best trainers and military leaders to 
participate in the process alongside the Quds Force and its late leader, General Qassem 
Sulaimani. Akram al Ka‘bi, the leader of Harakat al Noujaba’, an Iranian proxy, stated that 
Hezbollah trained the PMF under Suleimani’s guidance.132 
However, the eroding support for Hezbollah among many Lebanese parties 
became whopping after its participation in the region’s havoc. A spokesman of the 
“Lebanese Forces” argued that the core disagreement with Hezbollah is in its assertive 
interference beyond Lebanon. Hezbollah, he observed, doesn’t believe in the finite 
borders and fights anywhere necessary under the discourse of Islam as Nasrallah’s own 
words indicated: we fought in Bosnia. “As a Christian, I didn’t fight to protect the Christians 
in the Levant, i.e. Syria and Iraq; therefore, Hezbollah is an Islamic regional force focusing 
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on the umma (nation) rather than a limited territory, Lebanon in this case.”133 This claim, 
as explained in chapter 3, is valid because as Hezbollah’s personnel explained: The 
organization is a jihadist Islamist movement which believes in the umma of Islam. The 
Future Movement deputy secretary general argued that the Middle East has always been 
related to influential non-state actors, especially in fragile states where the system allows 
the emergence of such organizations. The role of these actors was highlighted with the 
rise of ISIS and its slaughters against minorities. However, he pursued, distinguishing 
Hezbollah’s interest from Iran’s is hardly accomplishable because the former has been 
the spearhead of Tehran’s regional agenda.134  
A Lebanese pro-Saudi Shi‘a journalist emphasized that what should be taken into 
consideration is the “power projection” that Hezbollah has presented in Lebanon which 
was tempting for the Iraqi Shi‘a. Iran, delighted by the success of the Lebanese sample 
–Hezbollah, was eager to inspire the Iraqis to follow path. Hezbollah, he continued, was 
a partner in training, qualifying, educating and skill-teaching them. It helped investing in 
the Shi‘a identity and even though Iraqis have a big reservoir of combatants, Hezbollah 
fought in Iraq and buried some fighters in Lebanese villages. Moreover, he concluded, 
before the emergence of Iraqi Shi‘a figures, Nasrallah was their only voice and built public 
support for their cause.135 Sectarian identity has worked as a mobilizational tool in Iraq as 
well as in Lebanon but each in its own context: In the latter it was used at the outset 
against Israeli occupation in Lebanon while in the former against the Americans and later 
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against ISIS. Sectarian mobilization was also used by Hezbollah in post-civil war Syria to 
prevent the collapse of the Syrian regime.  
That said, there was no point in Hezbollah’s role in Iraq except its implementation 
of Iran’s regional agenda. William Burns (2019) emphasized that “the chaos that spread 
across Iraq after 2003 created opportunities for Iranian mischief and influence, and helped 
reawaken broader competition between Sunni and Shi‘a for supremacy in the Middle 
East” (p.197). In fact, the one to blame for this turmoil is the US as Iran engaged after the 
breakdown of Saddam’s regime and had the US not removed the latter, there would have 
been no room for Tehran’s intervention. Although Hezbollah claim that its role in Iraq was 
limited, it is palpable that it is operating as a proxy for Iran in the country. Since 2003, it 
has helped establish pro-Iran Shi‘a groups, transmitting its experience to use anti-tank 
missiles, mortars and sophisticated weapons. Nevertheless, Nasrallah has denied any 
involvement in shipping any type of arms to Iraq.136 In 2016, the PMF participated in 
liberating Mosul from ISIS’ grip and diverged later to the Iraqi-Syrian border to cut off ISIS’ 
route. In that part of the region, advance on the ground had become a race for geopolitical 
dominance and the axis has accelerated its tempo to capture it to coalesce its Tehran-
Beirut route. The conquers and massacres committed by ISIS have strengthened the 
relationship between the host of Shi‘a actors: Hezbollah, the Quds Force and Iraqi Shi‘a 
factions. By then, Hezbollah’s regional role had unfolded and it appeared as a regional 
ANSA operating on Iran’s behalf in Iraq, but as a partner in Syria.  
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5.4 The Battle for Syria 
Departing from Tunisia, the wave of the Arab Spring disembarked on Syria’s 
shores in March 2011. Bellicose and eager to achieve political gains, domestic, regional, 
and international foes succumbed to the use of force. From an uprising against Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime, demonstrations quickly deteriorated into a bloody civil war between 
the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the anti-Assad armed groups. Soon enough, two camps 
were shaped: the first supporting the rebels, and contains the US, Britain, France, Turkey, 
most Gulf countries, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and a host of jihadist groups and 
terrorist organizations such as ISIS and HTS; the second backing the Assad regime, and 
includes Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, some Shi‘a Iraqi groups, i.e. Brigade Abou el-Fadl el-
Abbas, who later joined al-Hashd al-Sha‘bi or PMF, and pro-Iranian Afghani factions. 
Henry Kissinger (2014) delineated this rivalry as follows: “Saudi Arabia sees a Tehran-
led archipelago of rising Shi‘a power and influence running from Iran’s Afghan border 
through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the Mediterranean in confrontation with a Saudi-led 
Sunni order composed of Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, and the Arabian Peninsula, all 
in a wary partnership with Turkey” (p.140).  
Amid this turmoil, it was hard to escape the sense of insecurity that engulfed 
Hezbollah, pressing it to engage in the conflict to prevent the collapse of Assad’s regime, 
a strategic ally and partner in the axis. As rebels were biting, political and sectarian 
calculations commingled and Hezbollah launched its gradual intervention. It started by 
protecting a Shi‘a religious Shrine in Damascus’s outskirts, that of al-Sayyida Zeinab, and 
fighting alongside the Lebanese-Syrian border in order to protect Shi‘a villages from 
rebels assaults in al-Qusayr. Of course, Hezbollah deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a schism. In 
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the case of Hezbollah, as this chapter will examine, sectarian dynamics took a turn for 
the worse, and it became unlikely that the Sunni-Hezbollah, not to say Sunni-Shi‘a, 
relationship will regain its previous amicability. More assertively, in May 2013, Hassan 
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, acknowledged Hezbollah’s intervention in 
Syria’s blitz, saying that “Syria is the back of the resistance and naive is he who watches 
himself being besieged.”137 Subsequently, Hezbollah fighters spread all over the country 
and fight from Dar‘a in the south all the way up to Deir ez-Zor in the northeast and via 
inland Syria. “Hezbollah views its organization as the front line in the confrontation with 
Israel, and sees Syria as its rearguard” (Marisa Sullivan, 2014, p.9). Therefore, it was 
almost impossible for Iran and Hezbollah to overlook the leverage that Assad’s regime 
had long provided them with.  
By and large, Hezbollah’s embroil in Syria’s civil war for the ensuing years was a 
geostrategic necessity. The intervention was not as easy as it sounds, however. To 
garner support and mobilize its fighters, Hezbollah adopted a sectarian mobilization 
agenda using sect-specific symbols and grievances linking them to the current situation. 
However, the primary motive behind this was to preserve the geopolitical interest of the 
axis. The Syrian battlefield somewhat shaped Hezbollah as a quasi-army mixing between 
guerilla and classical warfare tactics. Therefore, this chapter will examine how the 
intervention in Syria’s moor was a war of necessity that gradually embedded Hezbollah 
as a partner in the axis. Moreover, it will unpack the events that transitioned Hezbollah 
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into a regional ANSA fighting for the benefit of the axis that extends from Iran to Lebanon, 
via Syria and Iraq, to a lesser extent, Palestine, and more recently Yemen. 
5.4.1 From Qusair to Qalamoun: Hezbollah’s Crawling into Syria’s Moor 
The engagement of Hezbollah in Syria’s civil war started in earnest from the 
Lebanese-Syrian border through the city of al-Qusayr, in Homs governorate. Al-Qusayr, 
strategically positioned on the route between Damascus and the pro-Assad mostly 
Alawite coastal regions, became a rebels’ den by mid-2012. It was also a crossing point 
for the opposition from Tripoli, northern Lebanon, to all rebel-held areas in Syria. Further 
afield, it was a smuggling route exploited by the opposition to transfer not only weapons, 
but defecting regime figures such as Manaf Tlass, a close friend to Bashar al-Assad and 
a General in the Republican Guard, but with low influence in the regime (Sam Dagher, 
2019, p.306-307). However, Hezbollah and the SAA managed to recapture the city faster 
than expected. Mohammad Mohsen (2017) argued that it was Hezbollah’s first serious 
offensive and was followed by a complete control of the region (p.13). From there, beaten 
and outmaneuvered, rebels moved to al-Qalamoun. Designed to curtail the rebels’ clout, 
Hezbollah and the SAA launched an offensive to control the villages and the barren hills 
of al-Qalamoun. The attack was paralleled by suicidal car bombs and rocket salvos 
against Shi‘a areas in the Beqaa and Dahiyah, Beirut’s suburbs. Although Hezbollah and 
the SAA were prevailing in 2015, the battle for al-Qalamoun dragged until 2017 for two 
reasons: First, Hezbollah decided to besiege the village of al-Zabadani for a quid pro quo 
allowing Shi‘a civilians to leave two surrounded towns in Idlib, al-Fou‘a and Kfarya; 
second, the remaining fighters of HTS and ISIS were positioning in the outskirts of the 
Lebanese Sunni village of Arsal, and trying to avoid further Sunni-Shi‘a tensions, 
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Hezbollah halted its advance. The confrontations in these overlapping areas unpacked 
the three variables that established Hezbollah as a regional ANSA during Syria’s war of 
necessity: the instrumentalization of sectarian identity, its emergence as a quasi-army, 
and its partnership in the axis and participation in the decision-making process. 
Since the early days of the protests in 2011, demonstrators in the city of Homs 
started maligning Hezbollah. The latter was looking with mounting alarm as the 
opposition’s animus was gradually unfolding. For instance, they were chanting “no for 
Hezbollah no for Iran” and “Hezbollah oh Hezbollah, we want king Abdullah” – the then 
king of Saudi Arabia.138 In Hama they burned Hezbollah’s flag.139 At this early stage, it 
was mere demonstrations, therefore, there was no military presence for Hezbollah and it 
had not yet declared any official statement that supported Assad or despised the 
opposition. Fearing ambiguity and exaggeration by the regime’s security reports, 
Hezbollah sent a delegation of its own security apparatus in the spring of 2011 to have a 
firsthand feedback of the situation, and in parallel appealed for political negotiations 
between the regime and the opposition (Samir al-Hassan, 2017, p.129). Hezbollah was 
acutely aware of the possible pandemonium that might engulf Syria and its spillovers into 
Lebanon. Rapidly, the war drums started beating and the country disintegrated into 
chaos.  
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By early 2012, clashes between the regime and the opposition intensified. The 
town of Sayyida Zeinab in Damascus’ suburbs that contains the Sayyida Zeinab’s 
Mosque, named after the daughter of Imam Ali, one of the most significant shrines and 
destinations for the Shi‘a, came under heavy attacks by jihadist factions. This accelerated 
the tempo of Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria to defend Shi‘a citizens and shrines. Sect-
specific symbolism was paramount for the sectarian mobilization that it has always 
adopted. Subsequently, the possible invasion and destruction of the shrine, led two Shi‘a 
organizations, the Lebanese Hezbollah and Abou al-Fadl al-Abbas, an Iraqi group, to 
send small units to prevent such outcome. Mohsen (2017) seconded that Hezbollah 
started a minor intervention in Syria to protect Sayyida Zeinab’s Mosque after threats by 
the armed rebels who promised to destroy it once they control the town (p.12). This will 
be unpacked in the next section. Suffice it to say here that the intervention to protect 
Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine was the first direct engagement of Shi‘a groups, namely 
Hezbollah, in Syria’s turmoil. 
In parallel, tensions were peaking in the west of Homs, namely in al-Qusayr. The 
latter converges with the Lebanese districts of Beqaa and al-Hermel, mostly Shi‘a areas, 
and Hezbollah’s permanent backyard. In 1982, the IRGC infiltrated through the Syrian 
border and set up camps in the Beqaa valley to train Hezbollah fighters, then emerging 
as an Islamist jihadi group determined to resist Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Nicholas 
Blanford (2011) highlighted that the IRGC started mobilizing, preaching and training 
recruits in the Beqaa Valley villages of what later became Hezbollah (p.44). Also, many 
Lebanese Shi‘a were cohabiting villages in al-Qusayr with their Sunni counterparts. 
Villages overlapped and both Sunni and Shi‘a had lived in harmony for decades, shared 
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the same markets and smuggling routes, intermarried, and even some Lebanese villages 
used the Syrian currency as they shared more with the Syrians than the Lebanese. 
Mentioning such a thing appears somewhat as an explanation of an abnormal or 
exceptional event about how Sunni and Shi‘a citizens lived together. But this is not the 
case because the Sunni-Shi‘a contest and sectarian dynamics are not the primary motive 
behind these conflicts as neither Sunni nor Shi‘a were seeking doctrinal truths, with of 
course, the exception of ISIS or HTS. The point to note here is that sectarian or religious 
conflicts are the exception rather than the norm and the true causal factor is mostly 
political. Bringing the discussion back to al-QUsayr, with the rise of the military 
confrontations between the Syrian regime and armed rebels in 2012, the Sunni-Shi‘a 
relationship in al-Qusayr’s countryside rapidly deteriorated. Sectarian contest in these 
villages was part of the broader communitarian schism that exploded in the Middle East 
since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.  
In an attempt to reduce tensions, an agreement had been bargained between both 
sects: The Shi‘a wouldn’t back any side in the war, while the Sunni pledged not to treat 
them as foes. The oral consent wouldn’t last long, however. The rebels started accusing 
Hezbollah of conducting attacks against them and supporting the Syrian regime in the 
battlefield. The Syrian National Council blamed the Lebanese organization for helping the 
SAA in the attacks against three Syrian villages on the borders.140 Abducting and killing 
became a daily fear for the Shi‘a inhabitants forcing a majority to journey toward safer 
Lebanese areas. Prospects of reconciliation waned. The race for armament started and 
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barricades were elevated on both flanks. Thereafter, rebel groups started conducting daily 
raids against towns such as al-Qasr and al-Tufail in the Beqaa Shi‘a villages in al-Qusayr. 
Without hyperbole, this is not meant to demonize rebel groups or to sanctify Hezbollah. 
A Syrian fighter appeared in a post-battle video in Ain al-Damamel, a town in western 
Qusayr, shouting “Shi‘a have no more lands here.”141 More importantly, Mohsen (2017) 
emphasized that commanders of some rebels’ groups, namely Al-Farouq Birgades, had 
occasionally opened the map of the Assi River that flows through al-Hermel, and 
discussed how they will control the restaurants on its shores (p.62). The sectarian 
discourses and the footages distributed by the rebels increased the insecurity among 
Shi‘a and helped Hezbollah justify its gradual intervention. 
Subsequently, Shi‘a in the villages held arms and established popular committees 
to defend their homes (Mohsen, 2017, p.38). There was then no recorded presence for 
Hezbollah. However, Sullivan (2014) highlighted the death of Hezbollah’s commander, 
Ali Hussein Nassif, in October 2012 and the attendance of high ranking Hezbollah 
commanders during the funeral in the Beqaa valley. As usual, the organization’s public 
report claimed that he was martyred doing his jihadist duties without stating neither the 
cause nor the place of death to keep them in blur (p.12). In fact, if anything, Hezbollah 
was present but it was not the right time for public declaration. A report by a Lebanese 
Television, filming on the borders in the village of al-Hammam, interviewed some of the 
armed men of the popular committees who denied any presence of Hezbollah fighters 
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and claimed that they are defending their towns from terrorist attacks.142 However, the 
organization has always had partisans and combatants in these villages, and therefore, 
they were fighting clandestinely under the cover of these committees. One Hezbollah 
fighter later argued that they distributed weapons to the citizens and helped them 
organize these committees.143 Mohsen (2017) clarified that in his report for Al-Mayadeen 
channel, he didn’t mention the presence of the organization’s fighters, but it was clear 
that most of them were well trained members of Hezbollah and other parties such as the 
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) (p.44). Al-Hassan (2017) stressed that in the 
summer of 2012, Hezbollah units, namely Unit 910 – responsible for external missions– 
turned from advising the SAA to fighting and in July, some troops started appearing in 
Homs and Damascus’ suburbs (p.129). Sullivan (2014) confirmed that by mid 2012, 
“Hezbollah’s fighters killed in Syria were quietly buried in Lebanon” (p.12). These events 
set the organization on a slippery slope towards a full-scale military involvement in Syria’s 
tumult.  
It is important to mention here that at the early stages of the war, the presence of 
Islamist groups hadn’t flourished yet in al-Qusayr and it was mostly dominated by the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA), a moderate group of defected soldiers and officers. Soon 
enough, other armed factions, such as Kata’eb al-Farouq, Liwa’ al-Qusayr, and HTS, 
started gradually reinvigorating in the Syrian city. In February 2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
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leader of al-Qaeda, had called for jihad in Syria.144 Subsequently, the first flag of HTS had 
risen in June 2012 and was followed by a large campaign of violence. For the first time in 
the war, a clandestine tunnel was dug under the hospital of al-Qusayr, controlled by the 
SAA, filled with explosives and blown up turning the hospital into debris. Sullivan (2014) 
argued that “improvised explosive devices (IEDs), tunnels, barricades, and booby-traps” 
resembled to those taught by Hezbollah to Hamas which proved that these capabilities 
were transmitted to the rebels (p.16). Moreover, in December, HTS executed two 
successful suicide bombings against regime headlocks. These operations were occurring 
only few kilometers from the Beqaa valley and Shi‘a towns, along with menaces and 
increasing aggressions. Mohsen (2017) explained that in a taped video, Wardan al-
Zouhouri, the founder of al-Zubair Ben al-Awwam Brigade, spoke about respecting any 
new regime that the Syrian people would choose, with a personal preference for being 
Islamic. However, Mohsen pursued that off-record, al-Zouhouri expressed sectarian 
hatred against all non-Sunnis (p.53). By other words, tacitly, sectarian belief was a key 
driver for few groups which demonized the sectarian other. Nevertheless, Mohsen (2017) 
acknowledged that not all factions who Hezbollah had fought were extremists or thirsty 
for blood like the so-called “Abou Sakkar”, the one who ate a piece of the Syrian soldier’s 
liver (p.14). However, the situation disintegrated into chaos and anti-minorities narratives 
were used by Hezbollah to justify its intervention and adopt sectarian identity as a 
machinery of mobilization.  
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In February 2013, Al-Farouq Brigades was able to kill four Hezbollah fighters in a 
close combat between the two villages of al-Safsafa and Abou Houri (Mohsen, 2017, 
p.64). A line was then drawn between Hezbollah units defending Shi‘a villages and the 
armed rebels without any advancing attempts by the former. Parallel to these clashes, 
rockets were being fired into the Lebanese villages. Hezbollah commanders in the Beqaa 
considered that by firing missiles into Lebanon, the FSA and HTS have crossed a red line 
(Mohsen, 2017, p.70). Meanwhile, the organization admitted its participation in the fights 
in Syria, yet it claimed fighting only to protect Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine and the Shi‘a who 
live in al-Qusayr villages (Matthew Levitt, 2014, p.103). Yet, these events were a turning 
point as Hezbollah twisted from defense to offense. Although Hezbollah adopted a 
sectarian mobilization agenda to justify its intervention, it was setting foot in a zero-sum 
geopolitical confrontation. Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria’s tumult was plagued with 
sectarian bickering in which Hezbollah took part. The point to make here is that its binary 
justification that consisted of defending Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine and Shi‘a villages in al-
Qusayr was merely a justification for what was in fact a geopolitical contest. As Fanar 
Haddad (2020) explained, “antagonistic, even aggressive, historical sect-specific myths, 
symbols, grievances and the like may be resuscitated and used for legitimation, 
mobilization and the creation of a sense of solidarity and continuity in service of 
contemporary conflicts and socio-political aims; however, these neither cause nor do they 
explain sectarian dynamics today. (p.221-222). 
Eager to protect its geopolitical interest and that of the axis, fighting in Syria had 
then become a war of necessity for Hezbollah. The removal of Assad’s regime will be a 
fatale loss for both Iran and Hezbollah and will tilt the balance of power in the Middle East 
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in favor of Iran’s foes, namely the US and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, weapons en route 
to Hezbollah has always checked-in in Damascus before being transported to Lebanon. 
However, the decision to participate and fight alongside Assad was not easily accepted 
at the outset. Mohsen (2017) contended that Hezbollah didn’t suffer any internal dispute 
for fighting in Syria (p.138). However, when interviewed, he admitted that the internal 
debate took place, but the dialogue ended, according to Mohsen, when the first 
confrontation started. Some questions were raised, such as “why should we fight in 
Syria?”; “we encouraged Uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, Tunisia, why not in Syria?”.145 
Hezbollah fighters, who had always prioritized the struggle against their “eternal enemy”, 
Israel, switched priorities. Sectarian tensions helped ease the intervention. As Haddad 
(2020) put it: “The intersection of sectarian identity and Arab-Iranian rivalry has seen 
regional strategy instrumentalizing markers of sectarian identity to foster sectarian 
solidarity and mobilization by portraying geopolitical issues as existential threats 
confronting all Sunni and Shiʿa (p.116)”. 
Sullivan (2014) argued that Nasrallah’s speech in 25 May 2013 was addressed 
against “takfirists” (those who accuse the other of apostasy) speaking about a new phase 
in the Syrian civil war, and by doing so Nasrallah was targeting Shi‘a audiences who were 
anxious about the organization’s intervention and its consequences (p.16). “Takfirists”, 
according to Abdullah Anas (2019), “declare you an apostate if you did not have the same 
creed as them, or if you failed to declare the Muslim rulers to be infidels or you believed 
in democracy then you were outside the fold of Islam” (p.150). Although Hezbollah could 
have directly used the geopolitical calculations as an excuse for the engagement, it could 
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have been a double-edged sword, avoiding further sectarian tensions, but also limited its 
machinery of mobilization among the Shi‘a. It was fully aware that such an involvement 
will be accompanied with a maligning agenda and a skyrocketing hatred among Sunnis 
in Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere, but this would be a bearable loss if compared with the 
consequences of the possible collapse of Assad’s regime.  
Hezbollah has taken the attention by its intervention, but it was neither the only 
Lebanese faction that stepped into the Syrian quagmire nor the first. Many Islamists and 
youth, mostly Sunni from Tripoli and Akkar, northern Lebanon, bamboozled by sectarian 
hatred were heading to al-Qusayr to fight alongside their Syrian comrades. Da‘i al-Islam 
al-Shahhal, a Salafist leader in Tripoli, along with other clerics, mobilized Sunnis to defend 
their Syrian brethren against both Hezbollah and Iran (Genieve Abdo, 2017, p.84). The 
pace of sectarian mobilization on both sides of the aisle was increasing. One Sunni fighter 
said that “originally, we don’t hate them [Hezbollah], but they started the attack on Sunnis 
in Syria” (Mohsen, 2017, p.149). Consequently, Hezbollah was being demonized among 
Sunnis and anti-Hezbollah edicts were enunciated in Sunni mosques. Salem al-Rafi’i, 
president of Hay’at al-Oulama’ al-Mouslimeen (Muslim Scholars Association), had 
encouraged youth in his weekly sermon in al-Takwa mosque to fight in Syria against 
Hezbollah and “advanced a Sunni martyrdom at the hands of the Shi‘a” (Abdo, 2017, 
p.85).  
That said, the religious mindset of these notorious figures wasn’t triggered by 
Hezbollah, and this Sunni mobilization stems from the antagonism vis-à-vis Assad and 
the Alawite sect. Again, this does not mean that doctrinal truth was the primary driver of 
the conflict but was one among other factors that animated sectarian dynamics. The 
	 188	
Lebanese Sunni enclaves such as Tripoli had become a linchpin for fighters who 
smuggled into SYria. Furthermore, the route from Tripoli to al-Qusayr via Akkar was 
strategic for the opposition and its Lebanese supporters. Sullivan (2014) emphasized that 
anti-Assad factions were smuggling weapons, supplies and fighters from Lebanon to 
Homs and elsewhere via al-Qusayr (p.8). It was a two-lane route and the rebels’ itinerary 
didn’t stop in al-Qusayr, but stretched to Homs, Rif Dimashq, and Dar‘a. Linking these 
regions was a calculated step because it gave the Syrian dissent access to the seashores 
of Tripoli and its harbor. In 2012, an armed shipment headed to Syria called “Lutfallah 2” 
was captured in Tripoli’s port.146 However, linking regions was a leverage in military 
calculations and therefore became a goal for both sides. That said, capturing al-Qusayr 
by Hezbollah and the SAA would annihilate the leverage that the anti-Assad factions have 
enjoyed in the pre-Qusayr battle.  
Hezbollah’s former private universities spokesman argued that the organization’s 
military skills paved the way for its intervention in Syria focusing on securing Damascus 
and its suburbs as a first step. He stressed that various world powers assisted the 
opposition and “since we are part of an axis, we protected our borders and Sayyida 
Zeinab, before expanding over vast swathes of the country.”147 This was somewhat a 
direct explanation of the causal factor behind the intervention: the interest of the axis and 
its regional agenda. A Lebanese Shi‘a politician close to Hezbollah said that the decision 
was strategic and straightforward: they wanted to pull the terrorists back and protect their 
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backyard.148 Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations emphasized that the 
participation came in the discourse of the geopolitical struggle in the region and 
questioned the rebels’ origins and their backers: “Who is the opposition? Only ISIS and 
HTS, or also the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan? No one in the world can face such 
powers alone.”149 Similarly, Hezbollah’s Minister explained that the war was not only a 
conspiracy by extremists and foreigners to breakdown Assad’s regime, but also against 
Hezbollah, so we had to face it. Moreover, he assured that the intervention was not an 
Iranian decision.150 This was contradicted by a Christian anti-Hezbollah former MP who 
maintained that the intervention was a pure Iranian decision.151 The latter’s discourse 
underestimated Hezbollah’s partnership in the decision-making process of the axis. In 
fact, if anything, its engagement falls into the partnership that it had long shared with Syria 
and Tehran. The interest of the axis was to stand as a bulwark against those who hoped 
to break the bridge at its center: Damascus. Tilting the balance of power in Syria by 
removing Assad would endanger Hezbollah’s survival and undermine Iran’s regional 
interest. 
Marching towards al-Qusayr, Hezbollah hoped to establish a buffer zone on the 
contours of its backyard in the Beqaa and Hermel, and test in earnest its military 
capabilities in a new battlefield and new type of warfare. Accustomed to fight in small 
formations and guerilla tactics, its fighters would now shift to using large army formations 
supported by aerial and ground bombardment. March 2013 marked the first confrontation 
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for Hezbollah in al-Qusayr’s countryside. That month, rebels had overrun the SAA and 
controlled “Tall Mando” (Mando Hill), a strategic and well located peak. In late March, 
Hezbollah and the SAA successfully launched a counter-offensive to regain it. Mohsen 
(2017) reported that intense bombardment and barrages of airstrikes anticipated the 
ground offensive and facilitated the capture of the hill lasting no more than 10 minutes 
(p.93). Since this first foray, Hezbollah adopted a “carpet bombing policy” that consisted 
of intensive bombardment of the area before the subsequent advance of ground forces. 
Rebels tried to counter-attack but their attempts to recapture the hill were a fiasco. In the 
first wave of assaults conducted by Fajr al-Islam Brigades, Hezbollah lost 7 fighters 
(Mohsen, 2017, p.93). The resonances of this assault reverberated across Syria and 
Lebanon. Eager to rout its opponents, Hezbollah triumphed in its first confrontation. 
Recapturing “Tall Mando” would just be the beginning, however.  
The Syrian regime had put much effort to push against the rebels’ advance and 
lost thousands of fighters but could not withstand further losses because regional and 
international powers had been increasing their sponsorship to the anti-Assad factions. A 
Shi‘a pro-Saudi journalist close to Hariri emphasized that the facts of a possible regime 
breakdown pushed Hezbollah to fight in Syria.152 Assad’s regime was then enduring its 
weakest days since the beginning of the civil war and therefore Hezbollah started 
accelerating the tempo of its intervention. At that time, Nasrallah visited Khamenei in 
Tehran and met with Mikhael Bogdanov, Putin’s special envoy to the Middle East. Two 
weeks after, Nasrallah stated that Syria’s regional and international allies, will not allow 
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its collapse neither at the hands of the US and the Israelis nor the “takfirists.”153 However, 
he denied the intervention of Iran and Hezbollah “yet”, but they both might do if needed. 
Further, Nasrallah insisted that Hezbollah will not keep the Lebanese in al-Qusayr 
vulnerable against menaces and assaults.154 The point to note here is that when 
Nasrallah announced Hezbollah’s intervention, its fighters had already been operating 
inside Syria for a while. More importantly, not only did Nasrallah speak for Hezbollah but 
also for Iran. Needless to say that this was a damning evidence that the Lebanese 
organization was gradually developing into a regional ANSA, cementing its partnership in 
the axis and participating in the decision-making process. A spokesman of the “Lebanese 
Forces” opined that Hezbollah and Assad are part of an axis, and the former reckoned 
that a regime’s breakdown will be a strategic setback. Damascus, he pursued, is the 
bridge between al-Dahiyah –Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut’s suburbs– and Tehran, so 
it was a war of existence for them. Further, Nasrallah is the one who spoke about his visit 
to Iran in order to convince Ayatollah Khamenei about the necessity to fight in Syria.155 
Coming from an anti-Hezbollah person, this further added to the argument that this paper 
is trying to make: Hezbollah participated in the decision-making process and the Syrian 
cataclysm was the conduit for its transition into a partner in the axis. 
Bringing the discussion back to the battlefield, after capturing the Mando hill, the 
Lebanese organization sought to secure the surrounding villages, and so it did. A counter-
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offensive spearheaded by Al-Farouq Birgades to retake positions it had lost quickly failed. 
Subsequently, Hezbollah positioned in these captured areas and gradually started biting 
rebel-held strongholds. While these triumphs dealt the rebels an immense psychological 
blow, it boosted the moral of its fighters. In three days, Hezbollah units were able to control 
the western countryside of al-Qusayr cutting the supply route for the rebels from Akkar, 
northeastern Lebanon. Afterwards, Hezbollah forces moved to secure the southern and 
eastern countryside, an area of around 100 square kilometers and much bigger than the 
western part. Fights increasingly intensified and Hezbollah faced fierce resistance in the 
village of “Jouseh”, yet after capturing it, most of the southern part became under its grip. 
Then, a 36 hours’ battle took place in “al-Dotheriyeh” and “al-Atifiyyeh” where Hezbollah 
faced severe resistance by HTS and the FSA fighters culminating in the former’s prevail 
with minor losses: 3 Hezbollah fighters were killed and 18 injured (Mohsen, 2017, p.127). 
By the end of these clashes, Hezbollah and the SAA had encircled the city of al-Qusayr 
from the west, east, and south, while leaving its northern countryside unharmed. 
As mentioned earlier, this further aggravated the Sunni-Shi‘a schism. The sect-
symbolism such as ‘Ya Zahraa’, ‘Ya Hussein’ or ‘Ya Zeinab’, that Hezbollah’s fighters 
used while marching against the rebels who happened to be Sunnis aggravated the 
sectarian cleavage. Besides, Sunni clerics such as Adnan al-‘Ar‘our, based in Saudi 
Arabia, mocked the Shi‘a and questioned their beliefs asking if they are murdering the 
children in al-Qusayr to avenge the death of Imam Hussein (Genieve Abdo, 2017, p.70-
71). Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto (2017) stressed that “the Sunni sectarian discourse of some 
of the new players in the Syrian political landscape, such as Shaykh al-‘Ar‘ur, was a gift 
to the regime, fueling its sectarianization narrative of the uprising as a Sunni militant 
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revolt” (p.133). That said, it was clear that clerics such as al-‘Ar‘ur were merely using 
these facts as a mobilizational tool among Sunnis. It might not be clear to the casual 
observer but Hezbollah’s fighters had always used sect-symbolism and sectarian 
mobilization to create a sense of solidarity. By other words, Hezbollah used these sect-
specific mottos, symbols and myths, against Israel to boost the moralities of its own 
fighters rather than recently adopting such discourse. This did not ease tensions but on 
the contrary further sectarianized the conflict, however.  
Hezbollah’s fast advance unfolded the finesse of its fighters and their ability to 
deliver. In fact, it was quickly adapting to unaccustomed warfare tactics where it adopted 
army formations instead of small top-notch units as it previously did in Lebanon, 
supported by armored units containing tanks and aerial support. In fact, if anything, the 
firepower and pouring of ammos that they enjoyed was not provided to any ANSA in the 
Middle East. The carpet bombing policy was devastating for the rebels and eased 
Hezbollah’s mission. This is not to underestimate the capabilities of its fighters on the 
individual level, but it is necessary to mention that Hezbollah was leveraged by a wide 
range of weapons and armament and the rebels were not easy meal. These were the first 
steps that changed it into a quasi-army that mixed classical and guerilla tactics. The next 
battle would be the cruelest and a game changer in the discourse of the Syrian civil war: 
The battle for al-Qusayr city. 
Therefore, on 19 May 2013, Hezbollah and the SAA instigated a whopping 
offensive to recapture al-Qusayr city. This battle was by and large Hezbollah’s first serious 
military confrontation and the key to its would-be preeminence in the battlefield. Since 
2012, al-Qusayr city became the den of the rebels, with huge fortifications and 
	 194	
underground tunnels all over the town providing leverage for the defenders. Hezbollah 
and the SAA, overwhelmed by their fast prevail in the countryside, had been preparing 
for the battle since they controlled the southern part. For the first time in its history, 
Hezbollah was invading a city with large military formations and using classical military 
tactics. Further, the battle was a hot spot for local, regional, and international media, which 
were keen to live stream the offensive. Western and anti-Assad Arab media, such as al-
Jazeera and al-Arabiya channels, were used as platforms to promote rebels’ advance, 
though they were more often defeated than triumphant. “Plenty of adjectives and some 
clichés are being bandied about from Washington to Beirut to describe the al-Qusayr 
battle results and significance.  Among them are "game-changer," "mother of all battles," 
"altered balance of power," critical "turning point in the civil war".”156 In fact, broadcasting 
and social media platforms were used by each side for its own interests, but Hezbollah’s 
prevail in the battlefield contradicted the zeal promulgated by the opposition’s channels. 
The media did not necessarily endorse false premises and illusory victories, but 
sometimes it was not objective. Social media was fundamental for the rebels who used it 
to promote their cause, their sectarian mobilization and their forays against the SAA and 
Hezbollah strongholds in an attempt to mobilize more Sunni sympathizers from across 
the world. This strategy worked for the rebels, however. They marshalled arrays of Sunni 
fighters who joined the ‘righteous cause’ against the devil and the “’a‘da’ al Sunna” or 
Sunni foes as they called them. Above all, the Israeli media kept a close eye on the course 
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of the confrontations, given the strategic nature of the area if controlled by their major 
enemy: Hezbollah.  
The battle opened with barrages of airstrikes and aerial bombardment of the city 
by the Syrian air forces and regime’s artilleries –the carpet bombing policy. These 
bombardments were followed by torrent of infantry crashing into rebels’ defenses. 
Mohsen (2017) highlighted that the ground assault was launched by Hezbollah from 10 
positions distributed in the south and east of the city. The FSA and HTS, the two main 
forces who were defending the southern part of al-Qusayr, had the upper-hand through 
defensive buildings and strongholds, while Hezbollah was advancing from open grounds. 
This culminated in heavy losses that exceeded 40 dead and many more injured among 
Hezbollah units (p.160). This was the highest death toll that Hezbollah had suffered in 
one day and its resonances amid Hezbollah’s supporters in Lebanon were frustrating. “I 
asked one Hezbollah commander amid these battles: Why are you sending waves of 
fighters? Why don’t you unleash them all at once? His answer was simple: We can’t afford 
losing huge numbers of fighters in one day because it will be a devastating blow for our 
supporters in Lebanon. The fact that Hezbollah’s elite troops were no more than 5000 
strong, it limited its maneuvers as it couldn’t risk a high death toll in one day.”157 Hezbollah 
spearheaded the offensive. This autonomy has revealed the mutual trust between the 
organization and Assad’s regime in such a fundamental confrontation plainly shaping 
Hezbollah as a partner in the axis. Mohsen (2017) argued that after the first day, 
Hezbollah units and the SAA had controlled 40% of the city (p.163). Thereby, although it 
had lost many fighters, Hezbollah was able to accomplish a major breakthrough into the 
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defenses of the rebels. Brief though it was, this first advance, by and large, was important 
to Hezbollah’s amplifying clout. 
On 21 May, Hezbollah and the SAA claimed that they have advanced to the center 
and the northern part of the city, “destroying tunnels, weapons and explosive devices. But 
the rebels, though outgunned, said they were holding their ground against the onslaught 
and had destroyed several armored vehicles and had inflicted heavy casualties on the 
army.” Qassem Tilawi, a FSA commander said: “I wasn’t expecting that from them 
[Hezbollah].”158 FSA commanders in al-Qusayr referred to the reception of Shi‘a refuges 
during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel thinking that the former would endear 
their previous hospitability instead of attacking them. Palpably, this standoff heralded 
further sectarian jitters and torpedoed the Sunni-Shi‘a bridges. The eroding support for 
Hezbollah among Sunnis was driving more youth into a fight that they perceived virtuous 
to defend their Sunni fellows in Syria against the assaults by Shi‘a and Alawites. This is 
plainly not the case, however. Rather sectarian mobilization was merely a tool for 
geopolitical ends. Abdo (2017) argued that the tweets of Adnan al-Ar‘our, a Syrian Salafist 
leader who lives in Saudi Arabia, peaked during al-Qusayr battle when he tried to mobilize 
supporters by calling for jihad in Syria (p.77). After Hezbollah’s breakthrough, the combat 
became a draconian street fight and mostly from house to house. Bit by bit, the death toll 
in the ranks of decreased if compared with the early days while succeeding to emancipate 
most of the southeastern part of the city. Hezbollah was altering into a quasi-army mixing 
between guerilla and classical army tactics and formations. 
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 Now that Hezbollah has become enmeshed in Syria’s turmoil, it altered its 
sectarian discourse and mobilization to a more political-centric discourse. “If Syria falls in 
the hands of the Americans, Israelis, takfirists, or regional pro-American countries,” 
Nasrallah explained, “the resistance will be surrounded and Israel will invade Lebanon 
again and we will dive into a dark era” (Mohsen, 2017, p.136). Conspiracy theories have 
always been a tool to face internal or external political threats and to galvanize supporters 
in the Middle East. The easiest narrative to mobilize supporters was to merge conspiracy 
theories with sectarian discourses. That said, Nasrallah framed the geopolitical contest in 
Syria as a conspiracy against Hezbollah and the axis. At this point, Mathew Levitt (2014) 
stressed that Nasrallah had promised a complete victory even though Hezbollah will have 
to sacrifice and take responsibility along the road (p.102). 2 days after, clashes increased 
in the city and in the adjacent airport of al-Dab‘a. The assault on the latter was mainly 
conducted by the SAA while Hezbollah focused on pursuing the offensive to retake the 
city. Amid these confrontations, rebel forces were shelling the Lebanese villages in the 
Beqaa valley and al-Hermel on daily basis. By 29 May, most of the city came under the 
control of Hezbollah and the SAA. A fighter of the Lebanese organization had commented 
that al-Qusayr was divided “on a grid into 16 squares, and 13 have been controlled”. A 
spokesman of al-Farouq Brigades avowed sustaining heavy losses and losing most of 
the city for the regime and Hezbollah troops.159 But while the rebel forces seemed 
collapsing, back up arrived. A huge force of al-Tawhid Brigade, led by the former SAA 
General known as Hajji Mare‘, came from Aleppo and was able to infiltrate into the city 
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after fierce battles with the Syrian army. The arrival of reinforcements and the 
counterattacks conducted by the rebels failed to alter the course of the battle which was 
sliding towards a triumph for Hezbollah.  
Mohsen (2017) opined that following these events, the narrative that al-Qusayr is 
“the myth of the Syrian revolution” collapsed, and many domestic, regional, and 
international parties fruitlessly intervened to bargain a ceasefire which would allow the 
evacuation of the injured rebel fighters (p.175). As they were biting, Hezbollah troops 
have shown finesse and an unyielding determination in the battleground. Acutely aware 
of the wider conflagration that its intervention will set off, Hezbollah had not budged an 
inch. The final wave of the offensive started on 2 June. Heavy equipped and armored 
Hezbollah and SAA forces, reinforced by more than 10 tanks, initiated the attack from al-
Dab‘a airport to capture the town of al-Dab‘a. In parallel, “Grad” missiles rained down the 
remaining pockets while Hezbollah units were marching toward the village (Mohsen, 
2017, p.179). Throughout these battles, Hezbollah was learning to manage and 
spearhead large offensives by coordinating between the attacking forces on the ground 
and air forces. Needless to say that such confrontations changed Hezbollah into a quasi-
army where it mixed classical warfare and formations with guerilla tactics. Although 
Hezbollah adopted large formations in its offensive, it also executed clandestine missions 
with small top-notch units. Additionally, Hezbollah worked in tandem with the SAA and 
had the Lion’s share in the operation room of al-Qusayr’s offensive. Sullivan (2014) 
reasoned that Hezbollah’s influence in the battlefield in 2013 was unquestionable, and for 
the first time, it operated in big numbers and “controlled the planning and the conduct of 
operations” (p.13-15). These daily events proved how Hezbollah was transitioning into a 
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regional ANSA. Its military engagement in Syria’s conflict embedded it as a partner in the 
axis and participated in the decision-making process on the military and political levels. 
In parallel to the attack on the city of al-Qusayr, Mohsen (2017) said that al-Dab‘a 
village was divided into squares, each with a number and also containing the names of 
the leaders conducting the assault in these areas (p.181). The offensive was 
unsuccessful, however; and Hezbollah units were trapped midway and the primary plan 
that was put to encircle the city of al-Qusayr after capturing al-Dab‘a town was aborted. 
A failed offensive was a rare outcome for Hezbollah since the beginning of its participation 
in the Syrian civil war. After that, videos of a new devastating missile called “Burkan” or 
Volcano, were released on social media. In the afternoon of that day, Mohsen (2017) 
reported that a big truck holding a huge missile reached the area. The latter was a short-
range rocket, with a big explosive warhead, fabricated by Hezbollah but highly effective 
and damaging. This kind of missiles became frequently used by the organization in al-
Qusayr (p.183). Hezbollah has not been a mere receiver and consumer of artillery, but it 
has developed and fabricated many rockets, i.e. the Volcano, and drones. On June 4, the 
remaining rebel-held streets in al-Qusayr witnessed intense shelling and barrages of 
rockets and missiles, namely “Burkan”. Mohsen (2017) reported that the rebels’ pages on 
Facebook stated that missiles and rockets fired on the remaining parts of the city were 
clashing in the air (p.192). Sullivan (2014) seconded that on June 5, Hezbollah and regime 
units conducted the final attack after “intense bombardment of the rebel enclave” (p.16).  
By dawn, 7 Hezbollah top-notch units infiltrated into the remaining rebel-held 
streets under heavy firepower to cover their advance while rebels were given a safe 
passage into the town of al-Dab‘a which partly remained under their control. By 6 am, the 
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FSA and HTS fighters retreated from the remaining parts of the city after sustaining heavy 
losses and one day after, Hezbollah and the SAA also recaptured al-Dab‘a village. The 
Hezbollah-led offensive, along with the SAA, to recapture al-Qusayr, has only lasted 17 
days. One of the most fortified rebel strongholds in Syria has been retaken from the 
opposition and Hezbollah has proven its ability to deliver. “The seizure of the strategic 
town after a fierce 17-day battle marks a significant victory for Assad regime and for 
Hezbollah, which has triumphed in its first engagement of the Syrian war.”160 The prevail 
in al-Qusayr has caused an avalanche of transformative events in the balance of power 
in Syria. For its own security, Hezbollah had to be immersed in al-Qusayr and succeeded 
in routing its opponents.  
One Hezbollah commander who fought in al-Qusayr contended that 1700 
Hezbollah fighters participated in al-Qusayr offensive, forming 14 divisions and covering 
all specialties such as snipers, rocket launchers and many others (Mohsen, 2017, p.191). 
Sullivan (2014) confirmed the number saying that up to 200 were killed in action and they 
were divided into 17 units each containing 100 fighters and sometimes to smaller groups 
of 3 to 5 men (p.15). Using top-notch small units was a tactic used to execute fast and 
efficient blitzes of hit-and-run. By and large, the military success in al-Qusayr was a game 
changer for the course of the Syrian conflict and the overture of a full-scale intervention. 
Chulov (2013) emphasized that the strategic triumph in al-Qusayr was a defining battle in 
the Syrian war.161 The war drums that knocked on Hezbollah’s doors has driven it to 
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slowly pedal into a battle that shaped it as a regional ANSA and a partner in the axis that 
extends from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad. During this time, the 
geopolitical contest was in its heyday and the pace to fill the vacuum in the collapsing 
state reached its apogee. Days after the prevail in al-Qusayr, Nasrallah said that 
“wherever we [Hezbollah] must be, we will be.”162 This discourse raised the stakes and 
unleashed Hezbollah’s fighters from the Syrian-Lebanese borders, all the way down to 
the south, namely Dar‘a, and up to the north via inland Syria. The upcoming battle would 
concentrate on al-Qalamoun mountains, south of al-Qusayr. 
Overpowered in al-Qusayr, some rebels retreated to the city of Homs while some 
others journeyed to the mountains of al-Qalamoun which contours Arsal, a Sunni anti-
Hezbollah Lebanese town. Since the early days of Syria’s conflict, Arsal became a safe 
haven for all the opposition fighters. Its barren mountains suited ISIS and HTS fighters, 
and therefore turned out to be their ultimate recourse that wouldn’t be fully liberated until 
2017, as detailed in chapter 4. By the end of the battle for al-Qusayr, al-Farouq Brigades 
faded and its fighters joined other factions such as HTS, ISIS, Jaish al-Islam (Army of the 
Muslims). In August 2013, Nasrallah opened the door for a greater intervention: “if we 
have a 100 fighter in Syria, we’re going to make them 200, if they are 1000, we’re making 
them 2000, if 5000 we’re making them 10000; if the battle against these terrorist takfirists 
needed me and all Hezbollah members to go to Syria we will not hesitate.”163 More to the 
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point, it was clear that Hezbollah was going all-in in its bid to safeguard the survival of the 
regime. During that year, the geopolitical contest peaked. 
Keen to fill the void and gain regional leverage, Gulf countries, namely Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, sponsored the Sunni rebels using a sectarian mobilization agenda that 
undermines Iran by accusing it of backing a Alawite regime against the Sunni majority. 
Kissinger (2014) opined that “to Saudi Arabia, the conflict with Iran was existential. It 
involves the survival of the monarchy, the legitimacy of the state, and indeed the future 
of Islam. To the extent that Iran continues to emerge as a potentially dominant power, 
Saudi Arabia at a minimum will seek to enhance its own power position to maintain the 
balance” (p.141). The rivalry and the geopolitical confrontation between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia was the main driver of the Sunni-Shi‘a rift. Bassel F. Salloukh (2017) emphasized 
that “the recent spread of sectarianism like wildfire in the Middle East is rooted in how 
Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed sectarian identity, narratives, and symbols to 
neutralize both domestic and external regime threats in what is otherwise a grand 
geopolitical contest” (p.36). On 28 October, Nasrallah urged a political reconciliation in 
Syria rather than military conflict and accused Saudi Arabia of thwarting the talks between 
the regime and the rebels. “If the regional and international powers are honest about the 
political solution,” Nasrallah stressed, “then they should remove the obstacles that they 
are implementing.”164 This appeal might have been valid before Hezbollah’s military 
intervention but now that it is part of the conflict such suggestions were a mere discourse 
contradicted by facts on the ground. Further, removing Assad, according to Nasrallah, will 
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pave the way for extremists who butcher people for giving their opinion165 –in reference 
to HTS and ISIS which were increasing their clout at that time.  
In November, Hezbollah and the SAA launched the offensive to retake al-
Qalamoun. The latter is a mountainous region located on the Lebanese-Syrian borders 
and extends from the outskirts of al-Qusayr to al-Zabadani, Rif Dimashk protectorate. it 
has high peaks and abundant caves facilitating camouflages and traps. In 2013, suicidal 
attacks started targeting Shi‘a areas in the Beqaa, al-Hermel, and al-Dahiyah. On 15 
August, a car bomb exploded in al-Dahiyah killing 18 people and wounding 300 (Sullivan, 
2014, p.25). Also, the Iranian embassy was targeted by a double suicidal attack causing 
many casualties but was unable to penetrate the fences and no Iranian diplomat or 
personnel were injured. Most assaults were conducted with cars full of explosives 
originating from al-Qalamoun mountains and infiltrated through Arsal. A military analyst 
argued that Hezbollah was not planning to begin an offensive on al-Qalamoun, but the 
bombings that targeted its residential areas rushed the battle. Moreover, Mohammad 
Ra‘ed, Hezbollah’s, Member of Parliament, argued that these attacks “pushed us to 
continue our job” to end the presence of the terrorist groups in the mountains.166  In fact, 
had the offensive been postponed, it would have only been delayed for few months.  
15 November 2013 marked the first clash in al-Qalamoun. During the offensive, it 
adopted large formations, used drones and armored vehicles, and was assisted by the 
Syrian air forces. Such sophisticated weapons, along with the army formations it adopted, 
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was not at hand for other ANSAs or armed groups. Hezbollah’s amplifying clout was both 
on the military and political levels transitioning it into a quasi-army. The advance started 
from the eastern city of Qara on the highway that links Damascus to Homs. The battle 
started by a draconian artillery and aerial bombardments and the town was captured 3 
days later. The rebels haven’t shown serious resistance in Qara and retreated to Deir 
Atiyyeh and al-Nabk. When ISIS and HTS attacked a hospital in Deir Atiyyeh that 
remained under regime’s control, many civilians were killed, including children, doctors 
and nurses. By late November, Hezbollah and the SAA overran the rebels in the village 
and moved towards al-Nabek.  
In parallel, ISIS and HTS were conducting an attack against the Christian village 
of Ma‘loula. By 2 December they took over the town, burned a church and kidnapped 12 
nuns and transported them to the deeper rebel-held town of Yabrud.167 HTS fighters 
removed the church bells and the statue of Jesus Christ in the village and detonated the 
statue of Virgin Mary.168 At this point, such sectarian-based raids were animating 
sectarian conflict and mobilizing fighters on both sides of the Sunni-Shi‘a divide. Paulo 
Gabriel Hilu Pinto (2017) argued that the regime took advantage of this situation to frame 
the rebels as Sunni jihadists (p.132). A Hezbollah-led offensive recaptured Ma‘loula and 
their troops took advantage of the situation to present themselves as protectors of the 
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Christians and other minorities by distributing pictures with statues of Jesus and Christian 
Crosses on social media. There was nothing more beneficial for Hezbollah than the rise 
of these groups and the sectarian-based attacks they conducted by providing Hezbollah 
with the perfect justification of a pre-emptive war against terrorist groups in Syria. While 
rebels did not put much resistance in Qara, they fought back in al-Nabek thwarting the 
recapture of the town by Hezbollah until mid-December in a battle that endured more than 
two weeks.169  
The next phase of the offensive began in late February when Hezbollah and the 
SAA marched on Yabrud, a rebel fortress, in an attempt to cut the supply route from 
Lebanon to the town. In both al-Qusyar and al-Qalamoun, cutting routes was a strategy 
that Hezbollah adopted in order to prevent further backup to the rebels. Hezbollah lost 
most of its fighters controlling the hills and the Rima Farms that contour the village, and 
once captured, they breached the town from the western side.170 On 12 March, Hezbollah 
led the final raid on Yabrud leaving an escape route for the rebels towards western 
Qalamoun and Arsal (Marisa Sullivan, 2014, p.22). In these confrontations, Hezbollah 
was leading most operations in coordination with the IRGC and the SAA. The cooperation 
with both sides during the ground offensives was a key factor that helped deepen the 
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tripartite relationship and embed Hezbollah as a partner in the axis. For its own security, 
it had to pursue its operations on the borders while pursuing an increasingly assertive 
involvement in the chaos that engulfed Syria. Needless to say that the axis that it is part 
of was playing a prominent role in the regional order through the conflict. 
By the following week, Ras al-Ain and Rankous were liberated. Capturing the latter 
was a strategic move as it isolated Arsal hoping to prevent smuggling more loaded cars 
into Lebanon.171 These explosions overburdened Hezbollah as it was fighting in Syria but 
was not able to secure its Shi‘a areas and protect them from such attacks. By 13 May 
2015, Hezbollah had controlled the western peaks of the Lebanese village of Younin 
which were used to launch rocket salvos targeting Shi‘a areas in the Beqaa valley.172 In 
these mountainous battles, Hezbollah used exploratory drones days before the ground 
advance of its fighters, 173 and aerial footage has been circulated on its media and social 
media channels.174 Not only its fighters were unaccustomed to such classical warfare, but 
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they had always been the underdogs during the confrontations with Israel as the IDF had 
aerial supremacy. That said, Hezbollah has continued to rise unabated during the battle 
for al-Qalamoun as its fighters were triumphing and accumulating more expertise in the 
battlefield.  
In parallel to this advance, a siege had been imposed by rebels against two Shi‘a 
villages with approximately 15000 inhabitants, Kfarya and al-Fou‘a, in Idlib, a Syrian 
protectorate adjacent to Turkey’s border. The twin Shi‘a towns were surrounded by large 
numbers of bellicose anti-Assad groups, namely jihadists, and have been continuously 
bombarded and attacked; food and medical aids were only available via parachutes 
dropped by aircrafts.175 Nevertheless, they were defended by armed units who were 
trained and well equipped by Hezbollah and therefore the attacks were doomed. In 
retaliation, Hezbollah besieged al-Zabadani town in al-Qalamoun to press the rebels 
hoping to bargain a deal that would culminate in lifting the siege imposed on the Kfarya 
and al-Fou‘a. It is important to mention here that many pro-regime towns were besieged 
or many citizens killed but the regime did not react if these areas were strategically 
worthless. However, the Shi‘a identity of the twin villages dovetailed with the 
determination of Hezbollah and Iran to protect all Shi‘a citizens culminating in the effort 
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to lift the siege. However, Nasrallah had always denied arguing that when Hezbollah offer 
support in any confrontation, it would be driven by what it sees as the best interest of the 
nation and the populations of these countries rather than through the sectarian lens.176 
these accusations Despite Nasrallah’s continuous claim that Hezbollah is not confined to 
Shi‘a citizens, facts on the ground contradicted this discourse. Not only did sect-specific 
grievances, myths and symbols serve as a mobilizational tool but the policy of protection 
imposed by Hezbollah and Iran vis-à-vis Shi‘a citizens became blatant. Hezbollah of 
course operated in tandem with Sunni groups, such as Hamas, but its priority was to 
mobilize Shi‘a fighters and groups. 
That said, on 5 July, the offensive against al-Zabadani started and the opposition, 
besieged with no safe passage, had no choice but to fiercely resist. The attack began 
with barrages of aerial bombardments and rockets prolonging for three consecutive 
days.177 This was the carpet bombing policy that leveraged Hezbollah ahead of every 
offensive and minimized its losses. While Hezbollah suffered daily losses while advancing 
towards al-Zabadani, it kept pressing the rebels to bargain a deal for Kfarya and al-Fou‘a. 
Progressively, Hezbollah cornered the fighters in the city after controlling the countryside 
and strictly besieged them in a distance of 2.5 square kilometers.178 It blocked the arrival 
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of food and medical care and cut the water. Chocked, the rebels had no choice but to 
comply. Subsequently, on 24 September, an agreement sponsored by Iran and Turkey 
was reached under the supervision of the United Nations (UN): 10000 civilians would be 
evacuated from Kfarya and al-Fou‘a while 4000 fighters will remain, and in exchange, the 
rebels would withdraw from al-Zabadani, in addition to the release of 500 inmates held in 
the regime’s prisons.179 Mikhael Awad (2017) argued that the regime was discontent with 
the deal since it mostly happened through back channels without its full consent (p.201). 
Hezbollah did not give much attention to the pundits who raised their voice against the 
imposed siege on al-Zabadani as it was unyieldingly determined to safeguard Shi‘a 
citizens across Syria at any cost. 
Soon after, Russia declared its intervention in the war to buttress Assad outraging 
the rebels who reneged the deal and the evacuation was hence postponed. Kissinger 
(2014) opined that “Russia, a formal ally of Syria, was interested in the continuance of the 
Assad government and to some extent in Syria’s survival as a unitary state” (p.128). 
Although Hezbollah maintained some kind of equilibrium in the battlefield and recaptured 
some areas that have been formerly lost for rebels, it didn’t have neither the means nor 
the quantity to cover all Syrian soil and help the regime prevail. At this time, Russia’s 
intervention was necessary for the exhausted regime whose fighters were spreading from 
south to north via inland Syria. Russia’s supremacy turned the table upside down 
curtailing the chance of succeeding for the rebels and their sponsor states. Therefore, the 
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implementation of the deal was delayed for almost two years and would only be 
reinvigorated by a Turkish-Iranian sponsorship. On 20 April 2017, the final rebel boot left 
al-Zabadani, and in parallel, the remaining Shi‘a civilians were transported outside of 
Kfarya and al-Fou‘a. This arrangement has shown that Hezbollah had had an Iranian 
green light to protect Shi‘a inhabitants. The starvation they imposed on al-Zabadani has 
been a compelling proof that the ends justify the means if it meant safeguarding the Shi‘a. 
Fanar Haddad (2020) opined that “while religious or doctrinal otherness is undoubtedly a 
factor, it is questionable whether it can, on its own, animate sectarian dynamics” (p.56). 
After all, sectarian otherness is not the primary motive for conflicts in the Middle East but 
the causal factor of the clashes that engulfed the twin villages was the overlap of sectarian 
identity and geopolitics. Afterwards, Hezbollah cleared the remaining ISIS and HTS-
dominated pockets in the barren hills of the Beqaa and chased them into the mountains 
of Arsal. In 2017, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah both launched an 
offensive and ended the linger of both terrorist organizations on the Lebanese-Syrian 
borders.  
 The result of the Qalamoun battle came as follows: liberating a distance that 
extends over 2500 kilometers on the Syrian-Lebanese borders, taking over 5 cities and 
11 villages, closing up 30 passages on the borders, dismantling 76 cars full of explosives, 
confiscating 28 bombs and missile factories and killing 300 commanders of HTS and 
other factions.180 The seizure of this geostrategic area was paralleled with suicidal 
attacks, car bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and around 70 cross-border 
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rocket salvos against Shi‘a areas, namely al-Dahiyah, Beqaa valley and Hermel. Up until 
June 2014, these attacks resulted into some 60 dead and 500 injuries.181 The Beqaa and 
Hermel have always been Hezbollah’s reservoir and backyard providing Hezbollah with 
a myriad of loyal fighters. Furthermore, they have been the route for smuggling weapons 
from Syria, the shelter for the organization in extreme urgencies, and a storage for its 
arsenal. Needless to say that losing the leverage that these fundamental areas have 
always offered for Hezbollah was unbearable.  
More to the point, when the rebels positioned atop of these mountains and 
sectarian tensions started erupting, Hezbollah decided to intervene: first by defense, then 
shifted to offense. First, the organization’s troops moved into al-Qusayr to protect Shi‘a 
villages from rebels’ attacks and then launched a full-scale offensive and recaptured the 
city alongside the SAA. A Shi‘a pro-Hezbollah politician argued that heading to fight in 
Syria was a strategic decision to push back against terrorist groups and protect the 
organization’s backyard.182 The deputy secretary general of the Future Movement had a 
different approach explaining that “during the Lebanese civil war, the Iran-Syria contest 
was driving the conflict between the Amal movement and Hezbollah in 1989, but at the 
moment, they both share the same regional agenda. Historically, Iran needed Syria when 
it was under Hafez al-Assad’s rule, however, the situation changed.”183 Although 
Hezbollah has taken advantage of the rebels’ pitfalls and adopted a sectarian mobilization 
through sect-specific discourse to justify its leap into Syria’s quagmire, the true motive 
underpinning this intervention was to frustrate would-be regional threat had Assad’s 
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regime collapsed. This sectarian mobilization deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a rift and further 
eroded Hezbollah’s support among the Sunni community. According to Bassel F. 
Salloukh, this is Hezbollah’s biggest fear and it has always sought to avoid it.184 
 
The causal variable leading to Hezbollah’s gradual intervention was for the casual 
observer sectarian identity, while in fact it was less the latter and more the possible tilting 
of the regional power balance in its rivals’ favor. This was a war of necessity for Hezbollah. 
In fact, its involvement aimed to preserve the survival of the regime and subsequently 
protect itself from a possible geopolitical loss for the axis that could have extended from 
Syria to Lebanon. Sullivan (2014) argued that an abundant part of Iran’s support came 
across Syria “making it the primary hub in Iran’s power projection in the Levant” (p.9). 
Therefore, the route that has always bridged Beirut to Tehran via Damascus, was to be 
protected at any cost. “Hezbollah sought to safeguard its own direct interests: fighting in 
al-Qusayr and al-Qalamoun areas along the border to create a buffer zone against attacks 
by Syrian jihadists inside Lebanon, preserving its vital Iranian supply line and protecting 
two Shi‘a shrines in Syria.”185 In any case, the battle was costly for Hezbollah as it lost 
hundreds of fighters but both the political and military gains erased the battle’s scars. 
Hezbollah has stretched its muscles in al-Qusayr and al-Qalamoun proving to be a vital 
ANSA for the Middle East order. The standoff in al-Qusayr marked the beginning of its 
first military alteration into a quasi-army mixing between guerilla and classical army 
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tactics. It also used large army formations and learned how to manage large-scale battles 
from operation rooms to ground offensives.  
The post-Uprising political order in Syria was the outcome of conflictual domestic, 
regional and international agendas. This broke the sect-blind in pre-civil war Syria 
generating sectarian violence. Haddad (2020) emphasized that “there is a difference 
between Sunni-Shi‘a violence and violence between people who happen to be Sunni and 
Shi‘a” (p.243). In fact, both cases are valid as this chapter has examined. For instance, 
the siege against Kfarya and al-Fou‘a was mainly driven by Sunni-Shi‘a violence, while 
the violence in al-Qusayr happened to be between Sunni and Shi‘a armed groups. To be 
clear, Hezbollah would have intervened even if the rebels were all moderate. By other 
words, the sectarian discourse and mobilization that Hezbollah adopted and the sectarian 
hatred animated by jihadist groups helped Hezbollah justify its intervention. Therefore, 
sectarian dynamics were a mere mobilizational tool for what was in fact a broader 
geopolitical contest. In coordination with Iran and Syria, Hezbollah rushed headlong to 
defend its geopolitical interest in Damascus.  
Pledging to defend Shi‘a shrines and villages, Hezbollah exploited its sectarian 
identity for political ends. Al-Qusayr, once the den of the rebels, was leveled to the ground 
by adopting a carpet bombing policy, which had become the prerequisite of each 
offensive. “Al-Qusayr also began a new phase of overt and substantial Hezbollah 
involvement in Syria” (Sullivan, 2014, p.16). Hezbollah troops then moved to al-Qalamoun 
and cleansed all the Lebanese-Syrian borders from jihadist groups. “Of course, sect-
centric actors were not the only ones rising against the regime, but the trepidation that 
such actors caused in some sections of society meant that their presence easily 
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overshadowed less extreme voices” (Haddad, 2020, p.258). Undeterred in the battlefield, 
Hezbollah was hence becoming a quasi-army and embedded itself as a partner in the 
axis that now extends from Lebanon to Tehran, via Syria and Iraq. Further, these two 
confrontations were among many others that transitioned Hezbollah into a regional 
ANSA.  
5.4.2 All in: A Full-Scale Engagement 
Hezbollah’s sectarian-based machinery of mobilization was paramount for its 
engagement in Syria’s tumult. However, the sect-centric discourse altered later to a more 
political-centric discourse stressing that this is a pre-emptive war against terrorist 
organization. Indeed, the mayhem that ISIS and HTS spread across the region benefited 
Hezbollah in the early stages of its intervention but true causal factor that underpinned 
this engagement was its fear of an alteration of the regional order would Assad’s regime 
collapse. This conflict was a war of necessity for Hezbollah threatening to topple its key 
ally and designed to curtail the influence of the axis. Hezbollah was thereby driven into 
Syria’s quagmire by the fog of the war. Its triumph in al-Qusayr paved the way for further 
expansion: stretching its troops from Dar‘a in the south all the way up to Deir ez-Zor in 
the north, via all inland Syria. Unleashed across Syria, Hezbollah further instrumentalized 
its Shi‘a sectarian identity in its bid to protect Shi‘a citizens and keep its sectarian 
mobilization active. This chapter will examine Hezbollah’s operations beyond the 
Lebanese borders and the variables that helped it transition into a regional ANSA: the 
instrumentalization of its Shi‘a sectarian identity, its embed as a partner and decision-
maker in the axis that extends from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad and 
the transition into a quasi-army mixing between guerilla and classical warfare tactics. 
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Since 2013, Hezbollah and the IRGC suggested a new strategy consisting of 
priorities: Recapturing the strategic cities needed for regime’s survival and linking 
Damascus with the coastal pro-Assad areas, while avoiding the useless exhaustion of the 
combatting forces in minus vital arenas, namely remote regions. This was a compelling 
proof that Hezbollah is a partner and participates in the decision-making process even at 
the highest levels. That said, Hezbollah fought with the SAA in order to strengthen its grip 
over Damascus, the decision-making capital, and recapture territories which are vital for 
regime’s endurance.186 Hezbollah’s participation –along with the IRGC, a host of domestic 
and foreign sectarian armed groups, and later on, Russia– to protect its Syrian ally, 
changed the balance of power on the ground in the regime’s favor. One Hezbollah fighter 
who led military assaults explained that in some battles, they fought alongside the SAA 
and other factions while in others, it was left entirely for Hezbollah, “from reconnaissance 
to clean-up.”187 The latter fought fiercely in Damascus and its suburbs, particularly in Rif 
Dimashq: Douma and Darayya, to protect the capital from rebels’ takeover. Further afield, 
it participated in the siege of Homs that lasted until 2014 and engaged in Dar‘a, Quneitra, 
Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, and Aleppo. Each battle was strategic in its own terms, but Aleppo was 
the toughest and the costliest in terms of casualties.  
Southern Syria, where the tri-borders with Lebanon, Jordan, and the Golan Heights 
converge, is composed of three provinces: Quneitra, Dar‘a and as-Suweida. 
Understanding the sectarian heterogeneity is key here: As-Suweida is almost entirely 
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inhabited by the Druze minority, Dar‘a is mostly Sunni and Quneitra a mix of both sects. 
The presence of other sects such as Shi‘a and Alawites in these territories is limited. The 
south is important for the following reasons: First, it is the habitat for the bulk of the Druze 
minority which is fundamental for the regime’s policy of protecting minorities. Second, the 
Israelis have always been eager to keep it under scrutiny as it converges with their 
northern border. Third, Dar‘a is the city where the wave of the Arab Uprisings 
disembarked in 2011. Hezbollah has been embroiled, yet unevenly, in all of them. It 
assisted and trained local inhabitants and pro-regime Druze parties, established small 
units to target Israel and its units also participated in several clashes.  
It didn’t take long to militarize and sectarianize the unfolding Uprising that broke 
out in Darʿa. Quickly, the opposition started forming armed groups that engaged with the 
SAA, followed by the establishment of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Other factions, 
including jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, later known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham 
(HTS), would follow later. As rebels were biting in in Dar‘a, the SAA was barely able to 
keep its positions. In Dar‘a, like other provinces in Syria, regional and international powers 
intervened to fill the vacuum left by the retreat of the SAA and increase their influence by 
helping overthrow the Assad regime. In 2013, the Military Operation Center (MOC), an 
operation room hosting military and security personnel from the US, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia, had been established in Jordan. This intervention further 
added to the tumultuous situation that was engulfing Syria: they sponsored rebel groups 
militarily and financially, trained their troops and directed the confrontations.  
The main driver of the conflict was the Iran-Saudi Arabia geopolitical contest. 
Needless to say that this rivalry pre-dated Syria’s civil war: starting with the success of 
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the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and increasing in post-Saddam Iraq. Further, foreign 
agendas play prominent roles in deepening sectarian rifts “and endowing sectarian 
identity with added political relevance” (Haddad, 2020, p.74). As Islamist fighters 
supported by the CIA and Gulf States formed a coalition and were assertively advancing 
on the ground, Russia was looking with mounting alarm to situation (Burns, 2019, p.333). 
Pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy and determined to reengage in the 
Middle East, Russia entered the Syrian conflict in 2015 and struck a deal with the 
countries operating in the MOC to shut it down (Awad, 2017, p.222). Subsequently, in 
2016, the MOC’s role waned and was subsequently dismantled.188 This imposed a 
somewhat new balance of power in southern Syria, palpably crippling rebels’ leverage 
and easing the advance of the SAA and its allied forces. But even with the MOC curtailing 
its efforts, rebels were putting stiff resistance and didn’t easily succumb.  
In parallel, the offensive to recapture Dar‘a by the SAA and Hezbollah put them 
under scrutiny by the IDF.  Israeli observers emphasized that by looking at the plan, one 
can see how the SAA is pushing the rebels towards the Israeli border.189 Therefore, Israel 
was keen to leverage the rebels and stop the regime’s biting, especially when this could 
be an opportunity for Hezbollah by giving them the momentum to operate from closer 
distance on the Israeli-Syrian border. Hence, some rebels had been in direct contact with 
the Israelis. Kamal al-Labwani, an anti-Assad political activist, visited Israel pressing to 
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implement a de facto buffer zone inside Syria,190 framing Iran, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda 
as common enemies for Israel and the Syrian people: Collaborating against them is an 
obligation.191 Further afield, the IDF transported injured rebels to receive treatment in 
Israeli hospitals where Benyamin Netanyahou, Israel’s Prime Minister, paid them a 
visit.192 The conflictual agendas of all actors were obvious in Dar‘a. In fact, the latter 
provided a perfect example of the complexity of geopolitics in the Middle East: While Iran 
and Russia backed the regime, the latter well-preserved Israel’s interest but the former 
sought to exploit the chaotic situation to implement its anti-Israel policy with Hezbollah’s 
help. Moreover, suffice it to say here that Syria was not so concerned with this contest.  
Bringing the discussion back to the battle for Dar‘a, capturing it was not a 
promenade for pro-Assad forces. Therefore, an armored brigade and an infantry unit of 
the SAA, along with fighters and prominent generals from the IRGC and Hezbollah, 
advanced towards the area.193 Hezbollah’s role on the ground was minor as it merely 
participated in the offensive to recapture al-Sheikh Miskeen.194 The former had been 
under rebels’ control for more than two years and given its strategic location on the 
Damascus-Dar‘a road, the battle was extremely brutal for all those involved. In December 
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2015, the SAA and Hezbollah launched a successful one-month offensive to recapture it. 
Ahmad Abu Al-Shaim, a rebel leader, asserted that Hezbollah’s commander known as al-
Shabah was killed in this encounter.195 The forfeiture of the rebels during this battle 
implemented mistrust among the opposition.196 This cleavage had become clearer when 
Mohammad Saleh al-Harbat, a former FSA leader, injured and receiving treatment in 
Europe, held HTS responsible for his targeting.197 In fact, William Burns (2019) argued 
that in a meeting between US president Barack Obama and his advisors, they discussed 
how moderate rebels were losing ground for the Sunni extremists (p.333). Such disputes 
and diverging agendas of opposition groups undermined their military capabilities and 
leverage pro-Assad forces. 
Hezbollah troops also engaged in Kherbet Selem and Izra‘. Adjacent to al-Sheikh 
Miskeen on the eastern side of the Damascus-Dar‘a road, both towns were strategically 
important for the rebels. Had they been captured, the path towards al-Ghouta, a rebel-
held city in Damascus’ suburbs, would be accessible and therefore a supply route 
bridging southern Syria with Damascus’ outskirts would place the opposition fighters were 
at the gates of the capital. According to al-Harbat, because of the overlap of these areas 
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with Rif Dimashk, we [FSA] thought we were closing up on Damascus and Assad’s 
breakdown was imminent.198 Izra‘ was challenging for the FSA because large numbers 
of its inhabitants were pro-regime and were previously trained by Hezbollah who also held 
ground to fight with them. So when clashes erupted, all civilians were evacuated whereas 
high ranking officers and their families maintained their positions to engage.199 Of course, 
Hezbollah’s military bolster crippled rebels’ chances of breakthrough. Despite the minor 
role it played if compared with that of al-Qusayr and al-Qalamoun, Hezbollah was 
becoming increasingly operational across Syria and transitioning into a regional ANSA.  
As the situation disintegrated into chaos, Busra al-Sham, a remote town in Dar‘a 
converging with as-Suweida and inhabited by both Sunni and Shi‘a, was divided along 
sectarian lines: Pro-Assad Shi‘a vs anti-Assad Sunni. Sullivan (2014) confirmed that small 
Hezbollah units were sent to Busra, along with Iraqi groups, to train and arm their Shi‘a 
comrades (2015). This was not a Sunni-Shi‘a contest in its sectarian meaning as neither 
was fighting for doctrinal truths but the instrumentalization of sectarian identity was in its 
heyday. Subsequently, in March 2015, battles erupted when HTS and the FSA attacked 
the positions of the SAA and Hezbollah in the village. “Busra sits on the edges of as-
Suweida”, a Druze fighter who participated in the battle said, “so we feared that its capture 
could transform it to a base from where HTS and other Islamist groups could orchestrate 
attacks against us; thereby, a lot of Druze fighters rushed to the battle.”200 21 March 
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marked the first confrontation and the Druze fighter confirmed that Hezbollah units were 
fighting along with the SAA, yet, four days later, Hezbollah retreated accompanied by the 
Shi‘a residents culminating in the capture of some SAA soldiers and taking them hostages 
by the opposition. Hezbollah lost three fighters in this battle and many Shi‘a and Druze 
citizens were also killed.201 Sectarian identity is one, yet important, of an array of factors 
driving the Syrian conflict; however, needless to say that the Shi‘a identity of Busra’s 
citizens was the only reason behind Hezbollah’s deployment of its troops in such remote 
towns. 
 In the neighboring region of as-Suweida, a Druze enclave, most citizens have 
remained loyal to Assad’s regime. Although Hezbollah did not fight any battle in as-
Suweida, nor did it have any presence on the ground, it played a role in training and 
assisting certain Druze groups in order to protect their villages from ISIS and HTS attacks. 
Indeed, reports suggested that Hezbollah has trained some local Druze in self-defense.202 
It is necessary to mention here that while some Druze fought in the ranks of the SAA and 
other pro-regime groups, some others preferred to defend their hometowns without 
further advance. In any case, as-Suweida has barely witnessed confrontations. The 
costliest attack took place in July 2018 when ISIS raided as-Suweida killing more than 
200 Druze and kidnapping 30 women and children.203 However, the situation in Quneitra 
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was more critical as it was witnessing fierce battles between pro-regime Druze villages 
and Sunni jihadists, specifically HTS.  
Overlooking large distances of southern Lebanon and much of southern Syria and 
rich in natural resources, particularly water, Quneitra was occupied in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war and the IDF did not fully withdraw from the area keeping parts of the Golan 
Heights under its control (Zena Agha, 2018). As mentioned above, Israel scrutinized 
southern Syria fearing a backlash on its northern border, namely in Quneitra. Netanyahou 
had warned that Hezbollah fighters are approaching toward the Israeli border to execute 
Iran’s plan through choking Israel.204 His suspicions were in place, however. Saouli (2019) 
argued that “Hezbollah has sought to transform its presence in the collapsed state into 
an opportunity to fight Israel. As early as 2013, Nasrallah expressed his willingness to 
support popular resistance against Israel in Syria. Hezbollah and Iran wanted, in addition 
to south Lebanon, another base from which to fight their Zionist enemy. Hezbollah 
dispatched several exploratory missions to the area surrounding the Golan Heights” 
(p.193). Of course, Israel had pledged frustrate would-be regional threat for its security. 
Jacob Amidor, former advisor of Israel’s Prime Minister, commented that “they [Hezbollah 
and the IRGC] tried to build a base in Quneitra, and work against Israel and the latter said 
that it will target anything that threatens it. Golan is sensitive and vital for us and some 
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settlements are close to the borders. Therefore, we do not plan on letting Hezbollah and 
the Iranians harm us”.205  
Accordingly, on 18 January 2015, Israeli aircraft targeted a convoy in Quneitra, 
near the Golan Heights, killing 6 Hezbollah members, among them was Jihad, son of 
Imad Moughniyeh, and Mohammad Issa, a top-notch commander, along with one IRGC 
General Mohammad Ali Allahdadi.206 Three days before, Nasrallah had denied in an 
interview with al-Mayadeen channel, a direct role for Hezbollah in the Golan Heights 
saying that “what is happening in the Golan is Syrian resistance and Hezbollah has no 
military force carrying out resistance operations there. However, we might be helping, 
assisting and training some resistance groups, or providing some of their needs.”207 This 
attack undermined Nasrallah’s pledge and was an evidence of Hezbollah’s maneuvers in 
southern Syria along with the IRGC.208 Wiam Wahhab, former Lebanese Minister whose 
party is involved in fighting in Druze areas, stressed that the Hezbollah operatives killed 
in the airstrike, along with the IRGC members, had trained a lot of Druze in Syria in order 
to defend their villages from possible forays.209 Targeted in Quneitra, Hezbollah retaliated 
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from Lebanon when 10 days later, its fighters attacked an IDF convoy while patrolling the 
Israeli-Lebanese borders. The point to make by retaliating from south Lebanon rather 
than Syria was palpably that both fronts are united against Israel in case of war.  
Of course, from the regime’s point of view this was not the right time, if ever, for 
such cross-border raids or maneuvers targeting Israeli forces. “In 1974,” Henry Kissinger 
(2014) opined, “Syria and Israel concluded a disengagement agreement to define and 
protect the military front lines between the two countries. This arrangement has been 
maintained for four decades, through wars and terrorism and even during the chaos of 
the Syrian civil war” (p.116). By other words, Syria shared the anti-Israel political stance 
with Iran and Hezbollah but this does not necessarily mean its willingness to go to war. 
Suffice it to say that Syria might have wanted to keep Hezbollah at bay on the south. 
Nevertheless, the state failure and political and military vacuum that was engulfing Syria 
gave more room to maneuver for all actors, Iran and Hezbollah, for instance. That said, 
some observers argued that the death of an Iranian commander along with Hezbollah’s 
fighters had given the green light from Iran to react.210 Iran gave its blessing: “the 
retaliation will be firm and decisive.”211 Additionally, Hussein Sheikh al-Islam, advisor to 
the President of the Iranian Islamic Shura Council, stressed that “the resistance 
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(Hezbollah) will activate the Golan front to respond to the Israeli miscalculations.”212 This 
does not mean that Iran was directing Hezbollah’s operation, but was definitely part of the 
new rules of engagement without interfering in the details. In effect, this imposed a 
somewhat burden on Hezbollah pressuring it to retaliate. It was more a matter of 
deterrence against Israel to maintain the power balance. The rapid procedures that 
followed the operation proved that Hezbollah had taken an immediate decision to 
retaliate. On 22 January, 4 days after the Quneitra attack, al-Akhbar newspaper alleged 
that individuals in Hezbollah started putting suggestions on the table and behaving as the 
retaliation is certain.213 There is no doubt that Hezbollah operated in conjunction with the 
Quds Force in al-Quneitra but not as a puppet for Tehran.  
In September 2017, an Israeli “Patriot” missile shot down an Iranian drone sent by 
Hezbollah into Israel through the Golan Heights.214 Likewise, rockets had been fired into 
the Golan and the Galilee from Syria in late August and Israel accused the IRGC for 
orchestrating the operations.215 Jihad Moughniyeh and the group that were targeted in 
the Golan were not the only ones operating in the area, Samir al-Quntar, liberated from 
Israeli prison during the 2008 exchange, also did.216 In cooperation with the IRGC, al-
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Quntar established a group of local Druze aiming to launch operations against Israel. 
They were trained and armed by Hezbollah and were tested by conducting clandestine 
missions against rebel groups. One week after shelling rockets into Israel, al-Quntar’s 
Druze assisstant, Mouwafak Badriyye, was assassinated by an Israeli strike while driving 
his car near Damascus.217 In December 2015, al-Quntar was also killed when an Israeli 
airstrike targeted his apartment in Jaramana, Damascus’ outskirts (Saouli, 2019, p.193). 
Awad (2017) confirmed that Israel had assassinated al-Quntar and other operatives who 
were involved in forming a resistance group in the Golan (p.221). It appeared as if all 
those involved in operational work against Israel in southern Syria were killed and as 
mentioned earlier, of course, with Russia’s consent. 
 Ghaidaa Hetou (2019) argued that the Iraqi group Harakat al-Noujaba’, on Iran’s 
request, organized the Golan Liberation Brigade pledging to expel the IDF from the Golan 
Heights and destroy Israel (p.45). Therefore, Hezbollah and other Shi‘a groups, in tandem 
with the IRGC, were operating for the interest of the axis on Israel’s northern borders, an 
agenda that Assad didn’t seem to share with his allies. Nasrallah had clearly stated that 
“the Israeli enemy must know that if an Israeli war is launched against Syria or Lebanon, 
it cannot be sure that the fighting will remain Lebanese-Israeli, or Syrian-Israeli, this could 
open the door for thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fighters from all over the 
Arab and Islamic world to participate –from Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.”218 Few days later, Qais Khaz‘ali, secretary general ‘Asa’eb Ahl al-Haq, a pro-
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Iran Iraqi faction, visited south Lebanon and the footage distributed has shown him 
standing on the Lebanese-Israeli border wearing military outfits. He thereafter said that 
his visit to south Lebanon wearing his military outfit was a message for Israel, and that “in 
the event of a military confrontation with the latter and its entire host of supporters, we 
[the axis] will prevail.”219 Needless to say that this was a translation of Nasrallah’s earlier 
pledge. Further afield, Nasrallah was palpably trusted to speak in the name of the axis 
extending from Tehran to Beirut, via Damascus and Baghdad and participated in the 
decision-making to mobilize the armed groups within the axis if needed.  
 Hezbollah’s troops also engaged along with the SAA and the National Defense 
Force (NDF), a pro-regime armed group, in the clashes in Damascus and its suburbs. In 
the early stages of the war, Hezbollah and Iraqi and Afghani Shi‘a factions fought in 
Sayyida Zeinab, in Damascus’ outskirt to protect it from jihadists attacks who had 
promised to destroy the Mosque located in the city. Sayyida Zeinab converges with the 
Damascus airport road and sits between western and eastern Ghouta making it a 
geostrategic town. This was paralleled with its gradual engagement in al-Qusayr. It was 
hard to escape the sect-centricity of Hezbollah’s engagement due to its binary pledge to 
defend a Shi‘a shrine and Shi‘a citizens. It is plainly true that anti-Hezbollah mottos were 
chanted in many cities from the outset and sectarian narratives started reiterating across 
Syria such as, for instance, “al-Masihiyun ila Beirut wa al-Alawiyun fil-tabut” (The 
Christians to Beirut, and the Alawites in the coffin) implementing fear among sectarian 
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and ethnic minorities (Gabriel Pinto, 2017, p.128), but the mere intervention to protect 
Shi‘a shrines and towns further added to the Sunni-Shi‘a rift. This intervention was 
necessary and Hezbollah was going to engage either way because the implode of 
Assad’s regime would be a debacle for the axis altogether. To be sure, had it not adopted 
a sectarian mobilization agenda it would’ve had to find other justifications to protect its 
geopolitical interest. 
Now settled in Sayyida Zeinab town, Hezbollah built a buffer zone to thwart the 
advance of the opposition groups and began increasingly biting the surrounding villages 
that were previously captured by both moderate and jihadist anti-Assad groups, namely 
the FSA, HTS and Ajnad al-Sham, respectively. However, by mid-2013, Jaish al-Islam, 
backed by the MOC, specifically Saudi Arabia, became the dominant faction in eastern 
Ghouta,220 and soon 15000 soldiers would be fighting under the command of its leader, 
Zahran Alloush.221 Eastern Ghouta is located about 10 kilometers from central Damascus, 
with a population of 400000, making it vital for both regime and rebels. Sitting at the edges 
of Damascus, bellicose jihadist groups were eager to make the final move on the regime’s 
decision-making capital. For this reason, securing these adjacent areas was a priority for 
Hezbollah and the regime to prevent dissent from closing up on the capital. Thus, “the 
regime, with strong participation from Hezbollah, has attempted to regain control of 
eastern Ghouta” (Saouli, 2019, p.191).  
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Sullivan (2014) argued that Hezbollah spearheaded battles in eastern Ghouta in 
2013 along with Iraqi Shi‘a factions. These offensives helped secure the southern 
entrance towards Damascus. Subsequently, Sullivan (2014) pursued, the regime rained 
dissent neighborhoods with barrages of rockets and aerial bombardment and Hezbollah 
alongside the Iraqi Shi‘a militants, were left to lead the ground assaults culminating in the 
capture of four neighborhoods: Zyabiyeh, Babila, Bahdaliyeh, and al Shamlaneh. They 
fought alongside the SAA in al-Mouaddamiyeh, southwest of Damascus (p.19). A 
Lebanese citizen living in Jaramana, adjacent to these areas, said that Hezbollah didn’t 
seize these villages but it only surrounded them to prevent rebels’ advance towards 
Sayyida Zeinab. But Beit Sahem, a strategic village overlooking the airport highway, was 
used by rebels to shoot at passing cars, therefore, small units of Hezbollah worked on 
securing it to prevent further assaults.222 These confrontations were fundamental as 
Hezbollah helped the regime alter the balance of power in its favor. The sectarian 
mobilization of both Sunni and Shi‘a groups added more sault to the wound. However, 
saying that such confrontations were primarily driven by sectarian identities is a 
mischaracterization of the situation. Indeed, Hezbollah leapt first in order to protect 
Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine but it was not seeking religious and sectarian truth. Doctrinal 
belief was a mobilizational tool but was not the only driver of the conflict. Rather, the 
conflict was driven, by and large, by both geopolitical and sectarian identity. 
Hezbollah’s units have undergone some setbacks amid fierce resistance by the 
opposition in Rif Dimashk. Occasionally, the frontline became a two-lane route of 
counterattacks between both sides during which many Hezbollah fighters were lost in 
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battle. One Hezbollah commander in the area confirmed that his forces were overran from 
several positions by rebel fighters in al-Ghouta (Sullivan, 2014, p.20). In late November 
2013, it had lost 24 combatants all at once during a counterattack by rebels in eastern 
Ghouta (Sullivan, p.22). However, the opposition groups were kept at bay due to the 
continuous bombardment which crippled them and leveraged the attacking forces. 
Therefore, Hezbollah deployed field commanders to eastern Ghouta to plan and assist 
the regime in its assaults continuously clashing face-to-face with the armed groups. In 
these neighborhoods, Hezbollah had to merge between its experience in guerilla warfare 
and classical army tactics and formations. While it generally adopted large army 
formations backed by artillery and aerial bombardments, when necessary, it infiltrated 
top-notch small units to execute hit-and-run operations. Bit by bit, Hezbollah’s modus 
operandi was shaping it as a quasi-army. 
In Douma, a large neighborhood in eastern Ghouta, Hezbollah directed assaults 
alongside the 4th army division, one of the most trained and well-equipped divisions in the 
SAA led by Maher al-Assad, Bachar’s brother.223 Subsequently, they were able to overrun 
Ajnad al-Sham, an opposition group, in Darayya after months of fierce clashes.224 The 
latter was vital for opposition and regime alike, as it is located on the periphery of the 
Mazzeh military airport which was used by the regime to conduct airstrikes against rebel 
strongholds. There, Hezbollah’s units played a decisive role in altering the balance of 
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power in the regime’s favor.225 Further afield, in February 2014, Hezbollah, along with the 
SAA, orchestrated an ambush at the edge of al-Atiba, in eastern Ghouta, killing dozens 
of rebels.226 Needless to say that Hezbollah’s special units had shown their unique 
capabilities in ambushes behind enemy lines as they were accustomed to such types of 
operations that they executed against the IDF in south Lebanon.  
For weeks, Hezbollah and the NDF also led the ground assault in al-Mleha while 
the Syrian air force bombarded it and rained it with barrages of land-to-land missiles.227 
In mid-September, Hezbollah and the pro-Assad factions participated in the attacks 
against the rebel-held neighborhoods of al-Hajar al-Aswad and al-Yarmouk (Sullivan, 
2014, p.20). The latter was the biggest Palestinian camp in Syria which would be later 
captured by ISIS fighters. In October, the SAA, Hezbollah, the NDF and Shi‘a Iraqi 
militants captured few more areas such as al-Boueida and Sheikh Omar. In November, 
they seized Sbeineh, and therefore, by December they had controlled most of Damascus’ 
southern flank (Sullivan, 2014, p.20). All these confrontations reflected Hezbollah’s further 
embed as a partner in the axis proving to be a stalwart ally for the SAA in the battlefield. 
As a matter of fact, Hezbollah’s engagement in al-Ghouta was necessary because rebels 
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had been biting at the edges of Damascus. These fights generated further nemesis 
among Sunni rebels, who were mostly Islamists in al-Ghouta and sponsored by Saudi 
Arabia. With the help of its allies, the regime hardly stopped the advance of the opposition 
and later managed to encircle anti-regime fighters in al-Ghouta. Yet, the battle for eastern 
Ghouta wouldn’t end until 2018 when the opposition groups bargained a deal with the 
regime, supervised by Russia, allowing them to journey towards the pro-rebel province of 
Idlib, in northwestern Syria, putting an end to one of the bloodiest confrontations during 
Syria’s civil war.  
Homs was another city where Hezbollah operated. It had been widely detailed in 
the previous section how Hezbollah started its gradual integration in Syria’s conflict 
through al-Qusayr. The latter, part of Homs’s province that converges with Lebanon’s 
Beqaa valey, was one of the most strategic cities. A military commander in the SAA said 
that by capturing al-Qusayr, one major supply route towards the city of Homs was no 
longer available for the opposition.228 Subsequently, pro-regime forces, backed by 
Hezbollah, recaptured Tal Kalakh, a rebel-held town adjacent to al-Qusayr and the 
Lebanese border, that was used as a smuggling route for weapons and fighters from 
Sunni areas in Lebanon. When these areas were secured and the rebel supply route from 
northern Lebanon was cut off, Hezbollah joined the SAA and the NDF in the battle for the 
city of Homs. “Mohammad Mroueh, a member of the Syrian National Council, said 
Hezbollah and Iran have been training the militias Assad is using for street fighting in 
Homs and have established, together with Iranian officials, operations rooms in the city. 
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When there is an area where the army and the militia encounter stiff resistance, they’re 
calling Hezbollah to do the fighting.”229 This does not mean that Hezbollah was getting all 
jobs done, but its fighters were more accustomed to street fights than the SAA which 
would develop such skills in the ensuing years. 
Bab Amr neighborhood was a symbol of the Syrian uprising as it became a 
dissent’s stronghold from the outset. Hezbollah’s role was decisive in regaining Bab Amr 
but rebels counter-attacked recapturing what they had lost and killed several SAA soldiers 
while the rest withdrew. However, Hezbollah and the SAA executed a lethal blow against 
the opposition ending their presence in the area. Isabel Nassif (2014) emphasized that 
Hezbollah played a main role in regime prevail over Homs. Classical army formations and 
tactics were less effective in these street fights and the SAA was more accustomed to 
classical warfare and army formations than these face-to-face street combats. Despite 
the small numbers of the troops it deployed if compared with the SAA, they were top-
notch fighters with more experience in these types of confrontations. Bit by bit, Hezbollah 
was expanding across vast swathes of the country paving the way for the transition into 
a quasi-army. This, after all, was one among three variables that transitioned Hezbollah 
into a regional ANSA.  
The fall of Bab Amr was a headshot for the rebels. Next, the SAA, backed by 
Hezbollah and the NDF, pushed towards Khaled Ibn al-Walid Mosque, located at the end 
of al-Khalidiyyeh neighborhood. This plan aimed at separating it from the old city, and by 
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doing so, rebel-held neighborhoods in Homs would be disconnected. Sullivan (2014) 
emphasized that Hezbollah’s role in these battles was limited to “specialized military 
assistance”, i.e. snipers and special units (p.17). Needless to say that at this point, 
Hezbollah’s troops had proved their ability to deliver. These battles were fierce as rebels 
zealously defended their enclave delaying the advance of the attacking forces. Sullivan 
(2014) confirmed that Hezbollah and pro-regime forces “launched a three-pronged attack 
on Khalidiyyeh slowly fighting their way through the neighborhood using tanks, rockets 
and mortars” (p.8). Slowly, Hezbollah units were getting accustomed to this new type of 
warfare where they were buttressed by a whopping range of artillery.  
Capturing al-Khalidiyyeh led to the domino demise of the city’s districts. Further 
afield, Hezbollah and other pro-Iran groups, such as Quwwat al-Ridha and Badr 
Organization, joined the SAA in recapturing Homs in May 2014. The latter groups were 
Shi‘a armed factions that adopted wilayat al-faqih doctrine and operated under Tehran’s 
supervision. Of course, most actors that meddled in Syria’s chaos adopted a policy of 
sectarian mobilization and instrumentalization of sectarian identity, but, for our purposes, 
Hezbollah instrumentalized its Shi‘a sectarian identity by recruiting Shi‘a fighters where 
possible. The focus on recruiting Shi‘a fighters in order to rout rebels who happened to 
be Sunni, culminated in increasing Sunni-Shi‘a antagonism. The more Hezbollah 
implemented a sectarian mobilization agenda, the more Sunni animus skyrocketed, the 
less room was left for reconciliation. In fact, if anything, this sectarian agenda was vital 
for Hezbollah’s transition into a regional ANSA. 
 By extension, “the Fifth Storming Corps spearheaded the pro-regime offensive 
that recaptured Palmyra from ISIS in March 2017 with backing from Russia, Iran, and 
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Lebanese Hezbollah” (Chirstopher Kozak, 2017). Al-Hassan (2017) opined that 
Hezbollah participated in the decision-making process and planning along with Russia 
and Syria’s regime, and this meant a recognition of its partnership not only in battles but 
also in leadership (p.138). Sullivan (2014) seconded that the IRGC, leaders from the SAA 
and Hezbollah coordinated operations in Syria at a headquarter in Damascus (p.23-24). 
This was a damning proof that Hezbollah is a partner in the axis rather than a surrogate. 
In short, day by day, Hezbollah was delving into a conflict that was only shaping power 
relations in Syria, but also that of the region, and for our purposes, shaping Hezbollah as 
a vital regional ANSA.  
Alexander Corbeil (2017) contended that Hezbollah got also engaged as far as 
Deir ez-Zor. In 2016, it helped establishing Zain al-Abideen Brigade, a group of almost 
120 fighter who were transported by regime Helicopters to the city.230 Brief though it was, 
its presence in Deir ez-Zor was significant. In some ways, it was a message for regional 
and international players that Hezbollah is operating in this remote area which stands on 
the strategical route from Iraq to Syria. It is necessary to mention here that when ISIS 
poured into Syria from Iraq, they captured most of Deir ez-Zor alerting all players 
operating in Syria. Further afield, the US-backed Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria had 
prevailed in al-Hasaka and were eyeing to advance towards al-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. 
All this did not diverge the attention of state and non-state actors fighting in tandem with 
Assad regime who were hence rushing to recapture it. The battle for Deir ez-Zor had 
become a race for geopolitical leverage between rivals. In fact, the SAA hadn’t fully 
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retreated from the city and small troops were trying to maintain positions. Nevertheless, 
SAA troops and Hezbollah fighters were besieged in the airport of Deir ez-Zor for 8 
months. By extension, in September 2017, the axis forces backed by the Russian air 
force, launched a successful offensive to break the siege against the airport. This in turn 
has driven a shift in the course of the battles in northwestern Syria. what the axis, namely 
Iran and Hezbollah, cared for in such a remote city was its strategic location at the border 
between Iraq and Syria; therefore, bridging the overland route from Beirut to Tehran in 
this area. 
The significance of Hezbollah’s presence there was directly reflected as one of 
Hezbollah’s field commanders, a.k.a. Abou Mustafa, appeared before cameras in an 
unusual act for Hezbollah’s military personnel. To illustrate, this appearance was a 
precedent for Hezbollah but it revealed the importance of the battle for Deir ez-Zor. “I 
want to thank Iran and Russia”, Abou Mustafa stressed, “for their support during the siege 
and amid the daily raids that ISIS conducted against us.” Thereafter, he opened a small 
piece of paper and read what was written on it: “Deir ez-Zor wouldn’t have been able to 
resist without the courage of the entrapped fighters and those who came from the outside 
to help break the siege imposed on the airport. This includes all partners within the axis: 
Syrians, Russians, Iranians and Lebanese. This is a strategic triumph.” The point to make 
here is that this was not merely an arm-stretch by Hezbollah, but the latter was palpably 
participating in the reshaping of the new regional order. The reporter then asked him 
about the reason of this first time appearance: “Hezbollah”, he answered, “is a partner in 
this axis that contains Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine and therefore my 
appearance is a decision taken by Sayyed Nasrallah and the leadership. We wanted to 
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make it clear that we are not hiding, on the contrary, we are fighting all over Syria and the 
current situation needed our appearance before cameras”.231  
The fact that such statement came from a military commander, it meant that 
Hezbollah was declaring itself a regional player and not only a partner and decision-
maker, but also one that speaks on behalf of the whole axis. Directly after opening the 
road towards the airport, Hezbollah, along with Iranians and Iraqi Shi‘a factions, stressed 
that its fighters are heading to liberate ‘Abu Kamal’, a city in eastern Deir ez-Zor that 
converges with Iraq’s borders. Hezbollah’s media described it as a highly strategic town 
and the operation was named “Fajr 3” (Dawn 3).232 “The meeting of Iraqi and Syrian forces 
in the Abu Kamal border region in late 2017 reflected a strategic transformation in the 
Middle East: the carving of a Tehran–Beghdad–Damascus–Beirut land route” (Saouli, 
2019, p.200). After all, geography matters. And as mentioned in the previous section, the 
determination to capture certain routes and strategic cities were at the core of the conflict. 
Further north, Hezbollah played minor roles in both Lattakia and Hama where 
fights were not as heavy as other provinces. It helped the SAA regain Kasab, a mostly 
Armenian-inhabited town on the shores of Lattakia, the Alawiite dominated protectorate 
and the reservoir that continuously poured regime forces with fighters.233 For them, it was 
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a matter of existence and there was no middle ground. From their point of view, they 
either win or the blowback will be insurmountable. Anyhow, Hezbollah was able to capture 
the hills that overlooks the town giving the SAA leverage for their advance,234 easing the 
recapture of the village by the advancing forces. Besides, the Russians buttressed an 
offensive that aimed at recapturing territories from the sea of Lattakia to the shores of the 
Euphrates river on the Iraqi borders; therefore, the operation was dubbed “From Sea to 
River”. Hezbollah did not only participate in the ground battles, but was also a partner in 
the operation room that included Russian, Iranian and Syrian officers.235 This day by day 
on-the-ground coordination was a reflection of a broader political and military partnership 
within the axis, and in certain cities, a coordination with Russia. “Most Hezbollah units 
and Iranians were concentrated in Sahl al-Ghab, namely Jurin front, and from their they 
were also able to advance towards Aleppo. However, they faced fierce rebel resistance 
and Hezbollah lost many fighters during these battles.”236 Hence, these confrontations 
were a cul-de-sac and Hezbollah’s troops were unable to prevail. It was mentioned earlier 
that there was no limit for Hezbollah’s firepower as they were bolstered by large quantities 
of ammo, in addition to the aerial and rockets support. That said, the loss of certain 
battles, such as in Sahl al-Ghab, makes one wonders if Hezbollah’s fighters would have 
been able to triumph without this backup. 
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Although each battle conducted in Syria was strategic in its own terms, Aleppo, 
like al-Qusayr, was a turning point for the course of the conflict. The Capital of northern 
Syria and converging with Turkey, Aleppo became ground-zero in the confrontation 
between most actors which were directly and indirectly engagement in Syria’s civil war. 
While the southeast of Aleppo’s countryside was dominated by ISIS, and the west by 
Turkish-backed factions such as HTS, Ahrar al Sham, Liwa’ al Tawheed and Noureddin 
al-Zanki, in the northern countryside, the SAA’s presence was limited to Minigh military 
airport which was later lost to the opposition, and two Shi‘a villages, Nubbul and al-Zahra’. 
Afrin was controlled by the Kurds. In 2013, the SAA and the opposition equally shared 
the control of the city of Aleppo. “For long stretches of 2013 there was only one area 
where residents of the divided city of Aleppo could pass between the rebel-held east and 
the regime-held west: Bustan al-Qasr checkpoint nicknamed the Crossing of Death” 
(Phillips, 2018, p.147). Further, Salah el-Deen, the first neighborhood where rebels 
surfaced in Aleppo, was equally split between both sides. And when the axis forces 
overran the opposition groups in December 2016, it was from this neighborhood that the 
last rebel retreated.237  
Where Hezbollah is concerned, its troops were deployed to Aleppo in the aftermath 
of al-Qusayr’s battle,238 and played a central role, in tandem with the SAA and NDF, in 
recapturing it. Reports suggest that 3000 Hezbollah fighters were transferred to Aleppo, 
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including the Military Academy and Nubbul and al-Zahra’.239 Elaborating about the latter 
towns is necessary here to understand Hezbollah’s maneuvers in the area. Needless to 
say that sectarian identity was one of an array of factors driving the conflict despite, of 
course, not being the causal factor. Nowhere have sectarian dynamics been more visible 
than in Syria, and due to the Shi‘a identity of the inhabitants of Nubbul and al-Zahra’, they 
have captured the attention of Sunni jihadist groups and pressed Hezbollah to rush 
headlong in order to safeguard their Shi‘a brethren. It has been mentioned many times 
by now that Hezbollah did not only adopt a sectarian mobilization agenda to justify its 
engagement in the civil war but it was also eager to protect Shi‘a citizens where possible.  
By mid-June 2013, reports started confirming that jihadist factions were conducting 
assaults against the Shi‘a towns 35 km from the Turkish borders.240 In fact, since the SAA 
retreated from their positions in Aleppo under heavy rebel attacks, Nubbul and al-Zahra’ 
were besieged and only accessible by helicopters. Tensions surfaced when Shi‘a civilians 
were kidnapped and their families retaliated by abducting Sunni civilians for a bargain. 
Stating this is not meant to malign Sunnis and highlight a Shi‘a victimhood. Rather, this 
was part of the broader Sunni-Shi‘a schism that emerged in the post-2003 Iraq and 
metastasized into Syria in the post-conflict environment. Further, violence against Shi‘a 
in the area was an extension of the tensions that emerged in other Syrian cities such as 
al-Qusayr and Sayyida Zeinab and Hezbollah’s engagement that generated further 
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nemesis among Sunnis. That said, Hezbollah took advantage of the jihadist attacks 
against Shi‘a to deploy units, estimated as much as 200 strong, to fight and train the Shi‘a 
in Nubbul and al-Zahra’ (Sullivan, 2014, p.17). Therefore, it helped establish and buttress 
a faction dubbed Imam al-Hijja regiment that aimed to protect both towns (Phillip Smyth, 
2016). As mayhem was spreading, Hezbollah didn’t help calming tensions, on the 
contrary, it used both villages as a linchpin for its operations in the area which culminated 
in further fomenting sectarian tensions.  
By extension, the SAA, Hezbollah, the NDF, Shi‘a Iraqi groups, and the Quds 
Force, launched an offensive to retake Aleppo in 2013 that would prove to be the costliest 
for Hezbollah. Although one military commander in the organization maintained that the 
ground assault was conducted by the SAA and the NDF and Hezbollah concentrated only 
on advising, planning, and supervising (Sullivan, 2014, p.17), there was damning 
evidences that Hezbollah went all-in in Aleppo’s confrontation. At the beginning, pro-
Assad forces recaptured few villages such as Azzan and Ebteen. Afterwards, Hezbollah 
and the SAA advanced to al-Eiss hill, a high peak that overlooks the area. In these battles 
Hezbollah top-notch units appeared in some footages using motorcycles, All-Terrain 
Vehicles (ATVs) and armed quadricycles. However, al-Eiss hill would only be captured 
three years later but many Hezbollah fighters were lost in battle,241 and even then, they 
could not hold their grounds for long as waves of rebels were on the counter-attack 
pressing them to retreat. Sullivan (2014) argued that if compared with the success 
achieved in al-Qusayr, the summer offensive on Aleppo was a shortcoming (p.17). In 
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parallel, the axis forces broke the siege of Aleppo’s Central Prison and advanced towards 
to the industrial city further north, to Seifat and al-Mallah Farmalands and therefore 
reducing the distance with Nubbul and al-Zahra’ (Christopher Kozak, 2015, p.23). During 
these years, Hezbollah had been shaped as a quasi-army fighting with large army 
formations, using heavy weapons including tanks, orchestrating communications 
between ground troops and operation rooms and transmitting locations for Syrian aircraft 
to bombard.  
An added, but key factor to the battle was Russia’s intervention in Syria’s chaos in 
2015, accelerating the slow advance of pro-regime forces since 2013. That year, “Iran 
and its proxies reportedly provided more than half of the 10,000 fighters assembled for 
the year-long regime campaign to seize Aleppo City” (Christopher Kozak, 2017). The axis 
has deployed thousands of troops, along with sophisticated weapons that entered Aleppo 
for the first time, in the bid to end the geostrategic battle.242 From September 2015 to 
February 2016, under heavy bombardment by the Russian air forces, Hezbollah fiercely 
fought in Aleppo’s neighborhoods, in tandem with the SAA, NDF and other pro-regime 
factions.  Russia’s engagement had a profound impact as it caused an increasing tilt in 
the balance of power in the course of the war. In fact, Syria was the door through which 
Russia reengaged in the Middle East after more than two decades of absence.  
By extension, in early February 2016, the SAA, Hezbollah and other Shi‘a groups, 
broke the three years’ siege on Nubbul and al-Zahra’ after capturing the town of Maarset 
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al-Khan.243 The original plan consisted of encircling the eastern part of the city which 
would cut the supply line between Turkey and opposition groups. However, this could 
have been accomplished without stretching all the way up to Nubbul and al-Zahra’ further 
north. But Hezbollah micromanaged these operations and diverged the direction of the 
operation towards the twin villages. Bringing the discussion back to Hezbollah’s 
instrumentalization of sectarian identity, this was clearly visible in the diversion of the 
offensive to safeguard a route towards Nubbul and al-Zahra’. Despite Hezbollah’s denial 
of assisting and training armed groups in the villages, its flags were obviously seen 
covering the coffins of those killed in battle and therefore the cooperation was palpable.244 
Nowhere was Hezbollah’s and Iran’s instrumentalization of Shi‘a sectarian identity more 
visible than in the illustrative examples of Nubbul and al-Zahra’.  
Subsequently, Hezbollah helped the SAA surround the rebel-held eastern part of 
the city. The opposition groups counter-attacked hoping to break the siege. However, 
Corbeil (2017) argued that their attempts to retake what had been lost failed but 
Hezbollah, participating in the defense of the city, lost 32 fighters. Now that city is 
confined, it was time for negotiations. On December 2016, Russia, Turkey and Iran, 
bargained a deal allowing rebels to retreat from the city towards Idlib along with their 
families. Hetou (2019) emphasized that by mid-December, Iran, Russia, SAA, Hezbollah 
and other armed groups, had retaken Aleppo and declared victory (p.44). Mohammed 
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Nuruzzaman (2016) opined that the triumph in Aleppo was the greatest victory for the 
regime in the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah played a major role in this battle, in close 
cooperation with the IRGC and the Russian air forces.245 Speaking about Hezbollah in 
the pre-Syrian conflict was the different on the military level. What is meant here is that 
Hezbollah’s presence in operation rooms as well as on the ground and operating in 
tandem not only with Syria and Iran, but also with Russia, was unexpected. Of course, it 
had previously executed operations on Iran’s behalf and acted as a proxy in countries 
such as Iraq, but in Syria its role was major as it became accustomed to classical warfare 
and large army formations. The point to make here is that war-making in Syria’s turmoil 
has changed Hezbollah into a quasi-army.  
Idlib was the left to the end for the obvious reason and that is its location but also 
because until the moment of writing this thesis, it has remained under rebels control. 
Located on the Syrian-Turkish borders, Idlib has been the final safe haven for the 
opposition and their families where all defeated anti-Assad fighters had journeyed 
throughout the war. More to the point, opposition fighters who risked being overran by 
regime forces bargained their transfer to Idlib. All these facts do not mean that Idlib 
remained isolated from the flanking chaos. Battles were harsh in the province and 
Hezbollah has taken part in it as its fighters engaged in eastern Idlib and in the industrial 
district, in addition to its key role in protecting the twin Shi‘a towns: Kfarya and al-Fou‘a. 
Similarly to Nubbul and al-Zahra’ in Aleppo, Kfarya and al-Fou‘a had been surrounded 
and Shi‘a citizens fought back against Sunni jihadist factions which were designed to rout 
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their opponents. In fact, sectarian otherness had become a key factor in the conflict as 
inter-sect relationships deteriorated. To illustrate, in Homs, Sunni houses were looted and 
furniture was sold in Alawite districts. In Idlib, Churches and Shiʿa mosques were 
destroyed and Alawite houses were allocated for Sunni families (Christopher Phillips, 
2015).  
One military commander in the villages said that they started arming and training 
when Shi‘a citizens were being kidnapped by jihadists located in the adjacent town of 
Binnish. Although it was palpable that Hezbollah had trained and equipped the Shi‘a of 
al-Fou‘a and Kfarya, one fighter denied these premises claiming that they were trained 
by former SAA soldiers and fought with light and medium weapons: “I personally hit a 
tank with 11 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RBG) shells.”246 This was plainly not the case, 
however. Hezbollah’s sponsorship was obvious for two reasons: First, while the SAA had 
merely distributed light and medium weapons for self-defense such as Ak47s or RBGs, 
especially for sect-centric groups, fighters in these towns were armed with heavy 
weapons. A spokesman of the media office in the twin villages avowed that they used the 
‘Burkan’ missile, launched by Hezbollah during al-Qusayr’s battle, during the standoff.247 
This was a compelling proof of Hezbollah’s meddling because there was no other way for 
fighters in both villages to received such weaponry except from Hezbollah. Second, 
fighters were filmed running one by one towards a guy holding the Quran, kissing it, 
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putting it on their forehead and then passing under it. This maneuver was transmitted by 
Hezbollah.248 The deployment of sect-specific symbols and anthems thus generated 
further sectarian violence and deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a split.  
One more evidence was the use of fighters in these towns what Hezbollah called 
‘al-e‘lam al-harbi’ (media war) to film and distribute footage of the confrontations in order 
to boost the moralities of their fighters.249 Suffice to say here that units in these villages 
were very-well organized in a clear sign of the training they received. It was shortly 
mentioned in the previous section that Hezbollah had besieged rebels in al-Zabadani 
village in al-Qalamoun, western Syria, in order to pressure the opposition to open a safe 
passage for citizens in Fkarya and al-Fou‘a. Therefore, in 2017, an agreement between 
Iran and Turkey and supervised by the United Nations, led to the deployment of rebels 
from al-Zabadani to Idlib and the release of opposition inmates in regime’s prison, in 
exchange for the evacuation of the two villages.250 With the de-escalation of the conflict 
in 2018, a trilateral deal between Russia, Turkey, and Iran, dubbed Sochi agreement, has 
taken place agreeing to establish a buffer zone under Turkey’s protection with a 
demilitarized line of 15 to 20 kilometers depth that will be patrolled by Turkish and Russian 
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forces.251 In the ensuing years, this agreement would be violated leading to the escalation 
of hostilities every now and then. 
Needless to say that Hezbollah was perhaps the only ANSA that participated in 
the regime’s battles across much of the Syrian territory.252 “Hezbollah’s military 
intervention in Syria had a strong impact on the war, contributing to maintaining Assad’s 
regime in the war-torn country” (Saouli, 2019, p.192). Al-Hassan (2017) seconded that 
Hezbollah had a major impact in tilting the balance of power during the conflict by putting 
an end to the advance of the opposition in mid 2012 and by dealing rebels a psychological 
blow in Bab Amro, al-Qusayr and Yabrud, by executing counter-classical warfare tactics 
such as the ability of its elite fighters to quickly move in the battlefield and their fast aiming 
at all kinds of targets, in parallel to the pressure they put against the supply route of their 
enemies and their commanding bases to thwart further reinforcements (p.139). These 
facts heralded the shift of Hezbollah into a quasi-army. Further Hezbollah has participated 
in various decision-making on all levels: it took part in convincing the Syrian leadership to 
stop deploying the SAA in useless and remote regions and instead relocate them to 
recapture cities that are key for the regime’s survival and “played a foundational role in 
building the NDF based on the Iranian ‘Basij’” (Christopher Kozak, 2017).  
In the early months of Syria’s cataclysmic conflict, Hezbollah was looking with 
mounting alarm before delving into a zero-sum confrontation. Bit by bit, it engaged in what 
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was by and large a war of necessity. First, it deployed units to protect Sayyida Zeinab’s 
shrine in Rif Dimashk and Shi‘a towns on the Lebanese-Syrian borders by 
instrumentalizing its Shi‘a sectarian identity and adopting a sectarian mobilization policy 
to justify this intervention. This has put Hezbollah on a collision course with Sunnis across 
the Arab world further deepening the Sunni-Shi‘a split. However, the conflict was not 
sectarian as many have falsely framed it but all actors played the sectarian card into what 
was in fact a geopolitical contest. With the partial unfolding of the civil war in 2018, it had 
become clear that Assad’s collapse was not an option anymore and the overland route 
from Tehran and to Beirut through Syria was secured. Saouli (2019) emphasized that 
“Hezbollah’s strategy contributed to Syria’s aims to avert strategies of encirclement by its 
regional adversaries. Hezbollah served to break the encirclement” (p.151). Having said 
that, Hezbollah, along with its partners in the axis, thwarted the attempt to tilt the regional 
order in their rivals’ favor. Most importantly, the engagement in Syria’s tumult had 
culminated in transitioning Hezbollah into a regional ANSA.  
5.5 Hezbollah in the Saudi Backyard: Yemen 
The geopolitical contestation between Saudi Arabia and Iran came to a climax 
when the groundswell of the Arab Uprisings reached the Saudi backyard, Yemen. The 
Uprising in 2011 very quickly disintegrated into a civil war leading to the collapse of 
president Ali Abullah Saleh’s regime and a Saudi backed president, Abd Rabbu Mansour 
Hadi, was hence appointed. This nomination, however, turned to be a fiasco. The Houthis, 
a Shi‘a Zaidi sect in northern Yemen, coalesced with former President Saleh, and 
orchestrated an armed upheaval against the new pro-Saudi administration. In fact, the 
causal factors of the Zaydis’ upheaval were the culmination of old-age grievances and 
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victimhood. Since 2004, the Houthis, keen to play a bigger role in the country, had tried 
more than once to fight for what they thought to be as their social and economic rights. 
Farther back to the post-1962 Yemen civil war, Zaydis had meticulously demanded the 
central government to endorse equality among its citizens rather than privileging Salafism 
over Zaydism (Stacey Philbrick Yadav, 2017, p.193). Having explained this, we bring the 
discussion to the Yemeni conflict. 
The escalation was somewhat shaped by the regional Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry. 
The former leapt at the chance of assisting the Houthis against the Saudi Arabia backed-
regime in a bid to set foot on the shores of the Gulf of Eden and therefore counter-
balancing Saudi Arabia on its southern border. In fact, had the Yemeni government and 
the Saudi regime endeavored a solution for the Houthis and engaged them in the pre-civil 
war era, they might have pre-emptively prevented Iran’s involvement. Notwithstanding 
their mutual antagonism, in March 2015, the Houthis and Saleh’s forces captured large 
swathes of Yemen, including the capital San‘a and forced Hadi to take refuge in Saudi 
Arabia. This step generated further nemesis provoking Riyadh to intervene directly in 
Yemen hoping to frustrate would-be regional threat on its border. Of course, from Iran’s 
point of view it was supporting the righteous cause of those who are seeking for equality. 
This, however, were a mere cover for its regional expansion and its biting game with 
Saudi Arabia. For our purposes, Hezbollah, acting as a proxy for Iran in Yemen, played 
a role to implement its regional agenda, déjà vu in Iraq. 
 Saouli (2019) maintained that “the gradual rise of the Houthis, who are renamed 
as Ansar Allah (God’s Supporters), and their controlling of San‘a in September 2014, 
offered Iran and Hezbollah another opportunity to extend their strategic regional reach; in 
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this case, to inflict pressure on Saudi Arabia from the southern tip of the Arab Peninsula. 
Saudi Arabia accused Iran and Hezbollah of transferring weapons and military expertise 
to Ansar Allah” (Saouli, 2019, p.200). In 2015, Saudi Arabia started sanctioning Hezbollah 
commanders who it accused of micromanaging the organization’s operations in 
Yemen.253 These figures were also sanctioned by the US Department of Treasury for 
spearheading Hezbollah’s activities in Yemen.254 Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s proxy role in 
Yemen was minor. Before the March 2015 clashes, Hezbollah’s Unit 3800, started 
shipping weapons to Yemen and trained Ansar Allah along with the Quds Force. Khalil 
Harb, a close advisor of Nasrallah and a Hezbollah commander, was leading the unit.255 
This was by denied Hezbollah claiming that Harb came back from Yemen in 2014 and 
was injured in Mosul, Iraq.256 However, on the contrary, avowing that he came back in 
2014 was a damning proof that Hezbollah had been assisting the Houthis and executing 
Iran’s geopolitical agenda in Yemen even before closing up on San‘a. 
 Hezbollah limited its intervention in Yemen to advisors and trainers and its units 
have not engaged in direct battles against anti-Houthi forces. A Hezbollah commander 
speaking of his experience to the Financial Times in training Houthis in Iran, Yemen, and 
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Lebanon, argued that “they are intelligent and fierce fighters.”257 Also the Saudis claimed 
that Hezbollah has lost fighters in Yemen. This has been rejected by Nasrallah who 
assured that if Hezbollah will have martyrs in the future it will be proud to officially declare 
it.258 However, Yemeni officials claimed the arrest of Iranian experts and Hezbollah 
personnel in al-Jawf Governorate.259 In fact, Houthi officials had been spotted in Beirut as 
they were hosted by Hezbollah.260 Furthermore, Nasrallah has bolstered the Houthis in 
his speeches and in parallel, Hezbollah’s channels were constantly covering the 
operations conducted by the Houthis and hosted pro-Houthi analysts in their TV episodes.  
Gradually, Hezbollah shifted from urging the Saudis towards a political solution,261 
to badmouthing the Saudi government and mobilizing its supporters against the Saudi 
Royal family. At the 10th of Muharram (10th day of ‘Ashoura) in 2015 and 2016, tens of 
thousands of Hezbollah’s supporters, aroused by Nasrallah’s speeches, had reiterated 
“Al-Mawt li al-Saoud” (Death for Al-Saud). Nasrallah declared that thousands of brave 
and courageous Yemeni fighters will achieve victory by “rubbing al-Saud’s nose in the 
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sand and make them loose the battle.”262 Such narratives raised the stakes rubbing more 
sault to the wound. In 2018, in parallel to the prevail of the axis on many fronts, Nasrallah 
met a delegation of Ansar Allah in Beirut.263 That year, Syria’s conflict had partially 
unfolded and Bashar al-Assad’s regime was triumphant, the PMF in Iraq had become 
stronger after the defeat of ISIS and more infiltrated in Iraq’s politics and the Houthis had 
not only survived the war but had also crippled their rivals. aware of the overall posture 
of the axis, Nasrallah’s heralded meeting with the Houthis was clearly a message to 
regional foes, namely Saudi Arabia, that the Houthis are key allies within the axis.  
 Iran and Hezbollah have not blatantly declared their engagement in Yemen’s civil 
war, but on the contrary, they have both denied sending arm shipments to the 
Houthis.264265 This, according to many pundits, allowed Iran to adopt a plausible 
deniability policy. However, Saudi media have broadcasted a video for one Hezbollah 
military commander during a conclave with Houthi fighters in which he appears giving 
them military instructions.266 This was a damning proof of Hezbollah’s proxy role on behalf 
of Iran. Although the Houthis fought for their own rights and rebelled against their 
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marginalization by the Yemeni government rather than in pursuit of Iran’s geopolitical 
interest, Tehran saw an opportunity in this conflict and decided to set foot in Saudi 
Arabia’s backyard. It was a chance to counter-balance Saudi Arabia which tried to tilt the 
balance of power in both Iraq and Syria in its favor in an attempt to curtail Iran’s influence. 
Needless to say that the relationship was mutually beneficial as Iran and Hezbollah were 
implementing the geopolitical agenda of the axis in the Middle East and in return the 
Houthis were benefitting from this back up to increase their domestic supremacy. Thomas 
Juneau (2016) best described it: Yemen represented Saudi Arabia’s soft underbelly, and 
this was an opportunity for Tehran which played a minor role in the country. Furthermore, 
as Zaydis, a Shi‘a offshoot, the Houthis were perceived, or at least pictured, as a sectarian 
threat. This allowed Saudi Arabia to malign the Houthis and mobilize Sunni support 
against its rivals. Although Saudi Arabia played the card of the sectarian other, the conflict 
was in fact geopolitical and was not a sectarian conflict. Obviously, the Houthis were not 
seeking religious or sectarian truth in Yemen and doctrine does not explain the causal 
factor of the conflict. Further, the late Sunni president Saleh had allied himself with the 
Houthis for political purposes, but was killed by them when he tried to change sides. 
 The avalanche of transformative regional events played out in Saudi Arabia’s 
backyard. However, the Zaydi-Regime rivalry dates to the developments in northern 
Yemen, when al-Islah party, backed by Saudi Arabia, sought to implement Salafi religious 
institutions aiming at converting Zaydis into Sunnism (Yadav, 2017, p.187-188). That 
said, the chaos in post-war Yemen was not Iran’s creation but it has its root causes dating 
back to decades of an overlap of sectarian and political contest. Further afield, when the 
US-Iran tensions escalated in 2018, the Houthis increased their attacks inside Saudi 
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Arabia, either by launching missiles or drones into Saudi provinces. Of course, Iran was 
accused of micromanaging these attacks to pressure the US in order to lift the embargo 
against it. For our purposes, Hezbollah’s meddling in the Yemeni conflict didn’t help calm 
tensions at a time of rising confrontation between both camps but on the contrary, it 
exacerbated the Sunni-Shi‘a schism and caused further chaos. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter inspected Hezbollah’s operations in four theatres: Palestine, Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen. Except for Syria, Hezbollah acted as a proxy for Iran and sought to 
implement its regional geopolitical agenda. Saouli (2019) argued that “Hezbollah’s military 
intervention in Syria, Iraq and Yemen had a religio-political meaning. In addition to the 
strategic threats these wars posed, the war presented a threat to the wilyat al-faqih, 
represented in the Islamic Republic” (p.189). While bolstering Palestinian factions is 
Hezbollah’s raison d’être and can be perceived from an Arab stance as supporting them 
against Israel’s occupation, Hezbollah wouldn’t have the means to act if it wasn’t for Iran. 
In Iraq and Yemen, it helped establish, fund, and arm Shi‘a factions and the Houthis, 
respectively, who became part of the axis. It was clear that Iran was immersed in the 
region’s turmoil in its bid to increase its clout through proxies allowing it to play the card 
of plausible deniability but at the same time giving it notable leverage at the negotiation 
table. In these theatre of operations, Hezbollah’s modus operandi presented it as an 
appendage for Iran in a mutually beneficial relationship. However, all Hezbollah’s 
maneuvers in the Middle East were minor if compared with its full-scale engagement in 
Syria’s conflict. 
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Henry Kissinger (2014) best described the overlap of sectarian and geopolitics in 
Syria: “Regional powers poured arms, money, and logistical support into Syria on behalf 
of their preferred sectarian candidates: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for the Sunni 
groups; Iran supporting Assad via Hezbollah” (p.127). The tilt in the regional order that 
would have occurred had Assad’s regime been removed would have caused an 
insurmountable geopolitical debacle. Therefore, for its own survival and for the interest of 
the axis, it had to be immersed in the conflict to frustrate would-be regional menace. As 
Sullivan (2014) maintained, Hezbollah’s continued commitment to Syria’s regime meant 
that they believe the benefits of this participation outweigh the costs (p.26). This chapter 
examined Hezbollah’s operations across Syria, stretching from its early offensive in al-
Qusayr, to Dar‘a and Quneitra in the south and Deir ez-Zor and Idlib in the northwest and 
northeast, respectively, through Aleppo, al-Qalamoun, al-Ghouta and many other cities. 
The chapter argued that to justify its intervention, Hezbollah adopted a sectarian 
mobilization agenda and instrumentalized its sectarian identity. This served as a 
machinery of mobilization for Hezbollah but at the same time deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a 
schism and undermined Hezbollah among the Sunni community. That said, the war of 
necessity in Syria transitioned Hezbollah into a regional ANSA.  
This chapter examined Hezbollah’s transition into a regional ANSA based on three 
variable catalysts: First, the turmoil was the conduit to tilt Hezbollah into a quasi-army 
mixing guerilla and classical warfare tactics and adopted large army formations or small 
top-notch units depending on the operation it conducted. Second, from south to north via 
inland Syria, it instrumentalized its sectarian identity to justify its intervention and to 
protect all Shi‘a citizens across Syria. Third, this standoff embedded Hezbollah as a 
	 256	
partner and decision-maker in the axis that extends from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus 
and Baghdad, and to a lesser extent, Yemen. The point to close with is that Hezbollah 
had reached its heyday with the partial unraveling of Syria’s conflict and transitioned into 
one of the most prominent regional ANSAs.  
6 The Transition: A Regional ANSA 
6.1 Introduction 
Al-sha‘b yurid eskat al nizam (The people want to overthrow the system), hustled 
across the Arab world faster than the light since late 2010. Although each country had its 
specificity, this slogan was common for all protestors. It was hoped that these protests 
will bring economic prosperity and democracy to the authoritarian-ruled countries across 
North Africa and the Middle East. But on the contrary, all it did, with the exception of 
Tunisia, was either further embed authoritarianism or inflame chaos. The plurality in 
Islam, as Geneive Abdo (2017) opined, and competition among Islamic schools, have 
always existed, but this wave of uprisings “brought identity and religion once again to the 
fore” (p.1). More importantly, it resurfaced the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry that was instigated 
in the post-Saddam Iraq. Haddad (2020) opined that “the intersection of sectarian identity 
and Arab-Iranian rivalry has seen regional strategy instrumentalizing markers of sectarian 
identity to foster sectarian solidarity and mobilization by portraying geopolitical issues as 
existential threats confronting all Sunni and Shiʿa (p.116). Moreover, Nader Hashemi and 
Danny Postel (2017) argued that the geopolitical confrontation between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran played out in Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon, but “the conflict in Syria has become ground 
zero in the war of position between the two regional hegemons” (p.13).  
	 257	
Post-Uprising Syria became an arena for contest between opened domestic, 
regional, and international states and a myriad of ANSAs. “Regional powers,” Haddad 
(2020) emphasized, “facilitated the flooding of foreign militants into Syria to fight and let 
their support to anti-regime insurgents while Iran’s and particularly Lebanese Hezbollah’s 
involvement in the conflict went a long way towards further sect-coding the Syrian civil 
war and validating the narrative of a regional Sunni-Shi‘a struggle” (p.254). Eyeing to 
stand as a bulwark against those wishing to remove Bashar al-Assad’s regime, a close 
ally of Iran and Hezbollah, the latter rushed headlong to prevent such outcome. 
Damascus is the bridge linking Tehran to Beirut that was used to ship weapons en route 
to Hezbollah and therefore, Assad’s collapse would deal the axis an immense strategic 
blow. That said, this was a war of necessity for Hezbollah and there was no escape from 
the engagement in this zero-sum geopolitical confrontation that further embedded 
Hezbollah in the axis. However, as Abdullah Anas (2019), former jihadist and son-in-law 
of Abdullah Azzam –Ossama Bin Laden’s mentor, placed it: “When you share life and 
death experiences and war, a bond is certainly formed” (p.61). 
This chapter will first examine Hezbollah’s necessity to intervene in the Syrian 
conflict stretching from Dar‘a in the south, through inland Syria, all the way up to Deir ez-
Zor in the east and down to Lattakia in the west. It will then examine its instrumentalization 
of its Shi‘a sectarian identity to justify its engagement, pledging to protect Shi‘a inhabitants 
on the Lebanese-Syrian borders at the outset and across Syria in later stages, and to 
defend Sayyida Zeinab’s mosque, in Damascus’s suburbs, from Sunni jihadist groups 
which were determined to destroy it. This further added to the Sunni-Shi‘a schism but 
sectarian identity was one, yet paramount, of an array of factors driving the conflict. 
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However, the primary motive of the intervention of all actors including Hezbollah was 
more geopolitics than doctrinal factors. More to the point, Hezbollah used its sectarian 
identity as a mobilizational tool in what was in fact a geopolitical contest. Rather, key 
driver of the conflict but sectarian identity. Further, the chapter will scrutinize the shift of 
Hezbollah into a quasi-army mixing between guerilla and classical warfare tactics. 
Subsequently, it used large military formations – which it wasn’t accustomed to use during 
its previous confrontations with Israel, in some confrontations, while it infiltrated top-notch 
small units to execute quick operations, in others. The chapter will close by underscoring 
Hezbollah’s participation in the decision-making process on all levels: from operations on 
the ground to the operations rooms, all the way up to the leadership level. The overarching 
aim of this chapter is to unpack these variables to explain Hezbollah’s transition into a 
regional ANSA during Syria’s civil war. 
6.2 Syria: The Choice of Necessity  
The alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah pre-dates the 2011 civil war to 
when the late Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father and then Syria’s president, rushed to 
support the Islamic Republic with weapons in its war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
Assad and Saddam were sub-regional rivals competing to implement their geopolitical 
agendas and therefore Assad found a chance to impede Saddam by supporting Tehran. 
In parallel, Syria had reached a quid pro quo with Iran allowing 1500 IRGC members to 
cross the borders into Lebanon on conditions that the former would control the timing of 
the operations that Hezbollah would conduct against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 
Subsequently, the Quds Force, the external wing of the IRGC, had set foot in the Beqaa 
valley in 1982, a mostly Shi‘a area that converges with Syria, to help establish and 
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organize Hezbollah. While Tehran was concerned with founding an organization bearing 
a Shi‘a Islamic identity and swearing allegiance to wilayat al-faqih, Assad was only hoping 
to micromanage the geopolitical confrontation with Israel in the Lebanese theatre.  
Despite few nuances, the creation of Hezbollah became the linchpin of a 
relationship that would develop in the ensuing decades into a partnership straddling the 
geopolitical fault-lines of the Middle East. Further afield, Syria started supporting 
Hezbollah with ammo and weapons, but also became the harbor where shipments of 
armaments from Tehran anchored before being transferred to Lebanon. Needless to say 
that Syria under Assad became a stalwart ally for both Iran and Hezbollah and the 
tripartite Iran-Syria-Hezbollah partnership withstood and hardened through time. Stating 
this was necessary before bringing the discussion to the engagement in Syria’s conflict. 
That said, when the rebels were closing up on Damascus in the second year of the Syrian 
civil war, Hezbollah and Iran began their gradual intervention to prevent the unbearable 
debacle had Assad’s regime collapsed. In 2011, few months after the eruption of the 
demonstrations, the echo of anti-Hezbollah discourses started reverberating across the 
region. Rebels were promising to reassess the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah 
once they remove Assad as they burned Hezbollah’s flags and chanted against it,267 
putting the dissent at a collision course with Hezbollah who started looking with suspicion 
at these events.  
Two other events also rushed Hezbollah’s intervention: First, the closing up of the 
jihadist fighters on the Mosque of al-Sayyida Zeinab, the daughter of Imam Ali and one 
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of the most important figures for the Shi‘a, at the outskirts of Damascus, and their 
promises to destroy it once they seize the town. Second, the sectarian clashes that were 
escalating on the Lebanese-Syrian border, namely in al-Qusayr, between the Sunni and 
the Shi‘a inhabitants who have always lived peacefully in these villages. Hezbollah was 
acutely aware of the sectarian hatred in Syria that was hibernating since the 1982 clash 
in Hama between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood during which the former ended 
a rebellion that had started against Alawites since the mid-1970s (Sam Dagher, 2019, 
p.81). “Rather than innate antagonisms, ancient hatreds or doctrinal incompatibility,” 
Haddad (2020) emphasized, “the reason that the sectarianization of the Uprisings in 
countries such as Syria, “was something of an inevitability due to very recent history 
spanning less than half a century and accentuated by the post-2003 environment. 
(p.257).”  
Further, many Sunnis rejected the idea of being ruled by an Alawite president in a 
Sunni-majority country. Haddad (2020) stressed that “while Sunnis in Syria are a majority 
in both national and transnational terms, the hierarchies of power in Ba‘thist Syria have 
nevertheless created a profound sense of Sunni victimhood among significant sections 
of Sunni society, who resent what they regard as sectarian oppression by an Alawi-
dominated regime” (p.172). These events were plagued with rising sectarian tensions 
across Syria which were exacerbated by Hezbollah’s bold intervention. However, 
scholars such as Abdo (2017) who argued that the Syrian conflict developed into a civil 
war between Sunni and Shi‘a with spillovers into Lebanon and Iraq (p.45), have 
mischaracterized the overall situation. Indeed, the engagement of a Shi‘a group to 
support the Alawite regime further mobilized Sunnis across the Arab world to fight 
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alongside the opposition. This is plainly not the case, as will be explained in the following 
section. Grudgingly, Hezbollah had to diverge its arsenal from fighting Israel to 
confronting anti-Assad groups which happened to be Sunni Muslims variying from 
moderate such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to jihadists such as Da‘esh (ISIS) and 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), previously al-Nusra.  
Confined to its regional partnerships and pegged to the fate of Iran and Syria, 
Hezbollah had no choice but to engage in an inevitable war of necessity. Hezbollah’s 
secretary general Hassan Nasrallah reasoned that “Syria is not anymore a space for a 
popular uprising against a political regime but a space for the US, the west and their 
proxies to implement their agenda. Syria is the backbone of the resistance and we cannot 
stand still while our back is vulnerable. If Syria falls in the hands of the Americans, the 
Israelis and the takfirists, Lebanon will be surrounded and we will enter again into the 
Israeli era. Al-Qusayr, Nasrallah pursued, is the back of the resistance and stupid is he 
who watches his own confinement.”268 At this time, Nasrallah was blatantly declaring 
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria’s conflict despite its earlier engagement. Christopher 
Phillips (2018) considered that Nasrallah declared the organization’s participation in 
Syria’s civil war in April 2013 for three reasons: “Firstly, the regime’s inability to repel rebel 
advances raised the prospect of Assad’s defeat. Secondly, the rise of jihadists and 
Salafists among the rebels represented a force along Lebanon’s border that would not 
just be anti-Assad, but threatened Shi‘a presence in the Levant. Finally, Iran appealed to 
Hezbollah for a greater help”. He argued that the final point cannot be confirmed but 
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Nasrallah flew to Tehran twice in April to meet Khamenei and Suleimani, and “soon after 
openly declared Hezbollah’s presence in Syria” (p.157). Anti-Hezbollah former Member 
of Parliament seconded by saying that the intervention was a pure Iranian decision and 
Hezbollah was forced to obey.269 However, this grossly mischaracterized the nature of 
the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. Of course, Hezbollah has to cooperate its 
intervention with Iran, but this does not mean that the latter dictates the former. Rather, 
Hezbollah is part of the axis and Syria’s regime is a stalwart ally; therefore, the former’s 
leap into Syria was a fait accompli as the regime’s collapse would deal them a strategic 
blow. 
Hezbollah’s former private universities spokesman contended that the Americans 
and their allies wanted to destroy the axis by toppling Assad as a prelude to end Hezbollah 
and then change the regime in Iran.270 That said, conspiracy theories have always 
prevailed in the Middle East and any imminent threat against one’s interest can be easily 
framed as a conspiracy to thwart such attempts. And this is the case here. 
Correspondingly, Hezbollah’s minister emphasized that they waited for a year but when 
the conspiracy to surround and choke Hezbollah through Syria increased, they were 
obliged to interfere and fight to protect themselves and the regime that had always 
supported them.271 Similarly, Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations opined that 
they were preparing new units to combat Israel but they were forced to deploy them to 
Syria when the war erupted. This confrontation, he explained, is a world war between two 
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camps on Syria’s soil.272 Sullivan (2014) emphasized that “the war in Syria presents a 
significant, even existential, threat to this strategic alliance by endangering one of its 
primary members and the chief conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah. At the same time, 
Iran cannot afford to lose its most important foothold in the Levant, and Hezbollah cannot 
risk losing its access to critical Iranian and Syrian support. Maintaining the Axis of 
Resistance is also a matter of great ideological importance for Iran and its commitment 
to exporting its Islamic revolutionary principles” (p.9). This was surprisingly approved by 
some Hezbollah opponents. A spokesman of the “Lebanese Forces” argued that 
Hezbollah was convinced of the necessity to intervene because the interest of the axis 
was a priority.273 Likewise, the Future Movement deputy secretary general argued that 
Hezbollah is a rational and pragmatic actor and wouldn’t throw itself under the bus. The 
engagement, he pursued, became necessary and was a calculated step to safeguard the 
regime whose survival wasn’t guaranteed at that time.274 In fact, for its own security, 
Hezbollah had to immersed in the conflict in order to frustrate would-be regional threat 
had the rebels prevailed. 
Bringing the discussion back to the causal factors driving Hezbollah’s intervention, 
the latter was looking with awe to the facts on the ground. From the Sunni-dominated 
areas in northern Lebanon, rebels were smuggling weapons and fighters into al-Qusayr 
and the fall of the latter in the hands of the opposition “threatened to isolate Lebanon from 
Syria, thus endangering Hezbollah’s own lines of communication: Beirut–Damascus–
Tehran” (Saouli, 2019, p.192). The battle for al-Qusayr was unpacked in chapter 5. 
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Suffice it to say here that it was not only Hezbollah’s first offensive in Syria, but also its 
first confrontation with what happened to be Sunni rebels, stretching from moderate 
groups to radical ones. The battle was of extreme importance for the course of the civil 
war as it came at a time when the regime was losing ground for the opposition which was 
closing up on Damascus. Unaccustomed to such type of confrontations, Hezbollah did 
not predict the outcome, but its triumph proved its ability to deliver. Fortified and thought 
to be unbreakable, Al-Qusayr was the rebels’ den. Nevertheless, Hezbollah dealt them 
an immense psychological blow by capturing it in less than a month and therefore 
leveraging the regime which was then at its steepest military posture. That said, from 
Hezbollah’s point of view, had it not pre-emptively engaged in al-Qusayr, it would have 
been forced to fight ISIS and HTS in Lebanon because they latter were planning to 
expand over vast swathes of the region (Muhammad Mohsen, 2017, p.140).  
Al-Qusayr’s encounter paved the way for further expansion of Hezbollah’s troops. 
Bit by bit, they went a long way towards further validating their presence from south to 
north, via inland Syria. Saouli (2019) emphasized that “the intervention was gradual and 
dictated by the changing military balance on the ground. The weaker the regime and the 
higher the threat of its fall became, the more Hezbollah stepped in to fill the void and to 
offer the necessary backing” (p.190). Therefore, in the ensuing years, Hezbollah pursued 
an increasingly assertive and more engaging policy starting from the south of al-Qusayr, 
the Qalamoun mountains, and spreading as far as Deir ez-Zor in the northeast. This is 
not meant to picture Hezbollah as the only actor which helped tilting the balance of power 
in the regime’s favor, as the latter has lost thousands of fighters in these battles, and 
Russia has put as much effort. But taking into consideration the limited number of its units, 
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its effectiveness on the ground was paramount. By and large, the forces within the axis 
were outnumbered by the flux of bellicose rebels who were pouring into the battlefield 
from all over the world. In earnest, this was an existential threat for the axis of which 
Hezbollah became more embedded. Hezbollah came to believe that the intervention in 
Syria was a double-edged sword, eroding its support among the Sunni community, but 
also guaranteeing its survival. 
The sectarian mobilization agenda was a short-term policy to justify its intervention 
into what was in fact a geopolitical confrontation. Therefore, Nasrallah’s early pledge of 
protecting the Shi‘a shrines and inhabitants in al-Qusayr and Sayyida Zeinab, 
respectively, altered. “Wherever we must be”, Nasrallah said, “we will be.”275 By other 
words, this marked a transition in Hezbollah’s discourse raising the stakes and opening 
the door for further engagement wherever it sees necessary. This does not mean a full 
sidelining of the sectarian discourse, however. Where possible, it kept engaging to 
safeguard Shi‘a citizens, as was elaborated in chapter 5. The rhythm of the mobilization 
was always at its apogee. “The confrontation in Syria”, Nasrallah believed, “is a war of 
existence and survival.”276 Phillips (2018) argued that “Hezbollah faced a grave, even 
existential threat should Assad be toppled. Syria provided it with strategic depth, including 
the essential supply to Iran, and legitimacy: The Syrian-Iranian alliance was presented as 
part of a wider resistance on behalf of all Muslims and Arabs against Israel and the West. 
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Like Iran, it feared a Sunni-dominated regime emerging in Damascus, but with further 
domestic reason: it might shift Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance in favor of Sunnis, at 
the expense of the Shi‘a and Hezbollah” (p.157). However, this alliance never 
represented the Muslim world especially since the 2003 wave of sectarianism and the 
post-Arab Uprisings, both causing an eroding support among Sunnis. 
From mid-2012 until 2018, Hezbollah’s units had fought from Dar‘a in the south, 
through inland Syria, all the way up to Lattakia in the northwest and Deir ez-Zor in the 
northeast. Operating across vast swathes of the country, their engagement was decisive 
in four regions: Al-Qusayr, al-Qalamoun, Aleppo and Rif Dimashk. Continuing to rise 
unabated, they were not confined to these areas as they fought in more remote cities 
such as Deir ez-Zor. The chaotic situation that engulfed Syria and the peak of the 
geopolitical contest between regional and international actors to gain more ground 
leverage, left no room for setbacks. Samir al-Hassan (2017) argued that the confrontation 
is between two camps and therefore it was ordinary for all actors in the axis, primarily 
Hezbollah as its troops are the most prepared and well trained force, to defend their 
geostrategic interest (p.129). A Lebanese Shi‘a pro-Saudi journalist, close to Hariri and 
opposed to Hezbollah, argued that facts on the ground forced them interfere. After all, the 
Syrian regime is a strategic ally and the fear of its collapse rushed their engagement.277 
 Syria’s mayhem was the conduit for Hezbollah’s transition. More to the point, the 
intertwinement of sectarian identity with geopolitics played an instrumental role in 
transitioning Hezbollah into a regional ANSA. This was not part of a grandiose plan. 
Rather, Saouli (2019) emphasized that Hezbollah exploited the looming opportunity to 
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advance its agenda and achieve its goals (p.214). Further, as Chafik Choukair (2016) 
reasoned, Hezbollah waged a war that impacted “its organizational structure and strategic 
position in the region, as well as its internal ethics” (p.5-6). By the end of 2018, Hezbollah 
had accomplished the transition into a regional ANSA that now stretches from Beirut to 
Syria and Iraq. This transition was not an opportunity that Hezbollah grabbed, but a war 
of necessity that it had to fight to guarantee its survival which is, by and large, pegged to 
the fate of both Iran and Syria. That year, Hezbollah had reached its apogee and it was 
hard to escape the sense of its emergence triumphant from the regional turmoil. Sectarian 
mobilization and the instrumentalization of sectarian identity was one of three main factors 
that helped Hezbollah transitioning. 
6.3 Hezbollah’s Sectarian Mobilization and Instrumentalization of 
Sectarian identity 
The death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD ignited a dispute over his successor. 
While one group insisted that the Caliph –recognized leader of the Muslims, and heir, 
must be one of the Prophet’s companions, in reference to Abou Bakr who became the 1st 
Caliph, another group argued that the upcoming leader must share kinship with the 
Prophet, in reference to Imam Ali –the 4th Caliph (Fouad Ibrahim, 2018, p.123). This 
disagreement led to the emergence of two sects which came to be known as the Sunni 
and the Shi‘a, respectively. Having said that, the causal factors of the Sunni-Shi‘a split 
was political rather than doctrinal. Ali mabrouk (2018) stressed that the emergence of a 
sect occurs when contest between people alter from political to divine and therefore 
becomes the tool that shifts the contest from “temporary” to “eternal” (p.89). 
Subsequently, Abdo (2017) argued that “the Shi‘a have long been a poignant reminder to 
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Sunni Muslims of the unresolved differences within Islam since the death of the Prophet 
Mohammad”.  
Generally speaking, abiding by a creed and being part of an Islamic sect means 
reviving the historical symbols of each sect, their splits and antagonism, as if these 
symbols are still alive and they need their followers to carry this mutual rivalry as perpetual 
(Abd al-Majid al-Sharfi, 2018, p.63). More to the point, “the Shi‘a telling of the death of 
Hussein, grandson of the Prophet and champion of the future Shi‘a, at the hands of the 
Umayyads in a battle near Karabla in 680 CE, has created the narrative many Shi‘a have 
lived by ever since” (p.8). Hamid Dabashi (2016) narrated how a Mulla [Muslim cleric] 
would come to their house and “start chanting songs in praise of Imam Hussein”. Dabashi 
(2016) pursed that the battle of Karbala is “the most sacrosanct traumatic event on the 
Shi‘a calendar” and when the Mulla starts singing to “Seyyed al-Shohada” (Master of the 
martyrs) – acronym of Imam Hussein, his mother sits to listen (p.3). Since then, the Shi‘a 
commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, praising him as a symbol for sacrifice who 
was oppressed by his foes until the moment of his death. Furthermore, sect-symbolism 
is paramount for mobilization and motivation during, for instance, military confrontations 
where Shi‘a fighters use mottos such as “Oh Hussein” ahead of each battle. This does 
not mean that the confrontation is sectarian, but fighters like Hezbollah had been raised 
on these sect-symbols and grievances and they refer to them as a sense of doctrine.  
The sectarian card, namely the Sunni-Shi‘a schism, has been a tool for each 
geopolitical contest in the Middle East during the 20th and 21st centuries. This does not, 
as should be clear by now, that the conflict is sectarian. Scholars relying on sectarianism 
to justify every skirmish in the region are Orientalists (Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel, 
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2017, p.4). In fact, the intertwinement of geopolitics with sectarian identity is the key driver 
of the confrontations. Hashemi & Postel (2017) maintained that the rise of modern 
sectarianism was triggered by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Subsequently, Saudi 
Arabia sought to thwart the spread of revolutionary Islam into the Gulf countries by 
labeling Iran as a Shi‘a/Persian state (p.10). Dabashi (2016) seconded that the Islamic 
Republic radically Islamized the revolution of 1979 and spread sectarianism in the region 
(p.182). Sitting at each other’s throat, Iran and Saudi Arabia instrumentalized sectarian 
identity hoping to thwart any attempt for regional leverage and tilt the power balace in 
their favor.  
Denied publicly but obvious on the ground and in sect-centric discourses, both 
states invested in the sectarian card. Abdo (2017) opined that “sectarianism in the Arab 
world remains an inescapable presence that ignites whenever there are social or political 
upheavals, such as the Islamic Revolution, the US invasion of Iraq, or the more recent 
Arab Uprisings and the resulting Syrian and Iraqi civil wars”; and “without religious 
identification the conflicts would not have flared to the degree they have done today” (p.7). 
This, however, is plainly not true. In Libya, for instance, the conflict is as ferocious as in 
Syria but there is no presence for sectarian identity as both sides are Sunni. Bringing the 
discussion back to Hezbollah, it is hard to ignore the role it has played in igniting the 
sectarian tumult in post-civil war Syria. Being Iran’s Islamic Republic ideological replica 
and part of the Islamic umma [nation] under the guidance of the faqih [jurisprudent], every 
now and then, Hezbollah played a proxy role on Tehran’s behalf in tandem with the Quds 
Force, the external branch of the IRGC. Key among them was its participation in Iraq and 
Yemen, undermining its argument that focuses on its maneuver based on Lebanon’s best 
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interest. Of course, there was no interest for Lebanon by engaging this far in the regional 
conflict and therefore Hezbollah prioritized the interest of the axis. These engagements 
fanned the flames of sectarian tensions. 
 However, this thesis focused on Syria’s civil war that deepened the Sunni-Shi‘a 
schism and where sectarian identity was one, yet key, of an array of factors driving the 
conflict. It is necessary to mention here that in 1317, Ibn Taymiyya, a radical Muslim Sunni 
scholar, had declared “Nusayris” (Alawites) to be “more disbelieving than Jews and 
Christians” (Ali Farouq-Alli, 2018, p.32-33). Then, Ibn Taymiyya’s edict was based on 
doctrinal beliefs rather than political motives. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, these sectarian 
hatreds were revived in Syria when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) accused the Alawites 
of apostasy legitimizing the attacks against them (Sam Dagher, 2020, p.81). Abdo (2017) 
seconded that during that era, the MB had labeled the Alawites as unbelievers (p.55). 
These accusations, however, were politically driven because it seemed unacceptable for 
the majority-Sunni community to be ruled by an Alawite minority (10% of Syria’s 
population) (Heiko Wimmen, 2017, p.68). Subsequently, in 1982, Assad crushed the MB 
rebellion (Abdo, 2017, p.55), in the city of Hama killing thousands Having said that, in 
communities where sectarian identity has played instrumental roles in historical conflicts, 
it can be easily reinvigorated. Moreover, Abdo (2017) argued that Hafez al Assad’s 
alliance with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war made things worse as Sunnis considered this a bold 
and threatening step (p.55).  
That explained, we bring back the discussion to the chaotic civil war. In the early 
days of the 2011 Uprising, “the deployment of religious vocabulary and symbols to 
express political opposition to the Assad regime reflected the importance of Islam as a 
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moral framework for action in Syrian society” (Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, 2017, p.126). Bit 
by bit, as sect-specificity increased and tensions mounted, Islamist activists resurfaced 
and Sunni jihadist groups started prevailing among the opposition. These groups started 
spreading mayhem against minorities and Sunni-Assad loyalists accusing them of 
apostasy. Saouli (2019) confirmed that “the sectarian discourse of jihadist groups, such 
as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State– who perceive Shi‘a as infidels– and the 
horrendous violence they inflicted on minorities and political opponents in Syria and Iraq, 
pushed many members of targeted groups to support Hezbollah and Assad. When 
Nasrallah announced that the battle in Syria was existential in nature, many attributed this 
not only to the survival of the resistance alliance, but also to the mere survival of various 
minority groups” (p.189-190). Furthermore, a Sunni elder was filmed shouting after a raid 
in al-Qusayr against Shi‘a inhabitants: “No more lands for the Shi‘a here from now on.”278 
Pinto (2017) explained the growing fear among Alawites, Christians, Druze and Ismailis 
amid the rise of sectarian narratives and mottos: In Homs,for instance, protestors were 
chanting “al-Masihiyoun ila Beirut wa al-‘Alawiyoun fi al-tabout” (The Christians to Beirut 
and the Alawites to the coffin) (p.132).  
Of course, Assad’s regime and the Syrian Ba‘ath are generally framed “as 
defenders of secularism, guarantors of the safety of minority groups, and the surest 
defense against ‘sectarianism’” (Haddad, 2020, p.256). Needless to say that where 
possible, “regimes will immediately reach for the tried and tested method of isolating and 
containing political threats emanating from sectarian outgroups by employing the vilifying 
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and delegitimizing language of ‘sectarianism’ and foreign collusion, thereby portraying the 
political mobilization of sectarian outgroups as a threat not just to the regime but to the 
rest of citizenry and to the nation as well” (Haddad, 2020, p.248). Moreover, anti-
Hezbollah former Member of Parliament reasoned that Hezbollah benefited from the rise 
of sectarianism advertising a coalition of minorities against the Sunni majority. The latter 
sect, he followed, has no prominent figures anymore such as Jamal Abdel Nasser or 
Yasser Arafat and they were transformed to terrorists in Iraq, to refugees in Syria and to 
underdogs in Lebanon.279 However, al-Mayadeen TV reporter who covered Hezbollah’s 
raid to recapture al-Qusayr argued that some voices within Hezbollah objected the 
intervention at the outset, but when sectarian identity started driving the conflict, namely 
against Shi‘a, they were all convinced.280 This is plainly valid as the Shi‘a community 
sensed the menace caused by the increasing clout of terrorist organization such as HTS 
and ISIS. 
Unpacked in chapter 5, Hezbollah adopted a sectarian mobilization and 
instrumentalized its Shi‘a sectarian identity to justify its engagement in Syria’s conflict 
focusing on the attacks against Sayyida Zeinab’s mosque and Shi‘a villages on the 
Lebanese-Syrian borders. However, sectarian identity cannot explain the causal factors 
of the conflict. Although it was the primary driver in certain cases, it remained an 
exception. In fact, if anything, what was falsely framed as a sectarian conflict was a 
geopolitical contest driven by an array factors stretching from political and economic 
grievances to sectarian identity. Tawfik al-Saif (208), for instance, argued that all modern 
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and primordial sectarian conflicts were caused by political contest. This, however, is not 
always the case. There are many examples that can dispel such narrative: take the 
clearest one that is ISIS’s mischief-making or other conflicts that are driven from below 
rather than above. Bring the discussion back to the main argument, Pinto (2017) opined 
that the engagement of Hezbollah, Iraqi groups, and Iranian brigades in Syria mirrored a 
strategic alliance, but commingled with sectarian overtones (p.140). According to Bassel 
F. Salloukh, the Sunni-Shi‘a divide was Hezbollah’s biggest fear and in the grand scheme 
of things, it maligned them because they always sought to portray themselves as a pan-
Islamist movement fighting against invading forces, namely the west, rather than a 
sectarian organization.281 
Hezbollah’s former private universities spokesman seconded that they didn’t 
benefit from the rise of sectarianism because they lost support among Sunnis in the Arab 
world.282 This was approved by the spokesman of the Lebanese Forces, an anti-
Hezbollah Christian party, who added that Nasrallah’s pictures were raised in Cairo and 
various other Arab cities following the 2006 war against Israel, but needless to say how 
much this support decreased in parallel to the rise of sectarian bickering and Hezbollah’s 
framing as a sectarian group.283 Conversely, the deputy secretary general of the Future 
movement stressed that Hezbollah benefited from the Sunni-Shi‘a schism by promoting 
itself as a transnational NSA maneuvering in new theatres where it proved to other Shi‘a 
constituents that they all belong to the same ideological and intellectual school.284 The 
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point to make here is that the regional role that Hezbollah played on Iran’s behalf or as a 
partner in the axis delegitimized it in the eyes of the Sunni but at the same time endeared 
it among Shi‘a.  
 The engagement in Syria’s turmoil, according to Saouli (2018), increased the 
Sunni-Shi‘a animosity and had broader ramifications within Lebanon (p.196). The 
demonization of Hezbollah had started with the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime 
minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. In 2019, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, officially accused 
Hezbollah for orchestrating the operation.285 Further adding to the Sunni-Shi‘a dynamics 
in Lebanon was the 7 May clashes when Hezbollah and its allies took over Beirut after 
overriding the pro-Hariri supporters who happened to be Sunnis. Although Abdo (2017) 
upheld that Hariri’s assassination was a rallying point for Sunnis against the threat of the 
Shi‘a Hezbollah, in addition to the Hezbollah takeover of Beirut that fueled anti-Shi‘a 
discourses (p.57-58), this is somehow misleading as it was framed as if Sunni-Shi‘a 
identities were the key driver of these tensions. In fact, paralleled with the rise of sectarian 
discord in post-Saddam Iraq and its spillovers, domestic power relations were easily 
framed as sectarian contest.  
So when the clashes erupted in Syria, “many of Lebanon’s Sunnis, instinctively 
sided with the mostly Sunni anti-Assad rebels” and thought to challenge Hezbollah at 
home (Phillips, 2018, p.157). Subsequently, sectarian violence erupted in Tripoli, northern 
Lebanon, between pro-Assad Alawites and pro-rebels Sunnis; in Arsal, a Sunni town in 
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the Beqaa valley, between Sunni armed groups, including ISIS and HTS, and the 
Lebanese army and Shi‘a neighbors; in Saida, southern Lebanon, with the rise of the 
radical Sunni sheikh, Ahmad al-Assir, who fought Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) (Phillips, 2018, p.159). The notorious sheikh generated its nemesis during 
the early days of the Syrian civil war and accused Hezbollah of butchering brethren 
Sunnis in al-Qusayr, and blamed the LAF for covering for it. After clashes with both 
Hezbollah and the LAF, al-Assir ended a fugitive until his capture while trying to escape 
through the Lebanese airport with a fake passport.286 Assir and his parallels are altogether 
convinced of the virtuous cause they are praising and it is hard to escape the sense of 
Sunni victimhood in Lebanon and in the Levant as well. 
 Above all, there was a regional dimension for sectarianism: The Iran-Saudi Arabia 
rivalry. The distort created by the Uprising in Syria, similarly to other countries such as 
Yemen and Libya, created a vacuum which Iran and Saudi Arabia sought to fill. Abdo 
(2017) argued that Iran and Saudi Arabia both have a sectarian agenda that bolster their 
geopolitical contest (p.13). “The Saudis have made a conscious decision to increase the 
salience of the Sunni-Shi‘a divide since the beginning of the Arab upheavals, to increase 
support for their allies, and to isolate Iran and its allies in the Arab world” (Gregory Gause, 
2011, p.21). Marc Lynch (2013) opined that the “Saudi regime, most obviously, 
systematically uses sectarianism in order to intimidate and control its own Shiite citizens 
at home and to combat Iranian influence regionally. Saudi leaders might or might not 
genuinely hate Shiites, but they know that sectarian conflict is a useful strategy.” 
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However, both countries are to be blamed for exacerbating the Sunni-Shi‘a divide and 
instrumentalizing sectarian identity.. Other regional countries, namely Turkey and Qatar, 
have also played cardinal roles in the sectarianizing the conflict.  
Furthermore, both Sunni- and Shi‘a-sponsored TV channels participated in fueling 
sectarian tensions. For instance, a documentary organized by Kata’ib Abdullah Azzam, 
called “Al-Ta’ifa al-Mazlouma” (The Oppressed Sect), circulated among Sunnis in the 
Arab world and galvanized them (Mohsen, 2017, p.188). Al-Manar, Hezbollah’s channel, 
followed up with the regional conflicts by boosting sect-specific symbols, myths, songs 
working as a machinery of mobilization. Of course, Hezbollah denied these accusations. 
Hezbollah’s minister stressed that they oppose sectarian confrontations even among non-
Muslims and they have always tried to unite Muslims and prevent internal fighting. We, 
he pursued, are eager to protect all Muslims and Arabs, not only Shi‘a, from conspiracies 
and our bolster of Sunni Palestinians offers a damning proof of this policy. But the takfirists 
and our rivals, held grudges against the Shi‘a, so protecting them was our duty.287 This is 
plainly not the case, however. Since its emergence, Hezbollah was built as a sect-centric 
group adopting a sectarian mobilization agenda. Saouli (2019) opined that “by supporting 
Assad and Iran, Hezbollah’s foes reaffirmed their narrative of Hezbollah as a sectarian 
movement that is determined to preserve and deepen Iranian infiltration of the Arab world 
in the hope of creating a Shi‘a or Persian crescent, trying Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus 
and Beirut” (p.196). Thus, Haddad (2020) stressed that “Arab regimes and less charitable 
Arab voices tend to overstate the commonalities between Arab Shi‘a and Iran and to 
exaggerate their potential to act as a vehicle for Iranian penetration of the Arab world” 
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(p.212). In fact, this partnership is mutually beneficial, providing Iran with a regional 
partner/proxy –depending on the arena, but also leveraging Hezbollah on the domestic 
and regional theatres. 
Sect-specific symbols and mottos such as “Oh Hussein” generate further 
antagonism among the opposition which happened to be Sunnis. Dai al Islam al-Shahhal, 
the Lebanese Salafist leader, frequently tweeted that the Shi‘a articulate “Oh Hussein” as 
a prelude to butcher, rape and burn Sunnis (Abdo, 2017, p.65). Such arguments are 
misleading and only serve as a mobilizational tool because Hezbollah was not seeking 
religious or sectarian truth in Syria despite the sectarian mobilization policy it adopted. 
Phillips (2018) emphasized that “it was the regime and the emerging radical Islamists that 
drove the gradual sectarianization of the conflict and Hezbollah helped exacerbate this 
trend once it entered the war” (p.158). Furthermore, the sense of Sunni victimhood 
increased with the establishment of the mostly-Shi‘a al-Hashd al-Sha‘bi or PMF as a 
response to the emergence of ISIS. More to the point, the PMF became “resented by 
Sunnis and just as fiercely defended by many Shi‘a” (Genieve, 2017, p.25). Hezbollah’s 
role in tandem with Iran in Iraq facilitated its demonization in the eyes of the Sunnis across 
the Middle East. Adnan al-Ar‘our, a Syrian Salafist leader, has devoted his TV channel 
called With Syria Until Victory, to pinpoint Hezbollah’s and Iran’s support to Assad’s 
regime against what he described to be Sunni rebels (Abdo, 2017, p.78). 
Further afield, Hezbollah, in tandem with the Quds Force, was eager to thwart any 
attempt by the opposition to attack Shi‘a citizens across Syria. Nowhere was this clearer 
than in the sectarian narrative they used to justify their intervention in order to protect the 
Shi‘a inhabitants in al-Qusayr or Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine, but more importantly, their 
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engagement in Nubbul and al-Zahra’ in Aleppo, Kfarya and al-Fou‘a in Idlib and Busra al-
Sham on the borders between as-Suweida and Dar‘a. How then did they not operate on 
a sectarian-based agenda? Both Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations and private 
universities spokesman argued that they [Hezbollah] feel more comfortable to maneuver 
in Shi‘a areas and they are more accepted within the Shi‘a community than among other 
sects. Our image, they pursued, was harmed by anti-Hezbollah propaganda because they 
labeled us as invaders, especially among Sunnis; however, we fought in many other 
places that are not Shi‘a, such as Lattakia, Idlib and Homs.288 This is plainly not the case, 
however. Hezbollah was unyieldingly determined to protect each and every Shi‘a in Syria. 
A spokesman of the “Lebanese Forces” argued that this is normal because Hezbollah’s 
ideological priority is protecting any Shi‘a entity.289  
In 2015, Hezbollah encircled rebels in al-Zabadani village, in al-Qalamoun, 
starving them and cutting water supplies in order to reach a quid pro quo that would 
guarantee the withdrawal of the Shi‘a citizens from Kfarya and al-Fou‘a.290 Furthermore, 
they fought in Busra al-Sham, a village co-habited by both Sunni and Shi‘a, but retreated 
after few days along with the Shi‘a residents. In a similar manner, during the offensive to 
retake Aleppo in 2015, Hezbollah diverted the direction of the operations from the city up 
to Nubbul and al-Zahra’ which have been surrounded and bombed by jihadist factions for 
more than two years. In these 5 villages, Hezbollah was keen to stand as a bulwark 
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against all attempts to overrun them. Of course, Hezbollah had trained fighters from these 
towns and armed them to fight alongside the SAA and the NDF. Reports have confirmed 
that Hezbollah and Iran were seeking to establish “a second Hezbollah” in Syria.291 By 
other words, they were establishing Shi‘a groups under their leadership. However, 
Mikhael Awad (2017) opined that using a Shi‘a identity was doomed among Syrians 
because of the shared patriotism and the secularity of the community and the elite. 
Further, the Russian intervention appeared as a call to prevent further Iranian involvement 
(p.201). Sharing the same geopolitical agenda with Iran and Hezbollah, Syria’s regime 
was neither part of wilayat al-faqih nor Iran’s subordinate. This imposed a somewhat 
divergence in certain political and sectarian matters.  
From a Salafist point of view, Hezbollah committed atrocities against Sunnis in 
Syria to prevent Assad’s collapse and this was no different than ISIS’ mayhem in Iraq. 
Consequently, Hezbollah was being maligned by calling it Hezb al Shaytan (Party of the 
Devil), instead of Hezbollah (Party of God) (Abdo, 2017, p.69). Abdo (2017) quoted Adnan 
Imama, a Salafist Sheikh in the Beqaa saying that “if a Sunni were committing these 
massacres in Syria, we would call for him to be killed, even if he were killing Alawites, 
Christians, and Shi‘a. We are not against Shi‘a as Shi‘a, we are against political Shi‘ism” 
(p.105). On another side, Nasrallah accused jihadist organizations, which he labeled as 
extremists, for butchering Sunnis as much as Shi‘a offering multiple examples, i.e. the 
invasion of ‘Adra, a town in Rif Dimashk where ISIS slaughtered families in their houses. 
Nasrallah also argued that many Sunnis are fighting in the ranks of the SAA assuming 
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that the conflict is not sectarian.292 Although Nasrallah’s argument is valid and sectarian 
identity is merely a mobilizational tool, paradoxically, Hezbollah’s maneuvers on the 
ground reflected the instrumentalization of Shi‘a sectarian identity.  
For our purposes, where possible Hezbollah had always sought to build alliances 
with Sunni groups to dispel the narrative that labels it a sectarian organization. After the 
2018 parliamentary elections in which Hezbollah and its allies won the majority of seats, 
it insisted on representing its Sunni allies in the cabinet. Nasrallah refused to hand the 
names of the Shi‘a ministers if prime minister Saad Hariri didn’t accept to include Sunni 
minister representing their allies.293 Needless to say that the geopolitical triumph of the 
axis in Syria provided Hezbollah with notable leverage at the negotiation table amplifying 
its clout in Lebanon. Furthermore, from Nasrallah’s point of view confining Hezbollah to 
the Shi‘a and labeling it a sectarian organization is a false premise because it has 
operated and supported over time many Sunni factions, namely Palestinians and 
Bosnians (Abdo, 2017, p.94). Hezbollah’s deputy head of political relations seconded that 
the more Hezbollah focused on a patriotic, Islamic and Arab discourse, the more it gained 
popularity; therefore, it didn’t exploit its sectarian identity but western states worked to 
introduce Hezbollah as a sectarian movement.294 This narrative can hardly convince any 
observer as facts on the ground proved the contrary and Hezbollah would even endure 
without the politicization of its Shi‘a sectarian identity. 
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Saouli (2019) dismissed Hezbollah’s discourse by arguing that its intervention was 
based on sectarian fears (p.189). Armenak Tokmajyan (2014) opined that Hezbollah’s 
sectarian mobilization served its geopolitical interest by safeguarding its strategic route 
that crosses through Damascus. In fact, Nasrallah was deeply interested in de-
sectarianizing the conflict at least in his discourses because any kind of sectarianization 
would undermine Hezbollah’s popularity among the Sunnis. Nasrallah even picked his 
words carefully when addressing Osama Bin Laden in his speeches or al-Qaeda as a 
sign of respect. In parallel, Hezbollah enjoyed a good relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt.295 Nevertheless, his attempts to mend ties with the wider Sunni 
Arabs were a fiasco. This was obvious when Hamas one of its closest Sunni allies, 
distance itself from the axis when the Sunni-Shi‘a discord reached its apogee during 
Syria’s chaotic years. Not only did Hamas remove its offices from Syria which had given 
it refuge for years despite the international pressures on Assad’s regime to expel Hamas 
and its leaders, but it also supported the jihadist anti-Assad groups, namely HTS.  
The climax occurred with the rise of sectarianism and the brutal confrontations. 
“Sectarianism thus has no explanatory power to make sense of the Syrian conflict. It is, 
rather, a political tool that was shaped and fostered by many actors in the conflict” (Pinto, 
2017, p.124).  Bassel F. Salloukh (2017) seconded that “the explosion of sectarianism in 
the Middle East is not a consequence of immutable or timeless religious differences but 
is, rather, driven by the sectarianization of otherwise realist geopolitical battles and the 
consequent post-uprising collapse of state’s coercive, institutional and ideological 
capacities in a number of countries with plural societies” (p.49). The Sunni-Shi‘a schism 
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was exacerbated by both Iran and Saudi Arabia across the region, and “the conflict in 
Syria has become ground zero in the war of position between the two hegemons” (Postel 
& Hashemi, 2017, p.13). “Both sides of the conflict were territorializing religious identities 
and producing a more homogeneous religious landscape, inscribing their sectarian 
dynamic in the social reality through violence, dispossession, and expulsion of parts of 
the local populations” (Pinto, 2-17, p.141). Sectarian dynamics and conflict since 2003 
“has been driven as much by foreign actors as by local protagonists, by victims as by 
perpetrators, by elite instrumentalization as by popular fear and prejudice, and as much 
from above as from below.” (Haddad, 2020, p.220). 
While leaders recognized that this was a political contest using citizens as a tool, 
the masses were conducting a pure sectarian conflict (Fouad Ibrahim, 2018, p.143-144). 
For our purposes, Hezbollah instrumentalized its sectarian identity widening the Sunni-
Shi‘a schism. However, as Lynch (2013) argued, the “Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in recent years 
has very little to do with intrinsic religious differences or with 1400 years of Islamic history”, 
on the contrary, the sectarian cleavages were exploited during the confrontations in the 
Middle East for “cynical purposes.” Doctrinal beliefs do not explain the intervention of 
Hezbollah and are not a causal factor of the conflict. Rather, sectarian identity served as 
a machinery of mobilization for what was in fact a geopolitical confrontation. It was, 
however, a key driver of the civil war. Of course, it is hard to escape the generated 
nemesis among the Sunni community which will hold grudges for the ensuing decades. 
Palpably, the Syrian conflict transitioned Hezbollah into a regional ANSA that played a 
flamboyant role in changing the power balance in the country, in tandem with its allies. 
That said, sectarian identity and mobilization served this transition and further embedded 
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Hezbollah as a partner in the axis that straddles the geopolitical fault-lines in the Middle 
East.  
6.4 The Shift to a Quasi-army 
The deterrence that Hezbollah imposed during the 2006 war against Israel 
established it a significant player in the regional power balance. Accustomed to fight from 
defensive positions in south Lebanon against the IDF where each fighter defends his 
village launching missiles from underground tunnels, Hezbollah’s mission in Syria was 
different: They are now on the offensive fighting Arab opponents who happened to be 
fellow Sunni Muslims. This is imposed a somewhat new tactic where Hezbollah adopted 
large army formations mixed, occasionally with guerilla tactics that depended on smaller 
units with great agility and efficient firepower (al-Hassan, p.139). What is guerilla warfare? 
Omar Ashour described guerrilla warfare as small units involving slight mobile units and 
hit-and-run strikes on security and military targets. The units are lightly armed and avoid 
any prolonged direct confrontation with the incumbent’s forces.296Wherever possible, for 
instance, small top-notch units executed operations behind enemy lines. This merge 
between classical and guerilla warfare tactics shaped Hezbollah as a quasi-army. 
According to a strategic military analyst close to Hezbollah, “they have indeed been 
trained by Iran but they benefited from all military schools, including the Israeli. They know 
how to learn even from their enemies.”297 
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Al-Hassan (2017) argued that Hezbollah had offered in 2006’s war a creative 
example that varied between guerilla and classical warfare: it turned caves into operation 
rooms and underground tunnels to missiles Launchpad, its fighters used the B10 cannon 
on shoulders instead of vehicles and the explosive devices instead of rockets when it was 
a better option while preserving the missile for other confrontations, they used their milieu 
for camouflage and moved on motorcycles between villages and livestock in order to 
transport food and equipment, they knew how to take advantage of unsophisticated 
missiles like, for example, launching the Katyusha on short distances and lower altitudes 
so that it wouldn’t be detected by the Israeli Patriot Defense System and they transformed 
the B-M 21 rocket launcher into one nozzle, the Russian Malotca into mobile launchers 
and the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) into wirily detonated instead of remotely 
(p.181-182). Hezbollah adopted a mix of guerilla tactics with classical army’s weaponry 
such as anti-armor and anti-battleship missiles and was able to hack the Israeli 
communication devices (Al-Hassan, 2017, p.182). In regards to the arsenal, Hezbollah 
has indeed introduced new method to use it but in 2006, it was still fighting in guerilla 
formations, namely small top-notch unit, while in Syria the situation was different as they 
adopted large army formations to breach the fortifications of their opponent.  
  Furthermore, “after Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel, Iran and Syria rearmed 
Hezbollah with vastly expanded and more sophisticated weaponry” (Sullivan, 2014, p.9). 
Hezbollah’s minister considered that it transitioned into a regional ANSA during the 2006 
war, yet, unintentionally. We, he maintained, didn’t want this transition, but when the world 
conspired against us in 2006 in order to annihilate us, the war transformed Hezbollah to 
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a regional power.298 Then, Hezbollah imposed deterrence against Israel but it was still 
confined to the domestic theatre with small proxy roles elsewhere on Iran’s behalf. In a 
comparison between Hezbollah in 2006 and 2017, al-akhbar newspaper pointed to the 
following: First, Hezbollah has mobilized more than tens of thousands of fighters and 
became more embedded within Lebanon’s society. Second, Hezbollah has now more 
than 150.000 missiles instead of the 12.000 it possessed in 2006. Third, it possesses 
precision missiles with longer ranges and larger impact. Fourth, Hezbollah’s fighters have 
gained more experience during their engagement in Syria’s conflict and became “a 
professional army”. Fifth, it is present with much more regional influence clout.299  
Al-Hassan (2017) opined that Hezbollah developed its tactics and structures during 
Syria’s cataclysm. It used a combination of guerilla-classical warfare tactics: it upgraded 
its formations to a quasi-army which gave it leverage ahead of offensives to recapture 
large cities and towns, on one hand, while it preserved guerilla tactics for its efficiency in 
the battlefield, on the other. The new formations included: infantry, artillery, rockets, 
drones, armored, commandos that are organized, well-trained and malleable with all sorts 
of firepower, supply lines, logistical assistance and quick actions, and can fight with both 
guerilla and classical styles and tactics (Al-Hassan p.198). “Hezbollah’s training since 
2006 focused on developing urban warfare skills. Some of these training courses were 
held in Iran, where they were conducted in mock cities.” Shortly after Hezbollah’s first 
battle in al-Qusayr, its “fighters told journalists that they were able to implement these 
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new practices” (Sullivan,2014, p16). Nicholas Blanford seconded that “since 2006, 
Hezbollah fighters have trained in Lebanon and Iran in tactics of both offensive and 
defensive urban warfare.”300 Sullivan (2014) argued that Hezbollah’s urban warfare 
tactics were efficient as they “used snipers, RPG-7s, and improvised rocket-assisted 
munitions (IRAMs) made from 107mm Katyusha rockets and other explosives. IRAMS, 
which are essentially rocket-propelled IEDs, were first used by Iranian-backed Shi‘a 
militants against US forces in Iraq” (p.16). 
Hezbollah’s pre-2011 arsenal contained:  
- SCOD D-Y missiles, caliber: 880, range: 700 km 
- Katyusha missiles (BM-21, BM-27): ranging from 12 to 22 kilometers. 
- Fajr (Dawn) missiles: it is an improved generation of Katyusha by Iran that reaches 
between 25 and 75 kilometers. 
- Raad (Thunder) missiles: Iranian similar to its Chinese counterparts that reaches 75 
kilometers. 
- Zelzal (Earthquake) missiles: Iranian that ranges between 150 and 200 kilometers. 
- Anti-battleships missiles: Chinise Land-to-sea C802 missiles that reaches 100 
kilometers. 
- Anti-battleships missiles: “Yakhont” missiles, and SA14, SA22 and Patetsear S1. 
- Anti-aircraft missiles: land-to-air directed missiles, similar to the SAM 7 but shorter and 
lighter and can be launched on the shoulder. 
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- Anti-armor missiles: Russian made Spigot AT4 and Soggost AT3 and the western 
fabricated Tow. 
- Anti-tank missiles: directed Cornett Sager (ATGM) 
anti-aircraft defenses 
- Drones: Iranian from the category “Mouhajer” (migrating) called “Mersad”; It has 3 
cameras, one radar and an electronic system, and can fly up to 6000 feet with a maximum 
speed of 120 kilometers (al-Hassan, 2017, p.132-133).  
Israeli sources opined that Hezbollah possess hundreds of drones, and some are loaded 
with explosives to attack Israeli targets.301 
-Khaibar-1; caliber: 302 that range 100 km.  
-Fateh-110: short range ballistic missiles; caliber: 600, range: 250 km.  
-The Russian Yakhont missile, caliber: 700, range: 120-300 km.  
Reports suggested that Hezbollah can now launch 1500 missiles a day in case a war 
erupted with Israel.302 Further afield, its armored regiment possesses: 
-Tanks: T-54, T-55 and T-72. 
-Automatic guided rockets Launchpad. 
-M113 APCs with 14,5 mm machine guns. 
-ZSU-57-2 SPAA, SA- 6 Gainful (251 Gvozdika) KS-12 85 mm Gun useful as fire support 
against land target. 
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-“Kornet” ATGMs mounted on Quadricycles that can fight any modern tank.303 
During Syria’s tumultuous conflict, Hezbollah witnessed deep structural changes: 
It edged the strength of an army and its force is estimated to be 20000 strong while it was 
5000 in 2006. In fact, if anything, Hezbollah is known for being reticent to reveal any 
information so these numbers are approximate. Its infantry forces transformed to a small 
army with new tactics and sophistications. In the pre-2011 era, the observation and 
discovery ahead of each operation used to take longer, but with the insertion of the drones 
during Syria’s civil war, the completion of these missions became faster. In parallel, the 
military formations altered in a way that each unit possesses all kinds of specializations 
which accelerates the pace of any operation. That said, Hezbollah’s units now work within 
the following process: first, they gather the information needed using drones; second, 
they divide the offensive into two steps: Launching missile salvos and rockets against 
rebel areas which has become a prerequisite ahead of each foray, then comes the 
exhaustion of the rivals’ human capabilities without any direct combat followed by 
confrontations micromanaged through operation rooms; third, its top-notch unit, al-
Rodwan – named after the acronym of its late military leader Imad Moughniyeh– enters 
the battle to conduct face-to-face clashes while leaving a safe passage for the opponents 
to withdraw (al-Hassan, 2017, p.137).   
 Of course, Hezbollah was not the reason behind the regime’s survival, but it was 
one of an array of actors which helped turn the tide of the war in the regime’s favor. As a 
matter of fact, the SAA and other Syrian pro-regime forces, namely the NDF, lost more 
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fighters than Hezbollah and the Russian intervention was even more eloquent than that 
of Hezbollah. But for our purposes, by and large, Hezbollah’s early engagement in a zero-
sum conflict starting from al-Qusayr on the Lebanese-Syrian border, through inland Syria, 
all the way down to Quneitra in the south and up to Deir ez-Zor in the northeast, was 
unyieldingly determined to prevent regime’s breakdown. In al-Qusayr, Mohsen (2017) 
argued, Hezbollah succeeded by raining the city with barrages of airstrikes and rockets 
as a prelude for its ground offensive (p.93). Its fighters had launched 132 mm Katyusha 
rockets, 57 mm cannons, 12,5 and 23 mm anti-aircraft heavy weapons to cover their 
ground advance (Mohsen, 2017, p.91-92). Christopher Phillips (2018) argued that “given 
Hezbollah’s reputation as the most impressive military force in the Arab world, this sapped 
rebel morale and boosted the regime” (p.158).  
The strategic military analyst who’s close to Hezbollah argued that the latter 
adopted the “carpet bombing policy” that aimed to destroy everything. Hezbollah, he 
pursued, enjoyed an unlimited support that no other ANSA ever did in regards to the 
ammo they received and the ammunition their fighters were allowed to use giving them 
intensive firepower.304 In fact, Syria and Iran were pouring ammos of all kinds: from small 
and medium to large weapons, to missiles and rockets. This abundant arsenal leveraged 
Hezbollah curtailing the chance of succeeding for their foes. Mikhael Awad (2017) opined 
that the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah military cooperation on the ground constituted a vital shift in 
managing the current war and the future conflicts that might take place. Hezbollah’s 
military competence and field coordination had increased with Russia’s intervention which 
introduced new technological, sophisticated and strategical arms. The efficiency of 
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Hezbollah’s fighters on a personal and group level increased because of the experience 
it gained throughout daily confrontations (Awad, 2017, p.200). For instance, al-Hassan 
(2017) emphasized that “al-Radwan” unit – named after the alias of Hezbollah’s late 
leader Imad Moughniyeh– fought side by side with the Unit 810 of the Russian Naval 
Infantry in many battles (p.138). The point to make here is that Hezbollah can now count 
on a new generation of experienced fighters that continued to rise unabated proving its 
credentials in Syria.  
“The conflict in Syria has affected Hezbollah’s military arm positively and 
negatively. Hezbollah fighters are gaining valuable combat experience in Syria. They 
have employed the tactics that they have trained on over the past few years with an eye 
towards the next conflict with Israel. Hezbollah now has a cadre of fighters that has 
experience conducting offensive operations in urban environments. And the rotation of 
fighters into Syria has given its newer recruits or reservists experience on the battlefield. 
Moreover, Hezbollah units have also gained experience coordinating with allied forces in 
combat, as well as logistical sustainment over longer periods. Another military drawback 
of the fighting in Syria is the casualties sustained on the battlefield. The group has lost 
hundreds of its elite fighters over the last year, with many more likely wounded. 
Hezbollah’s killed in Syria have included veteran military commanders. A number of these 
individuals had fought against Israeli troops during the 1980s and 1990s, and brought 
years of combat experience to conflict in Syria” (Sullivan, 2014, p.26). It has now units 
that can operate in all environments: inhabited, mountainous, maritime and deserted; and 
can also organize drills containing 3000 to 5000 strong (al-Hassan, 2017, p.131). This is 
considered a huge number for orthodox ANSAs which had always operated clandestinely 
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and in small numbers. During Syria’s turmoil, Hezbollah had lost 1650 fighters,305 
including many leaders. However, it built a new generation of experienced fighters who 
will serve within its ranks for years to come.  
“In November 2016, Hezbollah published a military parade, including convoy of 
tanks, that it organized in the Syrian town of Qusayr. It was not clear whether the parade 
aimed to flex Hezbollah’s muscles, presumably to deter enemies, or whether it was a sign 
of developing hubris” (Saouli, 2019, p.201). Most obviously, the tilt of Hezbollah into a 
quasi-army, al-Mayadeen channel reporter stressed, overlapped with the peak of 
ideologies as Hezbollah proved its determination to preserve the agenda of the axis at 
the expense of Lebanon’s best interest. Further afield, as a close observer of their forays, 
he argued that its units showed a high level of discipline obeying military orders without 
budging an inch.306 That said, where possible, Hezbollah still adopted guerilla tactics by 
infiltrating small top-notch units behind enemy lines, but generally, it used large army 
formations to capture large cities such as al-Qusayr. To close, Hezbollah became a quasi-
army mixing between classical and guerilla warfare tactics and formations. More to the 
point, this tilt was one among three variables that transitioned Hezbollah into a regional 
ANSA and a key player in the regional order.  
6.5 From Beirut to Tehran: Partners in the axis 
A key variable that transitioned Hezbollah into a regional ANSA was its further 
embed in the axis as a partner and decision-maker. From ground offensives to the 
leadership level, via operation rooms, Hezbollah participated in the decision-making 
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process and became a central partner in the axis that now extends from Beirut to Tehran, 
via Damascus and Baghdad, and Yemen to certain extent. It should be stated here that 
one should not mischaracterize the partners within the axis. To illustrate, Hezbollah and 
Iraqi Shi‘a groups are Iran’s ideological replicas and abide by the rule of the Jurisprudent. 
Syria’s regime, however, often described as “Alawite regime”, (Haddad, 2020, p.26) 
shared the same geopolitical agenda, yet not totally, with Iran and its ideological replicas. 
By other words, there are points of conflict within the axis despite the partnership they 
shared that was always confined to the political level.  
Bringing the discussion back to Hezbollah, the latter, with Iran’s approval and 
assistance, rushed to prevent regime’s breakdown. Concerns about blowbacks had 
Assad been removed highlighted the importance of the intervention. It was not possible 
for Hezbollah to lose a strategic ally and therefore giving its opponents the opportunity to 
encircle it by interrupting its arms supply from Iran en route to Beirut. Aware of these facts, 
Hezbollah had to intervene and there was no need for Iran to issue an order. Needless to 
say that during Syria’s civil war it became clear that the relationship between Iran and 
Hezbollah is not that of a senior–subordinate. A spokesman of the Lebanese Forces, an 
anti-Hezbollah far right Christian party, dismissed the narrative that accuses Hezbollah of 
taking orders from Iran.307 Similarly a Shi‘a pro-Saudi journalist close to Hariri emphasized 
that Hezbollah neither receive orders from Iran nor is its puppet, rather it is organically 
part of Iran. Hezbollah is a Lebanese/Iranian hybrid organization: It is part of the Lebanese 
society and part of the Iranian military apparatus. More importantly, Nasrallah is a 
decision-maker in the axis and one of the most prominent leaders, similarly to Qasem 
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Suleimani, head of the Quds Force, who was killed by a US airstrike in January 2020.308 
For our purposes, coming from Hezbollah’s rivals, these arguments are so significant that 
they confirm Hezbollah’s partnership in the axis and its participation in the decision-
making process.  
Adham Saouli (2019) argued that “Hezbollah’s growth, development and major 
role in driving Western and Israeli presence in Lebanon did not only realize Hezbollah’s 
goals, but also were integral to Iran’s strategy in the region. Hezbollah, thus, reflects Iran’s 
military and political reach in the Levant, one that is only located on the Lebanese-Israeli 
border, but is, as we shall see, crucial for the survival of the Syrian regime. Therefore, the 
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah has with time developed into one of 
interdependence” (p.150). Sam Dagher (2019) emphasized that decisions were taken by 
hard-liners operating under Assad in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah and then 
passed to field commanders for execution. “Iran and Hezbollah”, he stressed, “weighed 
on key decisions, since both had direct lines to Bashar and his tight circle” (Dagher, 2019, 
p.289). Choukair (2016) opined that despite Hezbollah’s justification for its early 
engagement, it has indeed become a partner with Assad’s regime, Iran, Iraq, and Russia 
to certain extent (p.5). Russia’s stance had been previously unpacked, but suffice it to 
say here that Hezbollah is far from becoming a partner with Russia. The latter enjoys a 
much better relationship with Israel than with Tehran and Hezbollah. It’s a matter of 
interest, in fact. Assad, though, vowed that the political, financial and military support of 
his allies –Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, provided momentum and lessened the casualties 
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in the battlefield.309 This is true from Assad’s point of view as all these actors participated 
in keeping him in power, along with, of course, the SAA and other pro-regime factions. 
To illustrate, a set of events produced Hezbollah as a partner in the axis. In 2017, 
Hezbollah, along with the SAA and other allied forces entered Deir ez-Zor, northeastern 
Syria, breaking a siege that was imposed by ISIS against their comrades at the airport. 
What was abnormal was that, despite being known for being reticent to appear before 
cameras, a Hezbollah military commander stated through live streaming on al-Mayadeen 
channel: We are not hiding, we are fighting all over Syria and Hezbollah is a partner in 
this axis that includes Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.310 Speaking as far as Deir 
ez-Zor, Hezbollah’s military commander was trusted to speak for the axis, a job usually 
assigned to Syrian soldiers. However, this was a geostrategic message to all forces who 
were fighting in Syria, including the US who was closing up on northeastern Syria along 
with the Kurds. Furthermore, he did not refer to Russia which brings us back to the 
previously mentioned argument about the latter’s distancing from Hezbollah and Iran at 
some point. More obviously, this alliance was underscored by Bashar al-Assad who –
speaking about Iran and Hezbollah, stressed that “we are certain that our battle, along 
with our allies, is the frontline for all actors within the axis of resistance.”311 Saouli (2019) 
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argued that “Hezbollah’s allies hailed the strategic depth that now tied all members of the 
resistance alliance” (p.200). During the war, “Iran arranged for other foreign Shi‘a militants 
to fight for the regime, mostly Iraqi militia until 2014 and from as far as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan after Iraqis returned home to fight ISIS” (Phillips, 2018, p.150). The harder the 
geopolitical contest, the more relevant sectarian and political mobilization and, hence, the 
closer the actors within the axis had become. 
Most obviously, Nasrallah spoke on behalf of the axis threatening Israel: The Israeli 
enemy must know that if a war is launched against Syria or Lebanon, it is not guaranteed 
that the fighting will remain Lebanese-Israeli or Syrian-Israeli, rather, this could open the 
path for thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fighters, from all over the Arab and 
Islamic world to engage: stretching from Iraq, to Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.312 Few days after this speech, Qais Khaz‘ali, secretary general of the Iraqi 
‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq who fought in Syria, strolled near the Lebanese-Israeli border wearing 
a military uniform. Khaz‘ali emphasized that his visit was a message for Israel not for the 
Lebanese people.313 As obvious as it looks, Khaz‘ali’s appearance was to approve 
Nasrallah’s discourse. The facts stated above, ensured Hezbollah’s central partnership 
in the axis.  
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More broadly, the axis has now the ability to garner hundreds of thousands of 
fighters, mostly Shi‘a controlled by Iran, except for those fighting under the command of 
the Assad regime, in case of conflict. Through this chain of proxies/partners Tehran can 
threaten Israel and use this card as leverage on the negotiation table. Generally speaking, 
the spokesman of the Lebanese Forces party argued that Hezbollah takes its decisions 
based on the interest and agenda of the whole axis.314 To further illustrate, all groups 
which have sworn allegiance to the wilayat al-faqih do not need daily guidance by Iran’s 
leadership because they are central to this partnership. One Hezbollah combatant has 
best put it: “We abide by the instructions of the Sayyed Khamenei [Iran’s Supreme Leader] 
and Sayyed Hassan [Nasrallah]. We fight wherever they ask us to, be it against Israel, in 
Syria or even in Honolulu. It is true that we fought in Sayyida Zeinab to protect our sacred 
shrine, but here [in al-Qusayr], they cut the route of our sacred weapons” (Mohsen, 2017, 
p.105). The point to make here is that the loyalty of the fighters within the axis is 
unquestionable and becomes blind at some point. 
After all, “the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah trilateral partnership has been decades 
in the making. It pre-dates the Syrian civil war, has strengthened as a result of the war 
and will likely endure in the post-war years.”315 Hezbollah has proven during the Syrian 
havoc that it is a partner in the axis rather than an appendage. This was reflected in the 
military triumphs which further embedded Hezbollah in the axis and its increased its 
participation in the decision-making process that stretched from ground offensives to 
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operation rooms all the way up to the leadership. That said, Hezbollah’s partnership was 
key to its transition into a regional ANSA eyeing to play a prominent role in the puzzle of 
the regional order. 
6.6 Conclusion 
When Syria’s civil war erupted, “outside powers entered the conflict; atrocities 
proliferated as survivors sheltered in ethnic and sectarian enclaves” (Kissinger, 2014, 
p.126). After six years of confrontations, there is too great distance between Hezbollah in 
the pre- and post-civil war environment. The Syrian conflict was a double-edged sword, 
maximizing Hezbollah’s triumphs, but also fomented further animosity that can re-surface 
in the future. However, its engagement in the conflict was a necessity driven by 
geopolitical calculations as it fought “what it perceived to be an existential war next 
door.”316 Hezbollah pedaled ahead slowly. First, it adopted a sectarian mobilization 
agenda to justify its engagement in order to protect Shi‘a villages on the Lebanese-Syrian 
border and Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine in Damascus’s suburbs. It later moved away from 
this argument focusing further on the narrative of a pre-emptive war against “takfirists” in 
order to avoid falling for the likes of ISIS and facing the same fate of the suffering Iraqi 
people (Tokmajyan, 2014). 
Salloukh (2017) explained that by its intervention in Syria to protect its strategic and 
geopolitical interest and that of Iran, Hezbollah risked increasing the Sunni-Shi‘a schism 
in the Middle East (p.230). In fact, as this chapter examined, sectarian power relations 
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were key in the conflict, yet, not the primary driver and are not causal factors. Rather, it 
was a geopolitical contest in which almost every actor played the sectarian card as a 
mobilizational tool. Sectarian identity being the primary driver of certain confrontations 
remains the exception. ISIS, for instance, was indeed driven by doctrinal beliefs but this 
is not the norm. That said, this chapter opened by unpacking the reasons behind 
Hezbollah’s engagement in what was a war of necessity before examining the sectarian 
mobilization policy and the instrumentalization of sectarian identity that Hezbollah 
adopted. The chapter then moved to survey the transition of Hezbollah into a quasi-army 
mixing between guerilla and classical warfare tactics and formations and how Hezbollah 
became further embedded as a partner and decision-maker in the axis, along with Iran 
and Hezbollah.  
To conclude, these variables altogether have transitioned Hezbollah into a regional 
ANSA straddling the fault-lines of the Middle East. Brian Katz (2019) argued that both, 
Nasrallah and Secretary of State Pompeo, agreed on the fact that “Hezbollah was 
growing more powerful” stating that Hezbollah’s experience on the frontlines, namely in 
Syria, shifted the organization into a regional player.317 This transition was not a grandiose 
plan that Hezbollah was planning to implement. Rather, Syria’s civil war and the regional 
geopolitical contest was the conduit of this tilt. As Hezbollah’s minister stated: “Fighting 
for us [Hezbollah], is not a hobby that we do in our free time. We fight for political purposes 
and for the righteous causes of our countries. We didn’t spark any war, we only defended 
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ourselves.”318 In fact, it doesn’t matter who started the war, what matters is that Hezbollah, 
maligned by its rivals and praised by its supporters, gained the attributes of a regional 
ANSA playing a key role in altering the regional power balance. Now that Hezbollah 
reached its apogee regionally and domestically, the true question remains: What comes 
next? 
7 The Heyday: What Next? 
Even the most prominent and optimistic scholars haven’t expected the eruption of 
the contagious Arab Uprisings. However, a common feeling emerged at the outset hoping 
to achieve economic prosperity and end authoritarianism paving the way for democracy 
in the Middle East and North Africa. This was not the case, however. The more the 
Uprisings spread, the more conflicts mounted and mayhem engulfed the region and 
hence, the less optimism became. Facts on the ground, ranging from ethnic and sectarian 
splits, to regimes’ security and regional geopolitical contest, stood as bulwarks against 
the changes that the Arab Uprisings were expected to bring. More importantly, for our 
purposes, “the rise of armed, sectarian, local or transnational non-state actors is one of 
the main consequences of geopolitical contests unleashed after the popular Uprisings” 
(Bassel F. Salloukh, 2019).319 William Burns (2019) stressed that “non-state actors – from 
the benign, like the Gates Foundation, to the malign, like al-Qaeda – have steadily eroded 
what was once the near monopoly of power enjoyed by states and government” (p.12). 
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This thesis, however, examined one among an array of ANSAs in the Middle East: 
Hezbollah. 
Henry Kissinger (2014) opined “radical groups promised to replace the existing 
system in the Middle East with a religiously based Middle East order reflecting two distinct 
universalist approaches to world order: the Sunni version by way of the regionally 
extensive Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1928, Hamas, the radical movement that 
gained power in Gaza in 2007, and the global terrorist movement al-Qaeda; and the Shi‘a 
version through the Khomeini revolution and its offshoot, the Lebanese “state within a 
state” Hezbollah. In violent conflict with each other, they were united in their commitment 
to dismantle the existing regional order and rebuild it a divinely inspired system” (p.117). 
This is plainly not the case, however. In Iraq, for instance, it was the US that disrupted 
the regional order and these groups competed to fill the vacuum in the post-Saddam 
environment. Hezbollah, acting as proxy for Iran in the Iraqi theatre of operations, helped 
it implement its regional agenda. More to the point, this thesis was concerned with 
researching Hezbollah’s operations in multiple theatres: Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and 
Iraq, but the main focus was on Syria. 
The overarching aim was to understand the transition of Hezbollah into a regional 
ANSA. Over time, “Hezbollah has transformed itself from a little-known, secretive 
apparatus founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards into one of the most powerful non-
state domestic actors in Lebanon and a major player in the regional politics” (Shoghig 
Mikaelian & Bassel Salloukh, 2015). However, Hezbollah’s deputy head of political 
relations commented that the transition was not tangible on the inside because most of 
the organization’s personnel are generally focused on domestic politics while the regional 
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portfolio is confined to the leadership. Nevertheless, he contradicted himself when he 
mentioned that from the outset, an internal discussion vis-à-vis the name of the 
organization had taken place of whether it should be called Hezbollah or the Umma of 
Hezbollah (The Nation of Hezbollah). We [Hezbollah] consider ourselves the party of the 
Umma but this frightens many Lebanese so we preferred to stick to Hezbollah.320 The 
point to note here is that despite Hezbollah’s focus to increase its domestic influence, it 
was never confined to the Lebanese theatre and considers itself part of a larger Islamic 
nation guided by al-waliyy al-faqih or Guardian of the Jurisprudence.  
Having said that, we bring the discussion back to the transition of Hezbollah into a 
regional ANSA which wouldn’t have been feasible without its engagement in Syria’s 
conflict. “Without the ability to operate within Syria, Iranian support to Hezbollah becomes 
much more difficult and risks interdiction. And Hezbollah’s own military capabilities and 
readiness would suffer without access to this military and financial assistance.” (Sullivan, 
2014, p.9-10). Therefore, Iran insisted on keeping Assad in power and keeping the 
overland route open from Tehran to Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad.321 Henceforth, 
bit by bit, “Hezbollah became a vital component of Assad’s forces and greatly shaped the 
conflict” (Phillips, 2018, 158). This thesis emphasized that Hezbollah, the Quds Force, 
Iraq Shi‘a groups and the SAA have become more experienced not only in joint training 
and planning, but have also learned how to better operate alongside each other. The 
conflict in Syria, which began as a major test for the axis, has, in fact, made it a more 
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integrated and capable fighting force. The ability of the axis forces to deploy troops across 
borders in order to conduct sustained operations in varied terrain has given Iran and its 
allies a vital instrument to advance their interests. It is for this reason that Hezbollah’s role 
in Syria is such an important development and one that is no doubt alarming for 
Hezbollah’s and Iran’s regional rivals (Sullivan, 2014, p.26). In regards to the losses, 
many elite fighters and commanders were killed in battle, but from Hezbollah’s point of 
view, the need to prevail in such a zero-sum conflict was more fundamental than any 
other damage. 
The thesis unpacked Hezbollah’s role in deepening the Sunni-Shi‘a schism. 
However, it was made clear in chapter 5 and 6 that sectarian mobilization and the 
instrumentalization of sectarian identity were merely a mobilizational tool that Hezbollah 
used to justify its intervention in what was in fact a geopolitical confrontation to prevent 
tilting the power balance in its rivals’ favor.  Kissinger (2014), for instance, argued that 
with Syria’s uprising, “age-old tensions broke out to reawaken the millennial conflict 
between Shi‘a and Sunni” (p.126). Sectarian violence, however, was an outcome rather 
than primary driver. As should be clear by now, Sunni-Shi‘a animosity does not explain 
the causal factors of the conflict. Rather, the sectarian card was deployed by most actors 
operating in Syria for their own interest for what was in fact a political contest. Phillips 
(2018) opined that “for Hezbollah, increased involvement came at a cost, albeit 
manageable one. Regionally, its popular reputation among Sunnis was shattered. A 
symptom of this was the strain place on its relationship with Hamas. Domestically, a series 
of attacks on Shi‘a areas by Sunni radical groups occurred in 2013 and early 2014, the 
first within a month of Hezbollah’s open declaration of its Syria operations” (p.159).  
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Further afield, “Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria formed an opportunity for 
its regional foes to delegitimize and fight the Shi‘a movement” (Saouli, 2019, p.198). 
Hamid Dabashi (2016) emphasized that both Iran and Saudi Arabia are 
counterrevolutionary regimes that inflamed Sunni-Shi‘a tensions in the region (p.199-
200), and Hezbollah, as this thesis deliberately explained, was part of this overlapping 
sectarian and political confrontation. To dispel the false argument of casual observers 
and prominent scholars, such as Genieve Abdo (2017) who maintained that “one of the 
many reasons sectarianism is so intractable and will, unfortunately, plague the Middle 
East for years to come, is that all players in the violent conflict claim to have a monopoly 
of religious truth” (p.1), this thesis unpacked Hezbollah’s instrumentalization of its Shi‘a 
sectarian identity to justify its engagement for what was rather a zero-sum geopolitical 
contest. In fact, “there is no end to the story of sectarianism in the modern Middle East” 
(Ussama Makdisi, 2017, p.34). Sectarian and ethnic identities can never fade because 
these are cultural and historical identities that are protected, shaped and reshaped by 
institutions, rituals and habits. What can alter, however, are the boundaries and the 
politicization or militarization of these identities (Faleh abd al-Jabbar, 2018, p.52). Fouad 
Ibrahim (2018) emphasized that while leaders recognized that this was a political contest 
using citizens as a tool, the masses were conducting a pure sectarian conflict (p.143-
144). 
Furthermore, there were conflictual points of view within Hezbollah on the matter 
of the Sunni-Shi‘a divide and the shape of the should-be relationship with Saudi Arabia. 
Hezbollah’s private universities spokesman stressed that they will always seek to mend 
ties with their Sunni counterparts and although Saudi Arabia is their political rival, he does 
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not expect to fight them in the future; even internally, a direct confrontation with Saudi 
Arabia was never mentioned.322 Similarly Hezbollah’s minister argued that they support 
a Saudi-Iranian reconciliation and restoring ties will mirror positive regional results. 323 
However, when asked if Hezbollah might fight against Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah’s deputy 
head of political relations rhetorically answered: “Who said that if a battle erupted in Saudi 
Arabia our intervention is needed?”324 By other words, it seemed that Iran and Hezbollah 
had already mobilized Shi‘a groups inside Saudi Arabia and maybe in the countries that 
converge with it, such as Iraq, to engage in a would-be devastating conflict. On the 
contrary,  
In 2018, with the de-escalation of the Syrian civil war and the unfolding political 
prevail in Lebanon, chiefly represented in the win in the ballot box, Hezbollah emerged 
victorious. This thesis attempted to put forth the three variables that helped Hezbollah 
transition into a regional ANSA during what was somewhat a war of necessity: its embed 
as a partner within the axis that extends from Beirut to Tehran via Damascus and 
Baghdad, the instrumentalization of its Shi‘a sectarian identity and the transition into a 
quasi-army. The year 2018 provided a set of conditions, surely impossible to reproduce, 
that allowed Hezbollah to blossom regionally and domestically. Of course, after every rise 
there’s a chute. This brings us to a main question: Will Hezbollah’ rise be its demise? 
There is definitely no answer for this query but it is hard to escape the sense that it will 
not play in the future such regional roles in the same scale as it did in Syria. In 2019, 
tensions mounted between Iran and the US as the latter’s president, Donald Trump, was 
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pressuring Tehran in order to reach a new bargain. Lebanon, Hezbollah’s habitat, is 
undergoing an economic crisis as part of the US pressure to force Hezbollah and Iran to 
yield. Moreover, Israel was targeting Iranian warehouses in Syria and weapons en route 
to Beirut, with Russia turning a blind eye to these attacks. It is clear that pressure is 
mounting against Hezbollah but its culminations are yet to be defined. Hezbollah’s 
maneuvers in the future are bound to the increase and decrease of the geopolitical 
contestation in the Middle East and the seismic shifts amid a changing regional order. In 
regards to its future roles, Hezbollah’s minister opined that after thwarting the conspiracy 
in Syria all what Hezbollah wants is to come back to Lebanon and diverge its focus on 
confronting Israel.325 This, however, did not seem the case and in the post-2018 era 
Hezbollah and Iran were struggling to preserve leverage in Damascus. To be sure, a 
regional consensus spearheaded by Iran and Saudi Arabia can ease bickering in the 
Middle East but this is not in the US best interest because managing the conflict can 
achieve more benefits for Washington than a full-scale agreement. 
To conclude, this thesis contributed to the following literature: First, groups and 
organizations can undergo transitional periods and Hezbollah is not an exception in this 
sense. Second, ANSAs are playing prominent roles in the Middle East order, in some 
cases, greater than the role of states and therefore more attention should be given to 
these actors. Where possible, ANSAs are bound to participate in changing the power 
balance in the region and contribute to the regional order. A balance of power, Kissinger 
(2014) emphasized, “needs to be recalibrated from time to time” (p.31). “The balance of 
power can be challenged when a heretofore secondary state seeks to enter the ranks of 
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the major powers and sets of a series of compensating adjustments by the other powers 
until a new equilibrium is established or a general conflagration takes place” (Kissinger, 
2014, p.33). Taking this into consideration, not only the rise of sectarianism has no clear 
end in the 21st century but also chaos in the Middle East has no endgame. Moreover, “if 
order cannot be established, vast areas risk being opened to anarchy and to forms of 
extremism that will spread organically into other regions.” (Kissinger, 2014, p.145). “The 
Middle East has a distinct history, culture, and geopolitical logic, with local powers locked 
in an eternally shifting great game. Too weak to avoid temporary domination by outsiders, 
they are nevertheless strong enough to resist full absorption. As a result, grand schemes 
for regional order inevitably go up in smoke, the exasperated foreigners eventually leave, 
and the game continues.”326 That said, Hezbollah is not a foreign power and its 
annihilation is palpably the hardest milestone for its regional and international foes and, 
therefore, it is likely to endure. 
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